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"I dined with Dr Gale at St Paul's school, where I saw many curious things, but more ancient Roman M.SS. especially the Roman Liber Pontificalis, with many rare Saxon writings, &c. very accurately."

Signed Isaac Newton.

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TRINITY OF PLATO AND OF PHILO JUDÆUS, AND OF THE EFFECTS, WHICH AN ATTACHMENT TO THEIR WRITINGS HAD UPON THE PRINCIPLES AND REASONINGS OF THE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

By CÆSAR MORGAN, D.D.
CHAPLAIN TO THE LORD BISHOP OF ELY.

Βελτιον ισως επισκεψασθαι, και διαπορησαι, ωως λεγεται, καιπερ ωροσαντες της τοιαυτης γενομενης ζητησεως, δια το φιλους ανδρας εισαγαγειν τα ειδη. δοξειε δ'αν ισως βελτιον ειναι, και δειν επι σωτηρια γε της αληθειας, και τα οικεια αναιρειν, αλλως τε και φιλοσοφους οντας· αμφοιν γαρ οντοιν φιλοιν, οσιον ωρωτιμαν την αληθειαν.

Arist. De Mor. L. I. C. IV.

LONDON:
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1795.

TO

THE HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND

JAMES,

LORD BISHOP OF ELY.

My Lord,

THE work, which I have now the honour of addreſſing to your Lordſhip, though begun, and in a great meaſure executed, under the preſſure of bodily infirmity and amidſt numerous daily avocations, has been often carefully reviewed by me at leiſure. For this leiſure, I am proud thus publicly to acknowledge, that I am indebted ſolely to your Lordſhip's unſolicited patronage. It has been ſometimes a ſubject of debate among nice obſervers of human nature, whether a relaxation from buſineſs and an encreaſe of income bring with them thoſe means of real enjoyment, which men fondly expect from them.

SEP 22 1960

But

But of this there can be no doubt, that it is a great conſolation to the weary ſpirit not to be obliged to toil, when the ſtrength faileth. Whatever, therefore, ſhall be my future deſignation in this life;

Seu me tranquilla ſenectus
Expectat; ſeu mors atris circumvolat alis;
Dives, inops, Romæ, ſeu fors ita juſſerit, exul;
Quiſquis erit vitæ color;

As long as I ſupport this "frail and feveriſh being;" I ſhall ever retain the warmeſt ſenſe of the favours conferred upon,

MY LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP'S

Moſt grateful and devoted

Servant and Chaplain,

CÆSAR MORGAN.

AN

INVESTIGATION, &c.

INTRODUCTION.

ALL the works of God are wonderful in their kind, and diſplay, in either a minute or ſtupendous manner, the wiſdom and benevolence of the Creator. Philoſophy, in it's ſeveral branches, initiates men into the great myſteries of the creation, and, by unfolding the principles upon which it was at firſt conducted, and is ſtill ſupported, leads us to admire, to reverence, and adore the author of all things. It is for this reaſon the

moſt valuable gift, that by the ordinary courſe of nature has been beſtowed upon man.

There is nothing in the whole order of exiſtence upon which the ſupreme Being has not impreſſed unequivocal marks of himſelf; and therefore nothing in nature is ſo inſignificant, or ſo far removed from us (provided it can be ſubjected to the notice of our underſtanding or our ſenſes) that the contemplation of it will not be highly gratifying to a rational mind, and uſeful for ſome of the various purpoſes of human life. But, as intellectual and moral beings aſſert an undiſputed claim to the firſt place in the ſcale of nature, and approach neareſt in rank and excellence to the Deity; the contemplation of the mind itſelf, the ſource of that diſtinction and ſuperiority over other leſs favoured animals of it's powers and defects, and of the beſt methods of extending the one and correcting the other, muſt be the moſt noble, the moſt exalted, and at the ſame time the moſt uſeful exerciſe of the human intellect.

On this account I have ever ſet a high value upon a knowledge of Pagan antiquity, particularly upon an acquaintance with the writings of the philoſophers of ancient Greece.

In

In them we ſee the human underſtanding in it's natural and unaſſiſted ſtate, putting forth it's moſt vigorous and beſt directed exertions in the purſuit of truth; and we may thence learn to ſet a juſt value upon that communication of wiſdom, ſo pure, ſo ſimple, and ſo unadorned, which is tendered to us in the Goſpel of Chriſt.

But, beſides this general advantage, which attends the ſtudy of all the philoſophic writings of ancient Greece, that have eſcaped the wreck of time; the writings of Plato ſtand eminently diſtinguiſhed by a privilege almoſt peculiarly their own. They were for ſome ages the principal ſtudy of the fathers of the Chriſtian Church; and the doctrines, which I have undertaken particularly to diſcuſs, were, by their fond partiality, in a manner incorporated into the ſyſtem of Chriſtianity. By a ſtrange fatality, all ſects of religion, however they differed from each other in the concluſions which they deduced from it, agreed in this opinion, that the great and diſtinguiſhing doctrines of Chriſtianity were to be found in the writings of Plato. Nor is that opinion abandoned by the generality of the Chriſtians of the preſent day, who

recur to the writings of the early defenders of our faith, for a knowledge of the doctrines maintained by the Church in thoſe primitive times.

The courſe of my own reading had led me to adopt the commonly received opinion, that Plato had ſome knowledge of the profound and myſtical doctrine of the Trinity. I was the leſs inclined to queſtion the truth of this opinion, as it was almoſt the only one, in which the controverſialiſts of the preſent day were generally agreed. When therefore I was excited to enter into a minute examination of this ſubject, my original object was not to aſcertain the truth of the opinion, that Plato was acquainted with the doctrine of the Trinity of perſons in the divine nature. Of this I entertained no doubt. But I wiſhed to know, by what authority, or by what train of reaſoning, he was led to embrace this doctrine; by what arguments he ſupported it; and in what ſenſe he explained it. So far was I from entertaining prejudices in favour of the ſide of the queſtion, which I have ſince found reaſon to maintain, that I did not even ſuſpect the poſſibility of it's being true at the time when I inſtituted the enquiry.

When

When I firſt read the Philebus, I was much more diſpoſed to diſtruſt my own underſtanding, than to believe that Cudworth could poſſibly have been guilty of ſo glaring a miſtake in the meaning of the paſſage, ὅτι νες ες γενεσης τε παντων αιτιε. I read over the paſſage many times, and conſidered it with the moſt intenſe exertion of thought; nor could I prevail upon myſelf to adopt my own interpretation of it, till I was clearly convinced by repeated examinations, that it could not admit of any other.

When I diſcovered that the doctrine could derive no countenance from this paſſage, I ſtill ſuppoſed that I ſhould find it clearly proved in others. But the ſame diſappointment ſtill attended me in my enquiries. The farther I proceeded, the more I was perſuaded, that the abſtract doctrines of Plato are at preſent but little underſtood: that falſe notions of them were gradually introduced among the early fathers of the Chriſtian Church, in a great meaſure by miſtaken interpretations of the writings of Philo Judæus: and that thoſe erroneous opinions were extended and formed into a ſyſtem by Ammonius Saccas. The moſt eſſential parts of this

ſyſtem have, by the authority of him and his immediate followers, been almoſt implicitly embraced ever ſince.

It may perhaps be thought a proof of great preſumption, to undertake to oppoſe the concurrent voice of the beſt and wiſeſt men for ſo many ages. But when it is recollected, how many errors of antiquity have been confuted, ſince the revival of literature and the introduction of ſound philoſophy into this kingdom, ſome will, I truſt, be diſpoſed to pay a candid and unprejudiced attention to the reaſonings which I ſhall produce in the following Treatiſe, and will paſs an impartial ſentence, according as they ſhall be influenced by the preponderating evidence.

The writings of the fathers abound with many fanciful and myſtical interpretations of the Holy Scriptures themſelves, which the ſober criticiſm of the preſent age would hardly be prevailed upon to admit. If therefore we ſubmit not implicitly to their authority in matters which fell more regularly within their province; why ſhould we think them infallible upon ſubjects, which were more remote from their immediate department, and

more obſcure and abſtracted in their own nature?

To urge in their favour, that they lived nearer the time of Plato than we do, by many hundred years, is a mere fallacy. They were too far removed from him to derive any authority from that preſumption. Even at their time and in their circumſtances, the beſt and only ſatisfactory method of arriving at a correct knowledge of the opinions of Plato was by a careful peruſal of thoſe writings, in which they are maintained.

This ſource is open to us, as well as to them. To thoſe writings I appeal, and ſhall endeavour to extract their genuine ſenſe by a careful attention to the context, to the chain of argument which the author is carrying on, and to the point which he is endeavouring to eſtabliſh. If any ambiguities ſtill remain, I ſhall endeavour to clear them up, by recurring to other dialogues of the ſame author, where the ſame terms are uſed, the ſame topics explained, and the ſame arguments enforced in a more ſimple or more perſpicuous manner. This I have ever conſidered as the moſt certain and only rational method of

arriving at the genuine meaning of any author, ſacred or profane.

I ſhall produce, in ſupport of many of my interpretations, pointed, and, as I think, deciſive paſſages, from other ancient authors. I do not know that my general doctrine is in one inſtance contradicted by the teſtimony or reaſoning of any pagan writer, from the time of Plato to the latter end of the ſecond or the beginning of the third century of the Chriſtian æra, when the Lectures of Ammonius, and the writings of his ſcholar Plotinus, gave a new turn to the heathen philoſophy. The ſages, who lived in the intermediate time, however diſtinguiſhed they may have been by their genius and induſtry, and how much ſoever they may have reverenced and imitated Plato, had not ſagacity enough to make thoſe diſcoveries, which were reſerved for the ſophiſts of Alexandria. They, in the decline of all other branches of learning, were able to explore the dark receſſes of the Platonic philoſophy, and to point out in it, and develope myſterious doctrines, which had eſcaped the penetration of Greece and Rome, when they were were ſuppoſed to have

have cultivated philoſophy and the arts with the greateſt celebrity and ſucceſs.

In the courſe of my enquiry, I ſhall be under the neceſſity of differing very widely from Dr. Cudworth, whoſe authority is deſervedly held to be of the greateſt weight in all ſpeculations of this kind, when there is nothing but man's authority to which we can appeal. But when the caſe is capable of being examined and determined by legitimate reaſoning, that deciſion is ſuperior to all human authority. At a time when theſe kingdoms were diſtracted by contending parties in church and ſtate, Dr. Cudworth muſt have been cloſely employed in laying up that fund of knowledge, from which he afterwards ſo copiouſly drew his materials, while he was compoſing his True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe. In that work he has repelled the aſſaults of atheiſm, and defended the principles of natural religion with aſtoniſhing ſkill and erudition, But, by reſigning himſelf too implicitly to the guidance of Plotinus and Proclus, he has given his ſanction to opinions, which in earlier times embarraſſed the reaſonings of the orthodox, and diffuſed a ſpecious

cious air of conſiſtency over the doctrines of heretics.

While I detect a few inadvertencies in the writings of this great man, which are the more dangerous on account of his general excellencies, I never for a moment forget, or ceaſe to reverence, his ſuperior attainments; and I always rejoice, that his deſtination in life was conformable to his favourite purſuits, which is almoſt the conſummation of the earthly happineſs of a literary man. For, next to his intellectual endowments, it was the peculiar felicity and diſtinguiſhing honour of Cudworth, to be placed at the head of a great literary ſociety*, at a time, when it was highly renowned for having recently produced Mede and Milton, both eminent for their various learning, and the one as profound a Divine, the other as ſublime a Poet, as the world ever ſaw.

* Fuller, in his Hiſtory of the Univerſity of Cambridge, which was publiſhed in the early part of the Maſterſhip of Dr. Cudworth, ſpeaks of Chriſt College in the following terms: "It may without flattery be ſaid "of this houſe, *Many daughters have done virtuouſly, but* "*thou exceлleſt them all*; if we conſider the many Divines, "who in ſo ſhort a time have here had their education." P. 91.

I con-

I conceive, that what I have ſaid about differing in opinion from Cudworth will juſtify me in not ſubmitting implicitly to the authority of Le Clerc, and other ingenious men, whoſe names are, with the greateſt reaſon, in the higheſt eſteem, and whoſe learning, abilities, and laborious exertions, have contributed much to the ſupport, illuſtration, and advancement of rational religion and genuine chriſtianity.

When a train of reaſoning appears to any mind to be founded upon ſolid and incontrovertible principles: when each ſucceeding ſtep of the argument is apprehended to ariſe neceſſarily out of that which preceded it, and the concluſion ſeems to be a clear and ſatisfactory deduction from the whole; I do not ſee what room there can be for the interpoſition of any human authority. While the mind is ſo circumſtanced, it cannot ſubmit to the authority without renouncing it's reaſon. However modeſt a man, poſſeſſed of ſuch a mind, may be; however diffident of his own powers; how much ſoever he may be diſpoſed to ſubmit to the opinions of others upon proper occaſions; he cannot, in this inſtance, liſten to the voice of authority, till he

he ſhall be convinced that his principles are uncertain, or his deductions fallacious. Nor is he unreaſonable in requeſting thoſe, who undertake to accompany him in the inveſtigation, to confine their attention entirely to thoſe eſſential points, which exclude the conſideration of all foreign and adventitious circumſtances till they are invalidated.

When I ſeriouſly entertained the thought of laying my ſentiments before the public, I was impreſſed with ſo ſtrong a ſenſe of the dignity of the ſubject, that I thought myſelf bound in duty to lay by the produce of my labours, till the warmth of enquiry had ſubſided: to review it repeatedly at diſtant intervals: and to peruſe, with the ſtricteſt attention, what had been advanced by others, that ſeemed to bear any relation to the ſubject.

It would have been a much more eaſy taſk to me to have been diffuſe, and ſeemingly more elaborate, in exhibiting as well my own opinions as thoſe of others. But I have taken ſome pains to be as brief in my expoſitions as was conſiſtent with order and perſpicuity.

It would anſwer no uſeful purpoſe to combat all the ſyſtems, which appear to me to be erroneous; or to invalidate the many arguments, that may ſeem to bear ſome weight againſt the opinions which I have advanced. I thought it would beſt anſwer the purpoſe that I had in view, if I confined myſelf chiefly to a ſimple expoſition of the genuine meaning of the paſſages, which are uſually produced in defence of the oppoſite doctrine, and of the principal reaſons that induced me to adopt the interpretation which I have exhibited.

I therefore requeſt, that no reader will, from a ſlight and ſuperficial view of the ſubject, and under the influence of a few popular poſitions and obvious objections, haſtily condemn, *in a ſummary manner*, what I have here laid down; but will give me credit for having beſtowed much conſideration upon the arguments uſually advanced on the other ſide of the queſtion, and for having ſatisfied myſelf, after deep reflection, of the inſufficiency of them to maintain the cauſe, for the ſupport of which they were produced.

To induce him the more readily to grant me this indulgence, I will take the liberty

of

of reciting to him a well authenticated ſtory. When the preſent authorized tranſlation of the Old and New Teſtament came out under the auſpices of King James, that great work did not eſcape critical cenſures. It happened, that one of the tranſlators, ſoon after the completion of that arduous undertaking, made a viſit to a friend in a part of the country, where he was not generally known. On the Sunday he accompanied his friend to the pariſh church, where the officiating clergyman, in the courſe of his ſermon, took an opportunity of depreciating the new tranſlation in general terms, and in particular aſſigned five reaſons, why a certain paſſage ought to have been differently tranſlated. As the preacher dined that day with the gentleman, the tranſlator did not omit to advert in private to the diſcourſe, that had been publicly delivered. Among other things, *quæ dicenda forent*, he told the preacher, that thoſe five reaſons, which he ſo pompouſly diſplayed in the pulpit, had been all conſidered and deliberately weighed by the tranſlators; but that thirteen more forcible reaſons had conſtrained them to render the paſſage in the manner in which it ſtood in the preſent tranſlation.

I am

I am not inſenſible to the great weight of oppoſing authorities. I have, however, the ſatisfaction to find, that I do not ſtand quite alone in many of my opinions. The very learned and judicious Moſheim has taken frequent opportunities of condemning the ſubtilties of the later Platoniſts.

Ει μεν δη ἑταρον γε κελευσ∫ε μ' αυ∫ον ἑλεσθαι,
Πως αν επειτ' Οδυσηος εγω θειοιο λαθοιμην,
Ὁυ περι μεν προφρων κραδιη κ᾽ θυμος αγηνωρ
Εν παυ∫εσσι πονοισι, φιλει δε ἑ Παλλας Αθηνη;

In thoſe valuable notes, which accompany his Latin Verſion of Cudworth, he often expreſſes his diſſent from his author's interpretations of Plato and Philo; though the nature and extent of his undertaking did not require, that he ſhould always enter into a minute examination of the preciſe meaning of the paſſages in queſtion *.

* Nimis mihi longa, eaque huic inſtituto parum conducens ingredienda eſſet diſputatio, ſi totam explicare vellem & explanare Platonis augumentationem.
Moſh. Obſerv. ad Pag. 627. Tom. 1.

In

In my Inveſtigation of the opinions of the fathers of the Chriſtian Church, I acted exactly in the ſame manner as I did when I examined the writings of Plato and Philo, as far as concerned the doctrines which they taught, and the meaning of the paſſages in which thoſe doctrines were expreſſed. When they quoted the writings of other authors, whether ſacred or prophane, in defence of their tenets, I took the ſame liberty with them, which I have always thought myſelf not only authorized, but bound to take, in matters of ſuch high import, with every other uninſpired writer. I examined, with all poſſible care and attention, the fidelity and accuracy of the quotation, the juſtneſs of the expoſition, and the force of the application and deduction. If I ſeemed to myſelf to detect errors in any of thoſe particulars, the reſpect which I entertained for the venerable authors, on account of their induſtry, learning, and piety, did not ſuffer me to judge of them lightly or raſhly. No fondneſs for novelty, no pleaſure in diſcovering the defects of others, influenced my judgment. Genuine truth was the only object of my enquiry; and indeed I was conſcious, that nothing but truth

truth could bear me up againſt ſuch great, ſuch long eſtabliſhed, and ſuch accumulated authority.

When I endeavoured, with all the candour that I was capable of exerciſing, to trace their errors and falſe reaſonings to their ſource, I thought I ſaw them originate from an ardent zeal for the advancement of the great cauſe, which they had undertaken, the cauſe of God and of his Chriſt. This led them, without due conſideration, to embrace the opinion, that the doctrine of a Trinity of Perſons in the divine nature is taught in the writings of Plato and Philo Judæus; an opinion, according to my conception, ſo remote from the truth, that nothing but error can be founded upon it. With an examination of this opinion, I ſhall begin the inveſtigation.

EPINOMIS.

THE following paſſage in the Epinomis is ſuppoſed by * ſome to eſtabliſh Plato's belief of the creation of the world by the Logos, the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity: ξυναποτελων κοσμον, ὁν εταξε λογος ὁ παντων θειοτατος ὁρατον. Ser. p. 986.

Before the deſign and general reaſoning of the Dialogue be conſidered, it will be proper to obſerve, that a ſtrong tincture of Pythagorean principles is conſpicuous in many of the Dialogues of Plato, but in none more than in the Dialogue now under contemplation.

The Epinomis is to be underſtood to be a continuation of the dialogue Περι Νομοθεσιας, and is carried on by the ſame characters. This circumſtance, as well as the ſubject of their

* Vide Clerici Epiſt. Critic. vii. p. 241. Amſt. 1700, and Bruckeri Hiſt. Crit. Philoſoph. Pars II. L. II. C. VI. Sect. 1. P. 692.

future enquiry, is ſtated very clearly by Cli-neas * in the beginning. The Athenian, who undertook to diſcuſs the ſubject, having touched upon the neceſſary, the ornamental, and the uſeful arts, concludes, that the know-ledge of none of them will intitle any one to the name of a wiſe man. He then proceeds to enquire, what knowledge that is, the want of which would render man the moſt irrational of animals. This, he ſays, is the knowledge of number, which he conſiders as the gift of ſome god to man. For it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the author of all other good things to us ſhould not be the author of the greateſt alſo, which is Wiſ-dom. Without the knowledge of number a man cannot have reaſon (λογος) †; if he were deſtitute of ſound reaſon, he would not be wiſe; if he ſhould not attain wiſdom, which

* Τα μεν γαρ αλλα, ὡς φαμεν, ἁπανλα διεξηλθομεν, ὁσα ην περι νομων θεσιν· ὁ δε μεγιϛον ἑυρειν τε κ᾽ ειπειν, τι ποτε μαθων θειϛος ανθρωπος σοφος αν ειη, τυϑο ϐλε ειπομεν, ϐλε ἑυρομεν· νυν δε πειρωμεθα τυϑο μη καϑαλιπειν.

† Στερομενος δε αληθους λογου, σοφος ουκ αν ποϑε γενοιϑο· ὁτῳ δε σοφια μη προσειη, πασης αρετης τομεγιϛον μερος, ουκ αν ετι τελεως αγαθος γενομενος, ευδαιμων ποϑε γενοιτο· ὁτως αριθμον μεν αναγκη πασα ὑποϑι θεσθαι. This doctrine is ſimilar to what he ſays in his Republic (L. vii. P. 522.) το ἑν τε κ᾽ δυο κ᾽ τα τρια διαγινωσκειν. Λεγω δε αυϑο ὡς εν κεφαλαιῳ αριθμου τε κ᾽ λογισμον· η ουχ ὁτω περι τεχνων εχει, ὡς πασα τεχνη τε κ᾽ επιϛημη αναγκαζεται αυϑων μεϑοχος γιγνεσθαι. And in the Philebus: Πασων πω τεχνων αν τις αριθμηϑικην χωριζῃ, και μεϑρηϑικην, και ϛαϑικην, ὡς επος ειπειν, φαυλον το καϑαλειπομενον ἑκαϛης αν γιγνοιτο.

is

is a very conſiderable ingredient in all virtue, he would not be completely good or happy.

The God, that gave number, is the heaven, who taught men the firſt principles of numeration by the * ſucceſſion of day and night, the variations of the moon, &c. He likewiſe taught them, what is more important, the mutual † relations and proportions of number by the arrangement of the ſeaſons and the elements, which renders the earth fertile and productive.

He then conſidered the heavenly bodies, and aſſerted them to be ‡ animated, and endued

* The ſame method of inſtructing men in number is likewiſe mentioned in the Timæus, p. 39. Ἡλιον· ἵνα ὁτι μαλιϛα εις ἀπαντα φαινοι τον ὐρανον, μεϛασχοι τε αριθμυ τα ζωα, ὁσοις ην ϖροσηκον, μαθοντα ϖαρα της ταὐτυ κ᾽ ὁμοιυ ϖερι φορας. Philo alſo, adopting the ſame doctrine, ſays, the ſtars were placed in heaven to anſwer many purpoſes —Πολλων χαριν—ἡμερων, μηνων, ενιαυτων, ἁ δε κ᾽ μερα γεγονε—ευθυς τε το χρησιμωτατον, ἡ αριθμυ φυσις εδειχθη, χρονυ ϖαραφηναντος αυτην· εκ γαρ μιας ἡμερας το ἑν, κ᾽ εκ δυοιν τα δυο, κ᾽ εκ τριων τα τρια. Περι Κοσμοϖ. Par. P. 11, 12.

† Προς αλληλα ϖαντα αριθμον αει λογιζεσθαι—ανεμων τε κ᾽ ὑετων γιγνομενων ὐκ εξαισιων ὐδε αμετρων,

‡ This ſentiment is adopted by Philo: Περι Κοσμοϖ. P. 16. ὡσπερ οἱ ἀστερες· ὁτοι γαρ ζωα τε ειναι λεγονται, κ᾽ ζωα νοερα. Origen, who was an admirer of Philo, is thus rendered by his tranſlator Ruffinus in the Proæmium to his Treatiſe Περι Αρχων. De ſole autem & luna & ſtellis, utrum animantia ſint, an exanima, manifeſte non traditur.—This, as well as many other opinions of Pythagoras and Plato, appears to have been originally derived from the Eaſt. Pococke, in ſtating Shareſtanius's account of the Sabians, who ſprung from Chaldea, ſays, it was a tenet

dued with perfect wisdom, on account of the regularity and constancy of their motions, so different from those of men. Know, says he, that there are round the whole heaven eight powers, akin to each other (αδελφας αλληλων) one of the sun, one of the moon, &c. Let not any of us suppose, that some of them are gods, and some not—but let us all say, that they are all brothers and in kindred departments—and let us not assign to one the honour of the year, to another the honour of a month, and to others none of that portion of time, in which each performs his course, accomplishing, in conjunction with the others, that visible order which the most divine reason of all established *. Inasmuch as that harmony, which is at present

tenet of one sect of that religion, that the bodies of the seven planets were the abodes of spiritual beings or intelligences, who possessed them in the same manner, as our bodies are possessed by our souls; and that they are living, rational bodies, animated by intelligences: Sacellorum cultores sacella vocant septem planetarum corpora, esse hæc spiritualium seu intelligentiarum habitacula, quæ eodem loco illis sunt, quo animabus nostris corpora. Essque ea corpora viventia, rationalia, ab intelligentiis animata. Pocockii Specimen Hist. Arab. p. 139. The Indians held this doctrine concerning the fixed stars, and with them agreed the Arabians, ib. and p. 163. Vide Maimon. de fund. Leg. p. 33.

* Παντες δη παντας λεγωμεν τε κ᾽ φωμεν αδελφους τ᾽ ειναι, κ᾽ εν αδελφαις μοιραις· κ᾽ τιμας αποδιδωμεν, μη τω μεν ενιαυτον, τω δε μηνα, τοις δε μητε τινα μοιραν τατ᾽ωμεν, μη τε τινα χρονον, εν ᾧ διεξερχεται τον ἀυτ᾽ν κοσμον, ξυναποτελων κοσμον, ὃν εταξε λογος ὁ παντων θειοτατος ὁρατον.

to be illuſtrated, and which produces the year of the ſeaſons (by the contemplation and imitation of which a wiſe man will attain an harmony of ſoul, the ſource of perfect happineſs) is not the reſult of the motions of any of them taken ſeparately, but is the joint effect of all.—In the ſame manner Plato likewiſe deſcribes *σωφροσυνη* in a ſtate, or public virtue, comparing it to *ἁρμονια*. De Rep. L. IV. P. 432.

Goodneſs and happineſs, both in this world and the next, are to be attained by firſt admiring this harmony, and then endeavouring to underſtand and acquire it in ourſelves, as far as is poſſible for human nature. Thus is made out the importance of the knowledge of number, which was taught men by the heaven. Without the knowledge of number and its proportions there cannot be reaſon (*λογος*) without reaſon wiſdom, without wiſdom an harmony of ſoul, virtue, and happineſs *.

According to this interpretation of the paſſage before us, it does not immediately

* This doctrine is likewiſe adopted by Philo—Περι Κοσμ. p. 17. Τοδε, *παγκαλων θεαματων ἁ καταπληκλικωτατας μεν εχει τας υσιας, καταπληκλικωτατας δε τας ποιοτητας, θαυμασιωτατας δε τας κινησεις κ᾽ χορειας, εν ταξεσιν ἡρμοσμενας κ᾽ αριθμων αναλογιαις κ᾽ περιοδων συμφωνιαις, εν οις ἁπασι την αρχετυπον κ᾽ αληθη κ᾽ παραδειγματικην μυσικην υκ αν ἁμαρτοι τις ειναι λεγων· αφ᾽ ης οι μετα ταυτα ανθρωποι γραψαμενοι ταις ἑαυτων ψυχαις, αναγκαιοτατην κ᾽ ωφελιμωτατην τεχνην τῳ βιῳ παρεδοσαν.*

relate to the creation of the world, nor does it at all expreſs the perſonality of the Logos. Pythagoras firſt called the world κοσμος, on account of the order and ſymmetry of it's parts. The word is here uſed in it's original ſignification, and the paſſage altogether means, that the heavenly bodies, by their regular and well proportioned motions, conjointly produce that beautiful order, which the divine wiſdom marked out. It is to be obſerved, that the word λογος, ὃς εταξε κοσμον, has not even an article prefixed to it; which, I conceive, it would have had, if it had been intended to expreſs a perſon.

Nothing is more common in all authors, than to attribute effects to qualities in the abſtract, without intending to attribute perſonality to the qualities themſelves, or to ſignify any thing more of them, than that beings, endued with ſuch qualities, have, by the exertion of them, produced ſuch effects *. In

* Thus Cicero De Legibus. L. 1. 7. Daſne igitur hoc nobis, Pomponi (nam Quinti novi ſententiam) Deorum immortalium natura, ratione, poteſtate, mente, numine, ſive quod eſt aliud verbum, quo planius ſignificem quod volo, naturam omnem regi? Id, quod tibi conceſſi, quorſum pertineat, expecto.—Huc pertinet, animal hoc quem vocamus hominem generatum eſſe a ſummo Deo—Solum eſt—particeps rationis—Quid autem eſt, non dicam in homine, ſed in omni cœlo atque terra, ratione divinius? Quæ cum adolevit, atque perfecta eſt, nominatur rite ſapientia.—Again, L. 11. 13.—Cum ſummos Deos eſſe concedamus, eorumque mente mundum regi, & eorundem benignitatem hominum conſulere generi.

In the Dialogue before us, Plato, when he ſpeaks of the univerſe merely as a production, aſcribes it to ſoul (ψυχη) an active and governing principle (ψυχης εσης αιτιας τε ὁλε, p. 988.) in oppoſition to body, which is paſſive and ſubject to controul (αρχομενον ϰ᾽ ανaιτιον πασης παθης, p. 983.) But when he is ſpeaking of the harmony and congruity of the parts of the whole, he aſſigns it to reaſon or intelligence, that faculty which is converſant with order and proportion, in oppoſition to chance or the random tendencies of matter.

The doctrine maintained in this Dialogue, is eſſentially the ſame, as that which has been embelliſhed in modern times by the pens of Shafteſbury and Hutcheſon, viz. that virtue is founded in a love of order and propor-

neri. And to this ſame purpoſe in his Dialogues De Nat. Deor. L. II. 38. Quis enim hunc hominem dixerit, qui, cum tam certos cœli motus, tam ratos aſtrorum ordines, tamque inter ſe omnia connexa & apta viderit, neget in his ullam ineſſe rationem, eaque caſu fieri dicat, quæ quanto conſilio gerantur, nullo conſilio adſequi poſſumus? An cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut ſphæram, ut horas, ut alia permulta; non dubitamus, quin illa opera ſint rationis? Cum autem impetum cœli cum admirabili celeritate moveri vertique videamus, conſtantiſſime conficientem viciſſitudines anniverſarias cum ſumma ſalute & conſervatione rerum omnium; dubitamus, quin ea non ſolum ratione fiant, ſed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione?—Xenophon Mem. L. I. C. iv. ſpeaks of εργα γνωμης and εργα προνοιας, which he likewiſe attributes σοφε τινος δημιυργε ϰ᾽ φιλοζωε τεχνημαῖι.

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tion. It is a doctrine which appears every where in the writings of Plato. In his Republic *, he diſcourſes at large upon the importance and connexion of harmony and rhythm in muſic, arts, and manners. In the ſame book Plato compares knowledge, paſſion or anger, and appetite, to the council or ſenate, the military, and the artizans, &c. in a ſtate. It is the prerogative of knowledge to direct paſſion, and the duty of paſſion to aid knowledge in keeping the appetites in ſubjection; and that harmony, which is the reſult of their performing each their ſeveral functions in due order, conſtitutes the juſt and perfect ſtate of the mind of man, and, as it were, the health of the ſoul. Hence he concludes, that as a city, whoſe members preſerve a regular ſubordination, will flouriſh more than one that is torn by contending parties; and as ſound health is better than diſeaſe;—ſo virtue is, on it's own account, more deſirable than vice.

* Τ῾ων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφὴ, ὅτι μαλιστα καθάδυεται εἰς το ἔνδος της ψυχης ὁ τε ῥυθμος καὶ ἁρμονια, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐλης, φερουσα εὐσχημοσυνην· καὶ ποιει εὐσχημονα, ἐαν τις ὀρθως τραφῇ—ὁ ἐκει τραφεις τα μεν καλα ἐπαινοι, καὶ χαιρων, καὶ καταδεχομενος εἰς την ψυχην τρεφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐλων, καὶ γενοιτο καλῶ τε κἀγαθος, L. III. P. 401.—Again, Ὁρας ὄν, ὅτι ὡς ἁρμονιᾳ τινι ἡ σωφροσυνῃ ὡμοιωται. L. IV. P. 431.

PAR-

PARMENIDES.

THE Parmenides is perhaps one of the moſt difficult of the Dialogues of Plato. The expreſſion and the reaſoning are ſo general and abſtracted, particularly in the part, where ἓν, ἓν πολλα, and ἓν καὶ πολλα are diſcuſſed; that it is not eaſy to determine preciſely the meaning of thoſe terms.

Serranus ſuppoſes the one infinite Being and ſecond cauſes to be the ſubjects of diſcuſſion. Other authors, deſervedly of great name, have thought that they have diſcovered the three perſons of the ever-bleſſed Trinity delineated under the articles, ἓν, ἓν πολλα, and ἓν καὶ πολλα.—Le Clerc, in his Ars Critica, P. II. S. I. CXIV. delivers his opinion concerning it in the following terms: Primus omnium tria principia conſtituit Parmenides, & poſt eum Plato; qui an conſenſerint, non ſatis liquet, quod Parmenidis non ſuperſit præter obſcura fragmenta. Plato autem dixit primum eſſe το ον, αιτιον απαντων, ens, cauſam omnium rerum: ſecundum vero Λογον, Rationem & Rectorem præſentium & futu-

futurorum: tertium denique Ψυχην Κοσμυ, animam ſive ſpiritum mundi.

The paſſages referred to in ſupport and illuſtration of this opinion in other parts of Plato's writings, will be conſidered in their order. I ſhall at preſent confine myſelf to the Parmenides, concerning the ſubjects of which Dialogue Cudworth had before acceded to the ſame opinion upon the authority of Plotinus, as appears from the following extract: "Wherefore Parmenides his whole "philoſophy (ſaith Plotinus) was better di-"geſted, and more exactly and diſtinctly ſet "down in Plato's Parmenides, where he ac-"knowledgeth three Unities Subordinate or "a Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes."—"Which "obſervation of Plotinus is, by the way, the "beſt key, that we know of, for that ob-"ſcure book of Plato's Parmenides." Intell. Syſt. p. 386-7. See p. 546, &c.—The laſt part of the quotation ſeems to me to imply, that he accepted this key, not becauſe he was perfectly ſatisfied with it, but becauſe he knew of no other ſo good for unlocking the intricacies of that obſcure book. He in fact appears to have conſidered it as the moſt plauſible hypotheſis, that had fallen in his way. If therefore we can obtain a key from the book itſelf, which will unlock it's intricacies in a manner conſiſtent with the ſubject of the diſcourſe, with the train of reaſoning adopted in it, with the philoſophic principles of the

characters introduced, and with the manner of their applying thoſe principles; I am perſuaded, that every judicious reader will acknowledge ſuch a key to be infinitely more valuable, than any arbitrary hypotheſis of Plotinus, however ſpecious it may have appeared, before this key was preſented to them.

Before I enter upon the inveſtigation, it will be proper to obſerve, that Parmenides is the chief ſpeaker of the Dialogue; and that the principles advanced in it, are the principles of that philoſopher, from whom Plato differed in opinion on ſome particular points, as we are told by Ariſtotle.

Let it be no objection to this obſervation, that the diſcourſe was held in the preſence of Socrates, that he bore a part in the beginning of it, and that he was in a great degree the occaſion of the whole.—Socrates was the maſter of Plato; and the ſentiments and reaſonings, which are aſſigned to him, may in general be ſafely conſidered as the ſentiments and reaſonings of Plato himſelf. It was likewiſe the uſual cuſtom, and indeed the chief employment of Socrates, to correct what he ſaw amiſs in the practice and opinions of thoſe with whom he converſed; and, above all, to detect the fallacious principles, and refute the falſe reaſonings of the philoſophers and ſophiſts of his time. His expreſs approbation therefore, and his tacit acquieſcence, had

had commonly the ſame tendency, though perhaps not ſo often the ſame force.

But upon the preſent occaſion, Socrates is repreſented in a ſituation, in which he does not often appear in the works of Plato. He is introduced, in this Dialogue, at a time of life, when he was not a teacher, but a learner; when it was cuſtomary with him, as he tells us in his Phædo, to attend the different philoſophers of diſtinguiſhed note; in order that he might be able, by impartial obſervation, to diſcover whoſe doctrine was moſt conſiſtent with the reality of things, and, of courſe, under whoſe guidance he ſhould put himſelf in his future enquiries. It was not, till he deſpaired of receiving any effectual aſſiſtance from others, that he ſtruck out a method of philoſophizing peculiarly his own. In this Dialogue therefore, contrary to what is the caſe in moſt others, we muſt not conſider the acquieſcence and approbation of Socrates as the ſame.

Yet even here Plato appears to treat his maſter with exquiſite delicacy. He makes him indeed propoſe his objections to the principles of Zeno, and defend the conſequences, deduced from thoſe objections, with an ingenuouſneſs ſuitable to his age; and he at length makes him, with the ſame ingenuouſneſs, acknowledge himſelf confounded by his veteran antagoniſt, who was by long practice verſed in all the ſubtilties of diſputation. But when

when Parmenides is prevailed upon to explain his own principles; the office of replying, and of courſe either of oppoſing or of expreſſing an acquieſcence, is transferred to Ariſtotle; and Socrates takes no part in the remainder of the Dialogue.

I have thought it neceſſary to make theſe obſervations, leſt any one ſhould think, that it is a ſerious objection to the interpretation here produced, if the principles attributed to Parmenides ſhould ſeem not always exactly to agree with the principles maintained by Plato under the character of Socrates, in other parts of his writings.—I will now proceed to examine the Dialogue itſelf.

Among the perſons of the Dialogue was Parmenides, an old philoſopher, who had maintained ἓν ειναι το παν *, that the univerſe is one thing; by which, I conceive, he meant one ſyſtem; and that all the things which ſubſiſt have a mutual connexion with each other, and ſubſiſt in it as parts of one whole. Zeno was a friend of Parmenides, and ſome years younger than himſelf. He had maintained, ϰ πολλα ειναι, that it is not many, does not conſiſt of ſeparate unconnected parts. Socrates, then a youth, was deſirous of know-

* It is probable, that his theological opinion did not eſſentially differ from that of Thales: Θαλης μεν τον κοσμον τον θεον· το δε παν εμψυχον ἁμα ϰ δαιμονων πληρες. Stobæi Ecl. Phyſ. L. I. C. 1. This was alſo the great outline of the theology of the Stoics.

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ing the meaning and foundation of thoſe doctrines, which Zeno affirmed not to be preciſely the ſame, though his reaſoning operated as a defence of the doctrine of his friend.

The firſt point which demands our attention, is to diſcover what is the real ſubject of the Dialogue, the nature of the objection urged by Socrates, the reply to it by Parmenides, and the defence of it afterwards by Socrates deſerve our ſerious conſideration; as they may fairly be ſuppoſed to be founded upon the ſubject of debate.—As ſo many parts enter into the compoſition of the univerſe, it is obvious, that, if it can be denominated one thing, it muſt be ſo, becauſe it is capable of being comprehended under one *ειδος* or general abſtract form. Now the difficulty that occurred to Socrates in the doctrine of Zeno, which denies a plurality, was this, that there are many diſtinct * *ειδη*, generally abſtract forms, each ſubſiſting ſeparately and independently. What does Parmenides reply to this? Does he ſay, you miſtake the nature of the thing or being, the unity of which I maintain? No. He undertakes to ſhew the contradictions, which, according to his

* Ου νομιζεις ειναι αυτο καθ' αὑτο ειδος τι ὁμοιοτητος, ϗ τη τοιυτῳ αυ αλλο τι εναντιον, ὁ εστι ανομοιον; τυτοιν δε, δυοιν ουτοιν, ϗ εμε ϗ σε ϗ τα αλλα, ἁ δη πολλα καλυμεν, μεταλαμβανειν; ϗ τα μεν, της ὁμοιοτητος μεταλαμβανοντα, ὁμοια γιγνεσθαι, ταυτῃ τε ϗ καθ' ὁσον αν μεταλαμβανοι; τα δε της ανομοιοτητος ανομοια;

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reaſoning, would ariſe from ſuppoſing, that the ſeveral εἰδη, ſpecies or general abſtract forms, ſubſiſt unconnectedly, and in a manner, that is inconſiſtent with the unity of το παν, the univerſe *.

I am well perſuaded, that the language and mode of reaſoning, adopted in this dialogue, will appear very harſh and forced to modern apprehenſions, which are more converſant and better pleaſed with the dictates of ſound ſenſe confined within it's proper limits, than with the logical ſubtilties of ancient metaphyſics. But if we would arrive at the genuine ſenſe of an author; we muſt be contented to accompany him upon his own terms, and to reaſon with him upon his own principles.

The ſpecimen, which I have produced, will perhaps be ſufficient to convince moſt people, that I have rightly ſtated *the ſubject* of the debate. If any be yet doubtful concerning it; I would recommend it to them, to peruſe with attention the whole of the converſation, if I may ſo call it, between Parmenides and Socrates, as it is ſet down at large in the original. Will they then be able to believe, that Socrates found a difficulty in acknowledging a perfect Unity, or in denying a plurality in the Deity, as diſtinct from the Univerſe; becauſe he ſuppoſed different

* Ορας ουν, φαναι, ω Σωκρατες, οσην η απορια, εαν τις ως ειδη ουσια αυτα καθ' εαυτα διοριζηται.

abſtract forms of equality and inequality, of greatneſs, juſtice, beauty, and the like, to ſubſiſt by themſelves ſeparately and independently of each other, and ſeverally to belong, either connectedly or disjunctively, to the ſeveral individual external Actions or Beings? Will they be able, in the next place, to conceive, that Parmenides, inſtead of urging the want of connexion between the doctrine and the objection, ſhould undertake to point out the inconſiſtences, that would ariſe from admitting the truth of the opinion, upon which the objection is built; and that the whole of the following converſation ſhould be employed, on one part, in endeavouring to explain away thoſe inconſiſtences; and on the other part, to ſhew the inſufficiency of the explanations, and the ſtill greater difficulties, that would reſult from them? If, beſides conceiving and believing all this, they can think it poſſible, that the diſcourſe ſhould be carried on through ſo many debates, objections, replies, and rejoinders, without either party mentioning, or in the moſt diſtant manner alluding to the real and original ſubject of doubt and diſpute; I confeſs, I know of no argument or mode of reaſoning, that is capable of reaching them.

When Socrates ſeemed diſpoſed to acknowledge, that he was puzzled with the difficulty of the queſtion; Parmenides told him, that he had plunged into the depths of philoſophy in

in the morning of life, before he was ſufficiently exerciſed. He praiſed indeed his ingenuity, but recommended it to him to exerciſe himſelf firſt in the diſcuſſion of more ſimple topics; by which means he would afterwards be able with leſs difficulty to inveſtigate more intricate and complicated ſubjects. The kind of exerciſe, which Parmenides recommended, as ſuited to the preſent ſtate of Socrates, was hypothetical reaſoning both poſitively and negatively upon the ſame ſubject. For inſtance *, If a thing be *ſo*, what will be the conſequence? Again, If a thing be *not ſo*, what will be the conſequence? After ſome entreaty, Parmenides is prevailed upon to give Socrates a ſpecimen of what he meant. He ſays †, he will begin from himſelf and an hypotheſis of the truth of his own tenet, which was the unity of the Univerſe, ἓν ειναι το παν. Concerning which he will enquire, firſt, If it be true: ſecondly, If it be not true; what will be the conſequence.

From the hypotheſis of his tenet, with reſpect to unity, being true, he ſhews, firſt, that unity itſelf, in it's moſt ſimple ſtate, as

* Χρη δε και τοδε εἰι πρῳ τυτῳ ποιειν, μη μονον, ει εϛιν ἑκαϛον ὑποϰειμενον, σκοπειν τα συμβαινοντα εκ της ὑποθεϛεως, αλλα και ει μη εϛι το αυτο τουτο ὑποϰειϛθαι, ει βουλει μαλλον γυμνασθηναι.

† Απ' εμε αρχωμαι και της εμαυτε ὑποθεϛεως, περι του ἑνος αυτου ὑποθεμενος, ει τε ἐν εϛιν, ει τε μη εϛιν, τι χρη συμβαινειν.

it is predicated of the Univerſe, indicates nothing beyond itſelf, but mere unity. It contains no other quality whatever. It implies neither beginning nor end nor ſhape nor identity nor diverſity nor time nor place nor exiſtence nor non-exiſtence nor any other property. Secondly, if in the hypotheſis of unity be included exiſtence, which muſt be the caſe, when you come to conſider the ſeveral parts, that are comprehended under this moſt ſimple unity, and, as it were, tied together by it; an infinite multitude will immediately branch out from it. For the unity, according to the hypotheſis thus ſtated, will imply exiſtence, and exiſtence unity; ſo that they neceſſarily become two, and conſequently can be no longer one *. Now, ſays he, unity, when

* Τοτε γαρ ἑν το ον αει ισχει, και το ον το ἑν, ὡσε αναγκη, δυ' αει γιγνομενον, μηδεποτε ἑν ειναι—ωκην απειρον αν το πληθος ἑτω το ἑν ον ειη. This will appear very peculiar reaſoning to thoſe, who have not ſome acquaintance with the language of ancient metaphyſics. But Ariſtotle tells us, that this verb, εστι, *is*, by it's efficacy to deſtroy the unity of unit in being predicated of it, gave ſuch diſturbance to the philoſophers, who maintained an unity of principle, that ſome of them, as Lycophron, ſtruck it out. Others changed the form of the expreſſion; as, for inſtance, they would not ſay, The man *is* walking, but, The man walks; leſt, by applying the word *is*, they ſhould make one thing to be many. As if, ſays Ariſtotle, unity and exiſtence were expreſſed only in one manner: Ἐθορυβηθη δε και οι ὑστερον, καθαπερ οι αρχαιοι, μη πολε συμβαινη αυτοις ἁμα το αυτο ἑν ειναι και πολλα. Διο οι μεν το εστιν αφειλον, ὡσπερ Λυκοφρων· ὡ δε την λεξιν μεταρρυθμιζον, ὁτι ὁ ανθρωπος ε, λευκῳ εστιν, αλλα, λελευκωται· ωδε, βαδιζων εστιν, αλλα, βαδιζει·

when by the hypotheſis it partakes of exiſtence, becomes many; though, when it is contemplated alone by the underſtanding in it's ſimple ſtate, it appears only an unit *. This reaſoning of our author is thus ridiculed by Theopompus: ἐν γαρ εϛι ϗδε ἑν· τω δε δυο μολις ἐν εϛιν, ὡς φηϛι Πλαϛων. Diog. Laert. p. 76.

Moreover, not only ἑν, when it partakes of ϗσια, exiſtence, will become many in number, that is, branch out into an infinite multitude of units or ſpecies; but alſo each of thoſe will be rendered limited in it's nature, (πεπερασμενον αν ειη) diſtinguiſhed by a particular form. The ſpecific forms, thus infinite in multitude, though they branch out from ἑν, unit, and † center in it, will be not only

βαδιζει· ἱνα μη, το εϛι προσαπλουϛες, πολλα ειναι ποιωσι το ἑν, ὡς μοναχως λεϛομενυ τυ ἑνϛ· η τυ ονϛ. Natur. Auſcult. L. 1. C. 3. Plato in Theætetus gives a ſimilar account of the doctrine of ſome philoſophers concerning the material elements: Εϛω γαρ αυ εδοκυν ακηκοεναι τινων, ὁτι τα μεν πρωϛα διαπερει ϛοιχεια, ἐξ ὡν ἡμεις τε ϗυϛκειμεθα και ταλλα, λοϛον ϗκ εχοι· αυϛα γαρ καθ' ἁυϛο εκαϛον ονομαζειν μονον ειη, προϛιπειν δε ϗδεν αλλο δυναϛον, ϗθ' ὡς εϛιν, ϗθ' ὡς ϗκ εϛιν· ηδη γαρ αν ϗσιαν, η μη ϗσιαν αυϛῳ προϛιθεσθαι. δει δε ϗδεν προσφερειν, ειπερ αυϛο εκεινο μονον τις ερει. P. 201-2. Serran.

* Αυϛο το ἑν, ὁ δη φαμεν ϗσιας μεϛεχειν, εαν αυϛο τῃ διανοιᾳ μονον καθ' ἁυϛο λαβωμεν, ανευ τυϛυ, ἡ φαμεν μεϛεχειν, αρα γε ἑν μονον φανησεϛαι; η και πολλα το αυϛο τυτο; ἑν, οιμαι εἰωγε.

† Plato in the Philebus explains at large the proceſs of reducing many diſtinct things to one. Things, which in their own nature admit of more or leſs, ſuch as hot, cold, ſwift, ſlow, &c. are not only many and various, but alſo

 oppoſite

only different, but often directly oppoſite to each other, and thus expreſs all the qualities, that can come under obſervation: limited in their nature, as being ſeverally one, and confined to a particular and appropriated form: and unlimited in number, as there is many a one: και περερασμενον και απειρον πληθει.

Again, after ἓν πολλα, many ſpecies, each of which is properly an unit, partaking of exiſtence and limited in it's form, there ariſe from the hypotheſis the ſeveral particulars in nature one and many (ἓν και πολλα) connected with time, and partly partaking of exiſtence and partly not *. Theſe individuals, ſubject to generation and deſtruction, are unlimited both in number and in nature †. The ſpecific

oppoſite to each other. Yet being collected and claſſed under the genus of unlimited, they become one. Or, as he expreſſed it again, The unlimited preſented many genera; but being impreſſed with the genus of more and it's oppoſite, it appeared one: Πολλα γε και το απειρον παρεσχελο γενη· ὁμως δ' επισφραγισθενλα τω τη μαλλον και ενανλιη γενει, ἓν εφανη. P. 26. Serr. How much more eaſy is it, ſays he, to reduce under one head thoſe things, which by their nature are limited, and are not ſeverally many? Και μην τογε περας ὑλε πολλα ειχεν, ὑτ' εδυσκολαινομεν ὡς ὑκ ην ἓν φυσει. Ib.

* Το ἓν ει εςιν, ὁιον διεληλυθαμεν, αρ' ὑκ αναγκη αυλο, ἓν τε ον και πολλα, και μηλε ἓν μηλε πολλα, και μελεχον χρονη, ὁτι μεν εςιν ἓν, ὑσιας μετεχειν πολε; ὁτι δε ὑκ εςι, μη μελεχειν αυ πολε ὑσιας; They are called ἓν και πολλα, as conſiſting of idea or form, which is one, and matter, which is denominated many.

† Ουκην ὁτως αει σκοπεηλι αυλην καθ' ἁυλην την ἑτεραν φυσιν τη ειδες, ὁσον αν αυλης αει ορωμεν, απειρον εςαι πληθει;—Τοις

αλλοις

cific form gives them a limitation in their relation to other ſpecies; while their own nature produces an unlimited variety in the particulars of the ſame ſpecies.

This will receive illuſtration from the Philebus, in which Dialogue Plato makes Socrates divide the principles of things into two kinds: firſt, matter and it's qualities, which, admitting, in it's own nature, degrees of more and leſs, and having nothing in it's nature to confine thoſe qualities, he calls απειρον, unlimited. Secondly, ſpecific form, which, containing in it's own nature a principle of limitation, he calls περας, and εχον περας *.

The firſt he likewiſe calls πολλα, as being many in it's nature †. But the latter is oppoſed to it as being characteriſtically different; ſince it does not admit of that denomination in it's nature ‡. Though he had § before ſaid, that each kind is divided into many in number. Out of theſe two conjoined ariſes a third claſs, which comprizes all particular things ‖.

αλλοις δη τω ἑνὶ συμβαινει, εκ μεν τω ἑνος και εξ ἑαυτων κοινωνησαντων, ὡς εοικεν, ἑτερον τι γιγνεσθαι εν αυτοις, ὁ δη περας παρεσχε πρὸς αλληλα· ἡ δε αυτων φυσις καθ' ἑαυτα, απειριαν.

* Τον Θεον ελεγομεν πω το μεν απειρον δειξαι των ονων, τοδε περας.

† Ὁτι δε τροπον τινα το απειρον πολλα εςι πειρασομαι φραζειν.

‡ Και μην τοτε περας ουκ πολλα ειχεν.

§ Τα δυο τυτων πειρωμεθα πολλα εκατερον εσχισμενον και διεσπασμενον ιδοντες, εις ἑν παλιν ἑκατερον συναγαγοντες. P. 23.

‖ Το δε τριτον εξ αμφοιν τυτοιν ἑν τι ξυμμιγνυμενον.

Of this union he produces ſeveral inſtances: among others, in diſorders a proper limitation, applied to the conſtituent parts of the body, produces health *. Again, limitation, being applied to ſharp, flat, ſwift, and ſlow ſounds, which are in their own nature unlimited, conſtitute muſic.

Plato, in the fifth Book of his Republic, has put into the mouth of Socrates a doctrine of ειδη, ſpecies, ſimilar to what is here laid down. Since, ſays he, handſome and ugly are oppoſite to each other, they are collectively two, but ſeparately one. The ſame may be ſaid of juſt and unjuſt, of good and evil, and all ſpecies. They are each ſeparately one, though, by a participation of actions, and bodies, and of each other, they appear ſeverally to be many †. Theſe, he ſays,

* Αρ' ουκ εν μεν νοσοις ἡ των ορθη κοινωνια την υγιειας φυσιν εγεννησε; P. 25.

† Επειδη εστιν εναντιον καλον αισχρῳ, δυο αυτω ειναι. πως δ'ου; ουκουν, επειδη δυο, και ἑν ἑκατερον. Και τουτο. Και περι δικαιου και αδικου, και αγαθου και κακου, και παντων των ειδων, περι ὁ αυτο λογος· αυτο μεν, ἑν ἑκαστον ειναι, τῃ δε των πραξεων και σωματων και αλληλων κοινωνια πανταχου φανταζομενα, πολλα φαινεσθαι ἑκαστον. P. 476. Again in the tenth book, Ειδος γαρ, ωι τι ἑν ἑκαστον ειωθαμεν τιθεσθαι περι ἑκαστα τα πολλα, οις ταυτον ονομα επιφερομεν. η ου μανθανεις; Μανθανω. Θωμεν δη και των ὁ,τι βουλει των πολλων. οιον, ει θελεις, πολλαι του εισι κλιναι και τραπεζαι. Πως δ'ου; Αλλα ιδεαι γε του περι ταυτα τα σκευη δυο· μια μεν κλινης, μια δε τραπεζης. P. 596. In the latter of which paſſages in particular it is to be obſerved, that ſeveral ειδη or ιδεαι are ſaid to be πολλα, many in number, and the particulars claſſed

ſays, conſiſting partly of exiſtence and partly of non-exiſtence are the objects of opinion, (δοξα) that holds a middle place between knowledge, which embraces eſſential forms, and ignorance, to which abſolute non-entities are aſſigned.

When Parmenides had ſhewn, that the preſent ſtate of things would reſult from the poſitive hypotheſis of the unity of the univerſe; he proceeded to argue upon the negative hypotheſis, which was found to lead to very different concluſions.

The reaſoning of Parmenides is founded upon the abſtract nature of an unit, and is intended to ſhew, that the preſent ſtate of things reſults from the unity of the univerſe. Hence, if this reaſoning were allowed, the neceſſity of a creator would be ſuperſeded, and the univerſe, conſidered as a whole, would have the principle of exiſtence in itſelf, be independent and eternal.

Ariſtotle, in his Φυσικη ακροασις, examines the opinions of the different philoſophers concerning the principles of things. In the ſecond chapter of the firſt Book, he accuſes

claſſed under each ιδεα are τα πολλα, the many, and that each ſeparate ειδος or ιδεα is εν εκαστον περι εκαστα τα πολλα. Thus Ariſtotle, ſtating the difference of the language, that was held by Plato and ſome other philoſophers concerning the principles of things, ſays, Ὁ μεν (Πλατων) ταυλα ποιει ὑλην, το δε εν το ειδος· οἱ δε το μεν εν το ἀποκειμενον ὑλην, τα δε εναντια διαφορας και ειδη. Nat. Auſc. L. I. C. v.

Meliſſus

Meliſſus and Parmenides of aſſuming falſe principles and of reaſoning unſyllogiſtically from them. He ſays, that the aſſumption of their firſt principle was inconſiſtent with an inveſtigation of nature. That a true natural philoſopher could no more diſpute with them, than a geometrician could diſpute with one, who denied the firſt principles of geometry. The force of the objection conſiſted in this, that they deduced a ſyſtem of Phyſics from a metaphyſical principle.—In the following chapter he urges the abſurdity of treating unit as a principle of production, which is conſidering that as a ſubſtance, which in itſelf expreſſes only quantity or number. In the firſt chapter of the thirteenth book of his Metaphyſics, Ariſtotle himſelf acknowledges unity and exiſtence to be true metaphyſical principles and to comprehend all ſubſiſting beings: πας γαρ λογος και πασα επιςημη των καθολε και ε των εσχαΐων, ὡς' ειη αν ἅτω των πρωΐων γενων· ταυΐα δε γιΐνοιτ' αν το τε ον και το ἑν· ταυΐα γαρ μαλις' αν ὑπολημθειη περιεχειν τα ονΐα παντα.

PLATO's

PLATO's DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.

IT may not be improper in this place to ſay ſomething of Plato's general Doctrine of Ideas. He divided all objects into two grand claſſes, denominated, from the different methods by which we become acquainted with them, rather than from their own nature, Intelligibles and Senſibles. (Νοητα και Αισθητα.) The firſt are the objects of the underſtanding, and the other of the ſenſes *. The intelligibles, which were ſingle in their ſeveral kinds, (ἓν εκαςον) were conſidered as the only real exiſtences and the objects of knowledge. The ſenſibles, which were the many, (τα πολλα) being of a very different deſcription, were the foundations of opinion only.

Under the claſs of ſenſibles he comprehended not only every particular external object, of what kind ſoever, but alſo every particular act or concrete quality belonging to it. There were many beautiful, many good, and many juſt things, (πολλα καλα, πολλα αγαθα, και πολλα δικαια) which were all claſſed under ſenſibles; (αισθητα) ſince the notice of all

* Τα μεν δη ὁρασθαι φαμεν, νοεισθαι δ' ȣ· τας δ' αυ ἰδεας νοεισθαι μεν, ὁρασθαι δ' ȣ. De Rep. L. VI. P. 507.

par-

particulars is conveyed by the ſenſes. But the intelligibles (*τα νοητα*) were thoſe things which are to be comprehended only by the underſtanding with reaſon *. In this claſs were included not only ſpiritual ſubſtances, but alſo all general abſtract qualities. (*τ. ε. το αγαθον και το δικαιον*) So that, in fact, *εν εκαςον νοητον* was the general or abſtract idea, and *τα πολλα αισθητα* the ſeveral particulars arranged under it.

Ariſtotle, who viewed nature with a more curious eye, and who was not ſo much under the influence of a lively and refined imagination, formed a very different judgment upon the ſubject. He maintained, that bodily or material objects were moſt properly entities †. He divided entities (*ουσιαι*) into primary and ſecondary. By primary entities he meant particulars, as a particular man or a particular horſe. By ſecondary entities he meant the ſpecies and genus, under which the particulars are claſſed. Thus the primary entity is a particular man: the ſecondary entities are the ſpecies man and the genus animal ‡. His doctrine therefore is, in this

* Νοησει μετα λογου περιληπτον. Timæ. P. 28.

† Ουσιαι δε μαλιςα ειναι δοκουσι τα σωματα. De Anim. L. II. C. 1. And again: Λεγω δε ουσιας μεν τα τε απλα σωματα, οιον πυρ και γην, και οσα συςοιχα τουτοις, και οσα εκ τουτων. De Cœlo. L. III. C. 1.

‡ Δευτεραι δε ουσιαι λεγονται εν οις ειδεσιν αι πρωτως ουσιαι λεγομεναι υπαρχουσι· ταυτα τε και τα των ειδων τουτων γενη· οιον

this reſpect, directly oppoſite to that of his maſter. For he maintains, that particulars are the only proper entities: that the ſpecies and genus exiſt only in a ſecondary ſenſe; and that they could not exiſt at all, were it not for the particulars or primary entities *. Now, ſays he, an entity ſeems to point out ſome actual and particular thing, which a primary entity truly and indiſputably does. Indeed by the conſtruction of the ſentence a ſecondary entity *appears* to do ſo, but does not in reality. It expreſſes only the quality †.

The reaſon why many philoſophers held general ideas to be the real entities, was, as Ariſtotle very juſtly obſerved ‡, that they regarded particular objects as tranſitory and fleeting. On this account Plato characterizes

ὐιον, ὁ τις ανθρωπος εν ειδει μεν ὑπαρχει τῳ ανθρωπῳ· γενος δε τη ειδυς εϛι το ζωον· δευτεραι ϖν ἀυϛαι λεγονται ϖσιαι, ὁιον ὁ, τε ανθρωπος και το ζωον. Categ. C. v.

* Αἱ ϖρωται ϖσιαι, δια το τοις αλλοις ἁπασιν ὑποκειϭθαι—κυριωτατα ϖσιαι λεγονται—Μη ϖσων ϖν των ϖρωτων ϖσιων, ἀδυνατον των αλλων τι ειναι. Ibid.

† Παϭα δε ϖσια δοκει τοδε τι σημαινειν· επι μεν ϖν των ϖρωτων ϖσιων αναμφισϐητητον και αληθες εϛιν. ὁτι τοδε τι σημαινει. ἀϛομον γαρ και ἐν αριθμῳ το δηλωμενον εϛιν. επι δε των δευτερων ϖσιων φαινεται μεν ὁμοιως τῳ σχηματι της ϖροσηγοριας τοδε τι σημαινειν, ὁταν ειπῃ ανθρωπον ἡ ζωον· ϖ μην γε αληθες· αλλα μαλλον ϖοιον τι σημαινει· ϖ γαρ εϛι το ὑποκειμενον, ὡσπερ ἡ ϖρωτη ϖσια, αλλα καϭα ϖολλων ὁ ανθρωπος λεγεται και το ζωον. Ib.

‡ Τα μεν ϖν εν τοις αισθητοις καθεκαϛα ῥειν ενομιζον, και μενειν ϖδεν ἀυτων. Metaph. L. XI. C. XII. Συνεϐη δ' ἡ ϖερι

rizes his entities as always the ſame and permanent in their nature and relations to each other. (αει κατα ταυτα και ωσαυτως εχοντα) In the Philebus he divides knowledge into two kinds: Firſt, experimental knowledge, which he places in a ſecondary claſs, as being converſant about fluctuating and periſhable things. Secondly, abſtract knowledge, which is intitled to the firſt claſs, as it reſpects things unchangeable and permanent *.

Philo Judæus, no inconſiderable Platoniſt, founds a curious interpretation of Scripture upon this doctrine of Plato. He ſays (περι Χερυβ. p. 116.) that the ſacred writings on this account ſtyle God the huſband, not of a virgin; for that is changeable and mortal —but of virginity, which is of a permanent nature †.

περι των ειδων δοξα τοις ειπησι, δια το πεισθηναι περι της αληθειας τοις Ηρακλειτειοις λογοις, ως παντων των αισθητων αει ρεοντων. ως', ειπερ επιστημη τινος εσαι και φρονησις, ετερας δειν τινας φυσεις ειναι παρα τας αισθητας μενουσας. η γαρ ειναι των ρεοντων επιστημην. C. IV.

* Επιστημη δη επιστημης διαφορα· ἡ μεν, επι τα γιγνομενα και απολλυμενα αποβλεπουσα, ἡ δε, επι τα μητε γιγνομενα, μητε απολλυμενα, κατα ταυτα δε και ωσαυτως οντα αει. ταυτην, εις το αληθες επισκοπουμενοι, ηγησαμεθα εκεινης αληθεστεραν ειναι. P. 61. This is ſimilar to what he had ſaid a little before: Την περι το ον, και το οντως, και το κατα ταυτον αει πεφυκως, παντως εγωγε οιμαι ἡ γεισθαι ξυμπαντας ὁσοις νη και σμικρον προσηρτηται, μακρῳ αληθεστατην ειναι γνωσιν. P. 58.

† Διοπερ ὁ χρησμος πεφυλακται, θεον ανδρα ειπων, η παρθενον. τρεπτη γαρ ἡδε και θνητη. αλλα παρθενιας, της αει κατα τα αυτα και ωσαυτως εχουσης ιδεας.

Con-

CONCERNING ΤΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ.

WE will now examine what Plato has diſcourſed in his treatiſe De Rep. *περι της τ αγαθ ιδεας*, which he calls *μεγιϛον μαθημα*. As Plotinus, Cudworth, (p. 259, 407, &c.) and many others, ſuppoſe *το αγαθον* to mean the * Supreme Being; it will be proper to conſider it with ſome attention.

We know, that all the ſects of heathen philoſophers did, with the greateſt reaſon, look upon the queſtion concerning the Greateſt Good †, as one of the moſt important, that could engage their attention. Cicero, in his Treatiſe concerning Laws, which he wrote in imitation of Plato, ſays, that the queſtion is immediately connected with that ſubject; as it is the buſineſs of him, who draws the plan of a ſtate, always to have an

* Brucker ſeems to think, that Plato here deſcribes the ſecond hypoſtaſis in the divine nature. Hiſt. Critica Philoſoph. Pars II. L. II. C. VI. Sect. I. P. 693.

† Quid eſt enim in vita tanto opere quærendum, quam cum omnia in philoſophia, tum id, quod his Libris quæritur, quid ſit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo ſint omnia bene vivendi rectèque faciendi conſilia referenda? quid ſequatur natura ut ſummum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? Qua de re cum ſit inter doctiſſimos ſumma Diſſenſio, &c.

De Finibus, Lib. I. C. 4.

eye

eye to the greateſt good of the ſubjects, which he can never do, unleſs he knows wherein that good conſiſts.

But let us obſerve, in what manner Plato makes Socrates enter upon this diſcourſe περι της τυ αγαθυ ιδεας, or, as he elſewhere calls it, to diſcover what is the moſt excellent of human poſſeſſions or acquirements. (Προς το διελεσθαι τι των ανθρωπινων κτηματων αριστον. Phileb. p. 19.)

He ſtates it as the moſt difficult, and at the ſame time the moſt important attainment; without which indeed every other poſſeſſion and attainment would be of no value *. Having warned his hearers of the difficulty and importance of the queſtion, he proceeds to ſtate the opinions of others concerning it. The multitude think it to be pleaſure; but thoſe, who are more refined, eſteem it to be knowledge or wiſdom †. The ſubject of enquiry, therefore, was plainly that, which Cicero calls *controverſam rem & plenam diſſentionis inter doctiſſimos* ‡, and which he deſcribes to be that, to which all things are referred, and for the ſake of obtaining

* Η οιει τι πολεον ειναι πασαν κτησιν εκτησθαι, μη μεντοι αγαθην; η πανυ τ' αλλα φρονειν, ανευ τυ αγαθυ, καλον δε κ' αγαθον μηδεν φρονειν; L. VI. P. 505.

† Τοις μεν πολλοις ηδονη δοκει ειναι το αγαθον, τοις δε κομψοτεροις φρονησις.

‡ Theſe are terms very ſimilar to thoſe, which Socrates uſes in ſpeaking of it: ηκην, ὁτι μεν μεγαλαι κ' πολλαι αμφισβητησεις περι αυτυ, φανερον.

which

which all things are to be done *. Hence it appears, that it muſt have been, what the nature of the enquiry implies, and what all philoſophers, how much ſoever they differed in other reſpects, eſteemed it, either the poſſeſſion of ſome external object capable of being enjoyed, or ſome perſonal qualifications, either corporeal or mental, capable of the moſt perfect enjoyment, or a mixture of thoſe ſeveral ingredients †.

Socrates was aſked again, whether he thought the greateſt good to be knowledge, or pleaſure, or ſome thing elſe different from thoſe ‡. He told them, that he could not diſplay to them *το αγαθον* itſelf; but he would ſet before them it's offſpring, moſt like itſelf, which he afterwards explained to be knowledge in the mind and truth in things. By which I conceive him to mean, that *το αγαθον*, the moſt general idea of good, muſt be an abſtract of the univerſal good, an object infinitely beyond the capacity of the human intellect, at leaſt in the preſent ſtate of man; but that ſome reſemblance of it may be attained by knowledge exerciſed upon the truth

* Finem bonorum, quo referuntur omnia, & cujus apiſcendi cauſa ſunt facienda omnia. De Leg. L. 1. C. 20. Or, in the language of Plato, ὁ δη διωκει μεν ἁπασα ψυχη, και τηδε ενεκα πανλα πρατλει.

† Τ' αγαθον δε οικειον τι και δυσαφαιρελον. Ariſt. De Mor. L. I. C. III.

‡ Πολερον επιςημην το αγαθον φης ειναι, η ἡδονην, η αλλο τι παρα ταυλα. P. 506.

of things. Theſe, he ſays, are not το αγαθον, but αγαθοειδη. P. 509. They ſpring from the univerſal good. In the Second Alcibiades, Socrates is made to aſk, what kind of ſtate that would be, which ſhould be compoſed of men ſkilled in all other arts and ſciences ανευ της τε βελτιςε επιςημης. Alcibiades is ſoon prevailed upon to acknowledge, that it would be a ſtate of the greateſt confuſion and anarchy: Αρ' ουκ αν ορθως λεγοιμεν, φαυλες πολλης ταραχης τε και ανομιας μεςην ειναι την τοιαυτην πολιτειαν;

Plato, in the Phædo, makes Socrates, in diſcuſſing the doctrine of Anaxagoras, ſpeak with diſapprobation of his not referring things to goodneſs and fitneſs as their cauſes: ως αληθως το αγαθον και δεον ξυνδειν και ξυνεχειν ουδεν οιονται. P. 99. Here δεον, and of courſe το αγαθον, to which Socrates would refer the compoſition and ſupport of things, muſt be the final cauſe. If any doubt of this could remain, it would be completely diſpelled by a reference to what Socrates ſaid, in the preceding page, he expected from the profeſſion of Anaxagoras. When, ſays he, Anaxagoras profeſſed, that things were diſpoſed by mind; I never imagined, that he would aſſign any other cauſe for them than this, that it is beſt they ſhould be in the manner, in which they are *.

* Ου γαρ αν ποτε αυλον ωμην, φασκοντα γε υπο νε αυλα κεκοσμησθαι, αλλην τινα αυλοις αιτιαν επενεγκειν, η ὁτι βελτιζον αυλα ὁτως εχειν εςιν, ωσπερ εχει.

I will

I will endeavour to throw ſome light upon this ſubject from the works of contemporary writers.

Xenophon was a ſcholar of Socrates at the ſame time with Plato, and has alſo handed down to poſterity many of the diſcourſes of that great teacher of morality to the Gentiles. Not being, like Plato, the founder of a ſect and a lecturer by profeſſion, he did not ſtudy to form an ingenious ſyſtem with materials, culled with the niceſt art from the traditions of diverſe countries and the ſpeculations of diverſe maſters. He told his artleſs tale with an unaffected though elegant ſimplicity. It is not wonderful, that the diſcourſes of Socrates ſhould appear different in the hands of ſuch different relators. One of the moſt ſtriking points of diſtinction is this, that, in Xenophon, Socrates always leads thoſe, who diſpute with him, from abſtract and general reaſonings to particulars.

It happens, that he has preſerved a diſcourſe between Socrates and Ariſtippus concerning the very ſubject, of which we have been treating. As Xenophon is ſuppoſed not to have been on the moſt friendly terms with Plato, I cannot help thinking, that by a particular expreſſion he meant to caſt ſome ridicule upon this doctrine of our author, which Ariſtotle likewiſe ſeems to have thought very open to reprehenſion, from the frequent ſtrictures, which he has paſſed upon it.

Xenophon tells us (Mem. L. III. C. VIII.) that Ariſtippus, deſirous of enſnaring Socrates, aſked him, if he knew what good is *. Do you mean, ſays Socrates, good for a fever?—No—For weakneſs of eyes?—No—For hunger?—No—Then, ſays he, if you aſk me, whether I know any thing good, that is good for nothing; I neither know nor deſire it †.—He then proceeded to ſhew, that there was nothing abſolutely and univerſally good: for that good referred to ſome end; and things, that were handſome and good for ſome purpoſes, were unſeemly and bad for others.

Ariſtotle begins his Ethics with aſſerting, that ſome good is the object of all our aims and purſuits; therefore that, which all things deſire, is called good in an abſolute ſenſe or The Good ‡. This in the ſecond chapter he farther ſtyles happineſs. But here he gives us the ſame account, that we have ſeen before in Plato and Cicero. Men doubt about the nature of this happineſs §. The many, (οἱ πολλοι) as Plato alſo calls them, think, that

* Ει τι ειδειη αγαθον.

† Αρα γαρ, εφη, ερωτᾳς με, ει τι οιδα πυρετῳ αγαθον; ουκ εγωγ', εφη. αλλ' οφθαλμιᾳ; ουδε τουτο. αλλα λιμῳ; ουδε λιμῳ. αλλα μην, εφη, ειγ' ερωτᾳς με, ει τι αγαθον οιδα, ἡ μηδεν ὠφελιμον εστιν, ουκ οιδα, εφη, ουτε δεομαι.

‡ Πασα τεχνη και πασα μεθοδος, ὁμοιως δε πραξις τε και προαιρεσις αγαθου τινος εφιεσθαι δοκει. διο καλως απεφηναντο τ' αγαθον ου παντα εφιεται. L. I. C. I.

§ Περι δε της ευδαιμονιας, τις εστιν, αμφισβητουσι.

it conſiſts of external things, as pleaſure, riches. Some were of opinion, that there was ſome thing good in itſelf, which was the cauſe to other things of their being good *.

Having in the third chapter confuted the opinions of the multitude, he undertakes, in the fourth chapter, to controvert the latter opinion, which was entertained by thoſe, whom he denominates the wiſe. This he calls το καθολε and the opinion of ſome friends. He maintains, that there can be no common or general idea of good (εκ αν ειη κοινη τις επι τυτων ιδεα) becauſe good is expreſſed in ſo many different ways: in the ſubject, as in God and the ſoul; in the quality, as in the virtues; in the quantity, as in moderation, in time, and place, and ſo forth. Again, having diſtinguiſhed good into ends and means (τα μεν καθ' αὑτα, θ' ατερα δε δια ταυτα) let us, ſays he, conſider, if they be expreſſed according to one idea. The concluſion, which he draws from his reaſoning, is, that there is not a common good according to one idea (εκ εϛι αρα το αγαθον κοινον τι καθ' μιαν ιδεαν). Thus Xenophon and Ariſtotle arrive at the ſame point by different roads.

It appears moſt evident to me, that Ariſtotle throughout this whole chapter is con-

* Παρα τα πολλα αγαθα, αλλο τι καθ' αὑτο ειναι, ὁ και τοισδε πασιν αιτιον εϛι τω ειναι αγαθα.

troverting the doctrine of Plato concerning το αγαθον; and all his reaſonings imply, that he underſtood his maſter to mean by it one general abſtract idea of good, under which all other things intitled good are claſſed, which he calls κοινον τι καθολε και εν, and again, εν τι το κοινη καθηγορεμενον αγαθον.

Ariſtotle begins his Great Morals with an enquiry about the ſame το αγαθον, which he pronounces to be the end of all knowledge and power (πασης επιςημης και δυναμεως εςι τι τελος), and ſays, that the idea of good is that, by partaking of which other things are good *. Having come to the ſame concluſion by nearly the ſame reaſoning as before, he attacks Plato more cloſely for introducing ſuch general and abſtract ſpeculations into political diſquiſitions. The profeſſion of no particular art or ſcience comprehends the knowledge of the good of every one. The phyſician knows not what is good in the art of a pilot, nor again the pilot what is good in the profeſſion of a phyſician; but each knows and is concerned about the good of his own occupation. So neither does it concern politics to treat of a good, which is common to all things. Wherefore, when any one undertakes to diſcourſe of good, he ought not to ſpeak of the idea. But the men, againſt whom this

* Ου τ' αλλα μαλακοχονια αγαθα εςι· τυτο δε εςι η ιδεα τ' αγαθυ.

reaſon-

reaſoning is directed, think, that they ought to treat of the idea; for they ought to treat of what is moſt completely good.—This, ſays he, can have no relation to politics, concerning which we are now ſpeaking.—But perhaps the perſon profeſſes to uſe this general good as a firſt principle, from which he will proceed to the particular good. But neither is this right; for he ſhould uſe the principles peculiar to his ſubject (*δει τας αρχας οικειας λαμβανειν*). Otherwiſe he would reſemble a man, who, in order to prove, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, ſhould begin with proving the ſoul immortal. Now we can prove the propoſition, without proving the immortality of the ſoul; and in like manner we can ſpeculate upon other goods, without the abſtract univerſal idea of good (*ανευ τυ κατα την ιδεαν αγαθυ*). Therefore this is not the peculiar principle of that good, which you are ſeeking.

Moſt of this reaſoning is repeated in his Ethics to Eudemus, L. I. C. VIII. particularly that a general abſtract good is of no uſe in politics *. He calls it likewiſe *το τυ αγαθυ ειδος*. And that you may not ſuppoſe it different from other ſpecies or general ideas, he ſays, *ωςε ειναι αυτο το αγαθον την ιδεαν τυ αγαθυ*.

* Ὁτι μεν υν υκ εςιν αυτο τι αγαθον, εχει αποριας τοιαυτας, και ὁτι υ χρησιμον τη πολιτικη, αλλα ιδιον τι αγαθον, ὡσπερ και ταις αλλαις. P. 201.

και γαρ χωρισην ειναι των μετεχονΐων, ὡσπερ και τας αλλας ιδεας. P. 200.

I think, I have now ſaid enough to prove, that Plato did not intend by the term το αγαθον to expreſs a perſon, and therefore that he could not mean by it the ſupreme Being, the firſt perſon of the Trinity; but rather the final cauſe of things, as he ſays in the Philebus, το γε μην ὲ ἑνεκα το ἑνεκα τε γιγνομενον αει γιγνοιτ' αν εν τῃ τε αγαθε μοιρᾳ εκειvο εϛι. P. 54.

In the Philebus, in which Plato profeſſedly treats of the ſame ſubject, he does not ſoar quite ſo high into the regions of abſtraction. The queſtion having been ſtarted, whether pleaſure (ἡδονη) or intellect and knowledge (νες και επιϛημη) are the greateſt good; in the courſe of the enquiry he divides both pleaſure and knowledge into two kinds, differing from each other in degrees of truth and reality; and concludes, that neither of them ſeparately, but that a mixture of the moſt pure parts of each, conſtitutes that good, which is the ſubject of enquiry *.

* Νυν δη τις λογ☉ εμηνυσεν ἡμιν, ὡσπερ και κατ' αρχας, μη ζητειν εν τῳ αμικΐῳ βιῳ τ' αγαθον, αλλ' εν τῳ μικΐῳ. Ει τ' αληθεϛατα τιμηματα ἑκατερας ἰδοιμεν ὡρωτον ξυμμιξανΐες, αρα ἱκανα ταυτα ξυγκεκραμενα τον αγαπητοτατον βιον απεργασαμενα ωαρεχειν ἡμιν; P. 61.

PHI-

PHILEBUS.

IN Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem is the following paſſage: "In his Philebus, "though he agree thus far with thoſe other "ancient philoſophers, ὡς αει τȣ παντος νȣς "αρχει, that mind always rules over the "whole univerſe; yet does he add after- "wards, ὁτι νȣς εϛι γενȣσης τȣ παντων αιτιȣ, "that mind is (not abſolutely the firſt prin- "ple but) cognate with the cauſe of all "things; and that therefore it rules over "all things with and in a kind of ſubordi- "nation to that firſt principle, which is Ta- "gathon, or the higheſt good.—Where when "Plato affirms, that mind or his ſecond di- "vine hypoſtaſis is γενȣσης with the firſt; "it is all one as if he ſhould have have ſaid, "that it is συγγενης, and ὁμοειδης, and ὁμογενης "with it; all which words are uſed by "Athanaſius as ſynonymous with ὁμοȣσιος "coeſſential or conſubſtantial." P. 578. See alſo P. 591.

Plato often ſpeaks of the authority, which the mind or ſoul in general exerciſes over the body, which it animates and informs. He applies to them ſeverally the epithets, go-

verning

verning and governed (ἀρχων και ἀρχομενον). —In the Timæus, ſpeaking of the creation of the univerſe, he ſays, The ſoul, which was prior in time and ſuperior in dignity, was appointed by the Creator as a miſtreſs and governor over the ſubject body *. Hence it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that νους, ὁς ἀρχει τε παντος, is the mind of the univerſe (τε παντος).—But, in order to arrive at the full meaning of the paſſage, upon which Cudworth has given this commentary, it will be proper to conſider the context, and to obſerve the train of reaſoning that led to it.

A diſpute had ariſen between Philebus and Socrates, whether pleaſure or intellect contributed moſt to the good of man. In the courſe of the enquiry Socrates divided all things now exiſting in the univerſe (παντα τα νυν ὀντα εν τω παντι) into four parts. Firſt, what is unlimited (ἀπειρον) viz. thoſe things, which admit of degrees, and have no principle of limitation within themſelves, ſuch as hard, ſoft, harder, ſofter, &c. Secondly, limitation (περας). Thirdly, things produced by the union of limitation with what is in it's own nature unlimited (κοινον). And fourthly, the author or cauſe of the union (το της αιτιας γενος).—Having proved, that pleaſure is of the kind of the unlimited, he then aſks, To which of the forementioned diviſions can

* Ὁ δε και γενεσι και ἀρετῃ προτεραν και πρεσβυτεραν ψυχην σωματος, ὡς δεσποτιν και ἀρξουσαν ἀξιομενα συνεστησατο.

we

we without impiety aſſign wiſdom, and knowledge, and mind or intellect? (φρονησιν δε και επιςημην και νεν εις τι ποτε των προειρημενων νυν θεντες, ουκ αν ασεξοιμεν;) or, as he aſks the ſame queſtion again in other words, Of what kind they are (νεν και επιςημην ερομεν, οποιᾳ γενος εισιν). This, ſays he, is eaſy; for all wiſe men agree, that mind is king of heaven and earth. And perhaps they ſay well. But let us, if you pleaſe, enter into an examination of the kind itſelf (αυτο το γενος) more at large.

Shall we, ſays he, aſſert, that an irrational power and chance preſide over the univerſe; or on the contrary, as thoſe who have gone before us, ſay, that ſome wonderful mind and intelligence arranges and directs it? (νεν και φρονησιν τινα θαυμαςην συνταττεσαν διακοσμειν;) Protarchus, one of his opponents, readily admits, that mind diſpoſes all things (νεν παντα διακοσμειν). Socrates encourages him to perſiſt in this opinion, and aſſures him, that he will take his ſhare of the danger and cenſure, if any doughty diſputant ſhould affirm, that thoſe things were not ſo diſpoſed, but proceeded in a diſorderly manner (οταν δεινος ανηρ φη, ταυτα μη ουτως αλλ' ατακτως εχειν).

He then ſtates the conſtituent parts of the viſible world and human nature. The fire, with which we are converſant, is ſupplied and repleniſhed by the elemental fire, which ſubſiſts

ſubſiſts in the univerſe (εν τω παντι) in a perfect ſtate. It muſt be ſaid alſo of our bodies, that they proceed from and are ſupported by the great body of the univerſe. Do we not ſay, that our body has a ſoul *? Whence did it receive it, if the body of the univerſe be not animated, and have the ſame things as this of ours, and ſtill more beautiful?—There are therefore in the univerſe a kind unlimited, limitation, and ſome cauſe not unimportant preſiding over them (απειρον, περας, και τις επ' αυτοις αιτια ου φαυλη) arranging and conſtituting years, ſeaſons, and months, which is moſt juſtly called wiſdom, and mind or intellect †. But wiſdom and intellect cannot ſubſiſt without ſoul ‡. Therefore we muſt acknowledge, that there is in the nature of Jupiter (that is, the univerſe,) a royal ſoul, and a royal mind, on account of the power of the cauſe. Think not, ſays Socrates,

* See this reaſoning adopted in Cic. De Nat. Deor. L. II. C. VI, VII.

† We find an argument ſimilar to this both in Xenophon and Cicero. Νων δε μονον αρα ουδαμου ουτα σε ευτυχως πως δοκεις συναρπασαι; και ταδε υπερμεγεθη και πανηθη απειρα δι αφροσυνην τινα, ως οιει, ευτακτως εχειν; Xen. Mem. L. I. C. IV.

Quid eſt enim verius, quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte adrogantem, ut in ſe rationem & mentem putet ineſſe, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Cic. De Leg. L. II. C. VII.

‡ Philo ſays, that intellect (νους) is to the ſoul, what the pupil is to the eye. Ψυχη τινα ψυχην καθαπερ κορην εν οφθαλμω. Περι Κοσμου. P. 14.

that

that I have produced this reaſoning to no purpoſe. It ſupports thoſe, who ſaid of old, that mind always governs the world. It alſo furniſhes this anſwer to my enquiry, That mind is of the ſame kind with the cauſe of all things.

It is evident, firſt, that the following paſſages all mean the ſame thing, viz. Νους εστι βασιλευς ημιν ουρανου και γης—Νουν και φρονησιν τινα θαυμαστην συνταττουσαν διακυβερναν—Νουν παντα διακοσμειν—Αει του παντος νους αρχει; and that they are put in oppoſition to the following ſentences; Τα ξυμπαντα και τοδε το καλουμενον ὁλον επιτροπευειν την του αλογου και εικη δυναμιν, και τα ὁπη εἰυχεν, and Ατακτως εχειν. Secondly, That the two following paſſages expreſs and the third refers to the ſame queſtion: Φρονησιν δε και επιστημην και νουν εις τι τουτε των προειρημενων νυν θεντες, ου ασεβοιμεν;—Νουν και επιστημην ερωμενοις, ὁποιαι γενεσ εισιν—Δια μακροτερων δ' ει βουλει, την σκεψιν αυτου του γενους ποιησωμεθα—And that the anſwer to this queſtion is, Νους εστι γενεσεως του παντων αιτιου λεχθεντος των τετταρων, ὡν ην ημιν ἑν τουτο. As Socrates himſelf immediately after expreſſes in direct terms, εχεις γαρ δη που νυν ημων ηδη την αποκρισιν. Thirdly, That Νους, which is ſaid to be γενεσεως του παντων αιτιου, of the ſame kind or akin to the cauſe of all things, is the human mind or intellect conſidered as a ſource of good in oppoſition to pleaſure (ἡδονη), which, conſiſting of ſenſations, was ſtated to be of the kind of unlimited

unlimited (απειρον). For Socrates proceeds thus: It has now been ſatisfactorily ſhewn by us, of what kind it is, and of what power it is poſſeſſed (ὅ μεν γενος εϛι, και τινα τοῖϛε δυναμιν κεκτηται); and alſo the kind (γενος) of pleaſure in like manner ſome time ago appeared. He then repeats the reſult of the preceding inveſtigation: We ſhould remember theſe things concerning both; that mind is akin to the cauſe and in a manner of the ſame kind with it (νους μεν αιτιας ην ξυγγενης και τοῖϛε σχεδον τι γενους); but pleaſure is itſelf unlimited, and of a kind that neither has nor ever will have in and of itſelf either beginning or middle or end.

This doctrine, that the ſoul of man is akin to the ſoul of the univerſe and derived from it, appears frequently in the writings of Plato and his followers. In the tenth book of his Republic he characterizes it as related to the divine and immortal and always exiſting (ὡς συγγενης ϛοα τῳ τε θειῳ και αθανατῳ και αει ονϛι. P. 611).

It abounds every where in Cicero: Quod prævideat animus per ſe, quippe qui Deorum cognatione teneatur. De Divin. I. 30. Neceſſe eſt cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri, 49. When we conſider, how copiouſly Cicero drew his materials from Plato, and what a variety of paſſages, almoſt literally tranſlated, he has tranſfuſed into his works; it is not unreaſonable

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to ſuſpect, that he had our author and his doctrine immediately in his eye, when he wrote the following part of his treatiſe concerning Laws: Cumque alia, quibus cohærent homines, e mortali genere ſumſerint, quæ fragilia eſſent & caduca; animum eſſe ingeneratum a Deo: ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum cœleſtibus, vel genus, vel ſtirps appellari poteſt.—Jam vero virtus eadem in homine ac Deo eſt, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea: eſt autem virtus nihil aliud quam in ſe perfecta & ad ſummum perducta natura. Eſt igitur homini cum Deo ſimilitudo. Quod cum ita ſit, quæ tandem poteſt eſſe prior certiorve cognatio? Cic. De Leg. I. 8.

Moreover, both Cicero, and Maximus Tyrius another profeſſed admirer and follower of Plato, have applied this very doctrine, of the human mind's being derived from the divine, as an argument to prove the very ſame point, for which Plato has here produced it, viz. The ſuperior efficacy of intellect above ſenſual pleaſure to promote the real good of man. Cicero prefaces his reaſoning with an immediate reference to Plato: Ex hoc igitur Platonis quaſi quodam ſancto auguſtoque fonte noſtra omnis manabit oratio. Having ſpoken of the nature and origin of vegetables and irrational animals, he next proceeds to man, the proper ſubject of his enquiry. Ut beſtiis aliud alii præcipui a natura datum eſt, quod ſuum quæque retinet, nec diſcedit ab eo; ſic homini

homini multo quiddam præſtantius: etſi præſtantia debent ea dici, quæ habent aliquam comparationem: humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo, niſi cum ipſo Deo, ſi hoc fas eſt dictu, comparari poteſt. Hic igitur, ſi eſt excultus, & ſi ejus acies ita curata eſt, ut ne cæcetur erroribus, fit perfecta mens, id eſt, abſoluta ratio; quod eſt idem virtus. Et, ſi omne beatum eſt, cui nihil deeſt, & quod in ſuo genere expletum atque cumulatum eſt, idque virtutis eſt proprium: certe omnes, virtutis compotes, beati ſunt. Cic. Tuſc. Diſp. L. V. 13.

The paſſage in Maximus Tyrius ſtands thus: Εχει μεν γαρ, εχει νυν και λογον—και παρα μεν θνητης παλημμελειας το σωμα εχουσι, εκ δε της αθανατυ απορροης τον νυν διαλαμβανουσι—ιδιον δε σαρκων μεν ἡδοναι, νυ δε λογω—ενταυθα τοινυν ζητει το ανθρωπυ αγαθον, ὁπυ το εργον—ενταυθα το εργον, ὁπυ το οργανον· ενταυθα το οργανον, ὁπυ το σωζον—τι ψυχης οργανον; νυς. ζητει το εργον. τι νυ εργον; φρονησις· ευρες το αγαθον. Diſſ. XXXIV.

EPISTLES.

EPISTLES.

The Second Epistle to DIONYSIUS.

THE reaſoning and expreſſion, uſed in the Philebus, will ſerve to throw ſome light upon a paſſage in the ſecond Epiſtle to Dionyſius: Φης γαρ δη, καλα τον εκεινυ λογον, υχ' ικανως αποδεδειχθαι σοι περι της τυ πρωτυ φυσεως. Φραζεον δη σοι δι' αινιγμων—ωδε γαρ εχει· περι τον παντων βασιλεα παντ' εζι, και εκεινυ ενεκα παντα· και εκεινο αιτιον απαντων των καλων. δευτερον δε περι τα δευτερα, και τριτον περι τα τριτα.

When we conſider the character of Dionyſius, and call to mind, that the * purpoſe of Plato's viſiting him was to inculcate moderation upon him; it is natural to ſuppoſe, that the reaſoning, uſed in the Philebus, would conſtitute a very important part of the Lectures, delivered by the Philoſopher to the Prince. He would ſtate to him, that there

* Plato explains this purpoſe in his ſeventh Epiſtle, which was directed to the friends of Dio. He ſays, that Dio, having attached himſelf to virtue in preference to pleaſure and luxurious living (αρετην περι πλειονος ηδονης της τε αλλης τρυφης ηγαπηκως. P. 327.) was deſirous, that Dionyſius alſo ſhould be brought to the ſame ſtate of mind. He therefore prevailed upon Plato to make a voyage to Syracuſe for that purpoſe.

are in the univerſe three principles, απειρον, περας, και το της αιτιας γενος: and as in the univerſe the moſt noble and beautiful productions are formed by the operation of mind or intellect, connecting limitation with the things, that are in themſelves unlimited; ſo alſo in man the greateſt good is produced by connecting limitation (περας) with the pleaſing ſenſations (ἡδοναι) which are in their own nature unlimited.

We might likewiſe expect to find, that as long as the Prince thought proper to continue the connexion with the Philoſopher, this ſubject would engage a conſiderable part of their attention.

The paſſage in queſtion confirms this reaſoning, and is illuſtrated by it; though it is deſignedly involved in obſcurity, that, in the caſe of the letter's miſcarrying, it might not be underſtood by any, but thoſe who had ſome previous knowledge of the principles of the author. In it is contained an enumeration of the three principles; the firſt of which, τον παντων βασιλεα, is the ſame as το παντων αιτιον, βασιλευς ἡμιν ουρανου και γης, by which, from a mixture of the other two principles, ὡραι τε και ὁσα αλλα παντα ἡμιν γεγονε, των τε απειρων και των περας εχοντων συμμιχθεντων.

The human mind, proceeds Plato, is earneſtly deſirous of learning the nature of theſe things, looking into the things of itſelf, that are related to them; none of which it has in

a perfect ſtate. But there is nothing of this kind (that is, of a ſtate, which is not perfect) with reſpect to the king, and the things which I have mentioned. Τȣ δη βασιλεως περι και ὡν ειπον ȣδεν εϛι τοιȣ̃το. Conſequently, the knowledge, which the mind acquires of the nature τȣ πρωτȣ, by looking into the correſponding things of itſelf, muſt be inadequate.

Plato here alludes to what is taught in the Philebus; firſt, that the conſtituent parts of man are of the ſame kind with the conſtituent parts of the univerſe: ſecondly, that thoſe parts in man are imperfect; but in the univerſe they are perfect.

THE SIXTH EPISTLE.

NEAR the latter end of Plato's ſixth Epiſtle is the following paſſage: τον των παντων Θεον, ἡγεμονα των τε ὀντων και των μελλοντων, τε τε ἡγεμονος και αιτιε παντερα κυριον. The author here appears to me to expreſs himſelf according to the ſyſtem of a creator and a creation. I conceive, that τον παντων Θεον correſponds with το παντων αιτιον and βασιλευς ἡμιν κ. τ. λ. in the Philebus, the univerſe or the ſoul of the univerſe. According to this interpretation αιτιε παντερα κυριον muſt mean the eternal, ſelf-exiſtent being, the Creator of the univerſe, who is called in the Timæus δημιεργος and παντηρ.

CRA-

CRATYLUS.

THE ſame terms in the Philebus are likewiſe explanatory of the following paſſages in the Cratylus: Ου γαρ εσιν ἡμιν και τοις αλλοις πασιν, ὁσις εσιν αιτιος μαλλον τε ζην, η ὁ αρχων τε και βασιλευς των παντων. συμβαινει αν ορθως ονομαζεσθαι ἑτως (Ζηνα) τω Θεω ειναι, δι' ὁν ζην αει πασι τοις ζωσιν ὑπαρχει. P. 396. Cudworth (P. 259,) ſaw the neceſſity of referring here to ψυχη *, the third hypoſtaſis of his Platonic Trinity, thoſe very titles, which in other paſſages he ſuppoſes to be applied, as diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics, to the two other hypoſtaſes. But the truth is, that they all refer to that one principle of life and intelligence, which was ſuppoſed to pervade the univerſe, and regulate all it's motions and operations.

* Hanc ego mallem interpretationem junioribus, a quibus profecta eſt, Platonicis, Plotino & cæteris reliquiſſet vir doctiſſimus, quam ſuam feciſſet. Nec enim, quamvis Plato Saturni, Jovis & Cœli loco iſto mentionem faciat, ullum ego ibi veſtigium video trium illorum principiorum, multo minus cum tribus his Platonicorum principiis tria Græcorum nomina componi cerno. Peſſimi, meo judicio, Platonis interpretes ſunt, qui poſt natum Servatorem Platonicorum adoptarunt ſibi vocabulum Quorum quidem animi, quoniam tribus illis principiis toti erant infecti & imbuti, ideo ubivis ea quoque ſagacius, quam fas erat, in Platone venabantur, cujus quippe præcepta videri volebant unice inculcare. Moſhem. in loc. Tom. 1. P. 380.

TIMÆUS.

THE Timæus of Plato cuts ſo diſtinguiſhed a figure in the preſent queſtion, and has been ſo often quoted and referred to by authors, that we may venture to enter upon an examination of it without any farther preface.

Timæus, who is the ſuppoſed expoſitor of the ſyſtem advanced in this Dialogue, divides things into two claſſes: Firſt, What is without beginning and unchangeable, which is comprehended by the underſtanding with reaſoning. Secondly, What is made, and periſhes, and is the ſubject of opinion only, being in it's nature variable, and having nothing in it ſo ſtable, as to furniſh the materials of knowledge properly ſo called.

What is made, neceſſarily implies an author. Now whatever the Creator forms, looking at what is invariable and uſing ſuch a pattern, muſt be completely beautiful. But whatever he forms, looking at what has been made and uſing ſuch a pattern, will not be completely beautiful.

Having conſidered the univerſe, and concluded from it's being viſible, that it was made; he next enquires, whether the Creator,

tor, in forming it, looked at an invariable pattern, or at one that was made, and aſſerts, it is manifeſt, from the beauty of the work and the excellence of the Creator, that he looked at what is unchangeable. For, ſays he, *that* is the moſt beautiful of the things which have been made, and *he* is the beſt of cauſes. Thus it was formed according to a pattern, comprehenſible by reaſon and thought, and unvarying.

Having thus diſtinguiſhed the image and the pattern, he ſtates the nature of the account, which he is about to give. He calls it only a probable ſtory and probable reaſonings (εικοτα μυθον και εικοτας λογους) which they muſt be content, on account of the imperfection of their common nature, to accept, inſtead of ſuch expoſitions as would correſpond with the dignity of the ſubject. Theſe latter, in oppoſition to the others, he calls αὐτοις ὁμολογουμενους και απηκριβωμενους λογους.

He then proceeds to enquire into the reaſon and manner of the creation. The firſt he attributes to the goodneſs of the Creator. With reſpect to the manner, he ſays, the Creator took what is viſible, viz. matter *, which moved irregularly and diſorderly, and reduced it to order from diſorder, on account of the excellence of the former above the latter.

* Αλλα και τυδε παλιν ὁ μεγαλοφων Πλατων ουχ ὁμολογει, λεγων αρχας ειναι Θεον, και ὑλην και παραδειγμα. Hermiæ Irriſio Gent. Philoſop.

He conſidered alſo (Λογισαμενος) that what is intelligent is more excellent, than what is devoid of intelligence; but that there cannot be mind or intelligence without ſoul or life. On account of this reaſoning (δια τον λογισμον τονδε) having conſtituted a mind in a ſoul and a ſoul in a body, he compoſed the whole, that he might complete a work moſt beautiful and excellent in it's nature. Thus ought we to ſay, according to a probable account (κατα λογον τον εικοτα) that this world was in truth made an animated and intelligent being by the Providence of God (δια την του Θεου γενεσθαι προνοιαν). The whole compoſition of the ſoul, he ſays, was completed according to the mind of the compoſer (κατα νουν ξυνιςανται).

When he ſpeaks afterwards of the production of time, in which this animated and intelligent being ſhould exiſt; he ſays, Therefore from ſuch reaſoning and conſideration of God (εξ ων λογου και διανοιας Θεου τοιαυτης) the ſun, &c. was made.

From all this it appears moſt evident to me, that λογισμος, προνοια, λογος, and διανοια Θεου are only operations of the ſupreme intelligence, as προνοιας θεων (p. 44.) is of the inferior gods.

I will now examine the nature of the pattern and the image ſpoken of in this diſcourſe.

I have already ſhewn at large, that, in the writings of Plato, general or abſtract ideas

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are conſidered as the real entities, on account of the ſtability of their nature, different from particular exiſtences, which are in a ſtate of perpetual change; and that he denominated them ever-exiſting, as they bear no relation to time, nor are they affected by it. I will, however, produce a paſſage or two more to confirm a point of ſo much importance in determining the meaning of the pattern mentioned in the Timæus, a miſconception concerning which has been very extenſive in it's operation.

It is one of the leading principles of the Platonic Philoſophy, that general or abſtract ideas only can be the foundation of real knowledge; as they only are exact and permanent in their nature and relations *.

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* Arguing upon this principle in his Dialogue concerning a Republic, (L. v. P. 478.) he reprobates the pretenſions to wiſdom advanced in favour of thoſe men, who are converſant with particulars only. Αποκρινεσθω ὁ χρης, ὁς αυτο μεν καλον και ιδεαν τινα αυτ καλης μηδεμιαν ἡγειται αει καλα τ' αυτα ὡσαυτως εχσαν· πολλα δε τα καλα νομιζει εκειν ὁ φιλοθεαμων, και ηδαμη ανεχομεν, αν τις ἐν το καλον φῃ ειναι και δικαιον και τ' αλλα ὁτω.—True philoſophers he characterizes thus: τσς αυτα εκαςα θεωμενης και αει καλα τα αυτα ὡσαυτως ονλα.—Again, in the beginning of the following book, he defines philoſophers οἱ τ αει καλα τ' αυτα ὡσαυτως εχον δυναμενοι εφαπτεσθαι.—The terms, in which he deſcribes the unphiloſophic, deſerve our particular attention: τ ον εκαςυ εςερημενοι της γνωσεως, και μηδεν εναργες εν τῃ ψυχῃ εχοντες παραδειγμα.—Again, (P. 486.) ſpeaking of the turn of mind to be expected in a philoſopher, he ſays, Εμμετρον αρα και ευχαριν ζητωμεν φ τοις αλλοις διανοιαν φυσει, ἡν επι την τ ον ιδεαν εκαςυ το αυτοφυες, ευαγωγον παρεξει.—By the two laſt cited

The Timæus of Plato is derived from the treatiſe of Timæus the Locrian concerning the ſoul of the world. In this treatiſe the pattern (παραδειγμα) is called ιδεα and ειδος, the idea and the ſpecific form, which was eternal and co-exiſtent with ὑλη, matter, but diſtinct from and oppoſite to it. What was formed at the creation by the conjunction of theſe two, is called their offspring (τα εκ τουτων εκγονα). Information concerning theſe three is attained by three different ways—concerning idea or ſpecific form, by the mind according to knowledge—concerning elemental matter, by ſpurious reaſoning (λογισμῳ νοθῳ), ſo called, becauſe it does not arrive at that certainty and preciſion, which are attained by abſtract reaſoning—concerning their offspring, particular material objects, produced by the union of ſpecific form with elemental matter, by ſenſation and opinion.

We are to underſtand, ſays the philoſopher, that, before the creation, there were Idea or abſtract form, Matter, and God the Creator. Now God ſaw matter aſſuming ſpecific form (την ιδεαν) and changing, in all ways indeed, but diſorderly. He was therefore deſirous of

cited paſſages it appears, that the terms ιδεα and παραδειγμα are uſed to expreſs abſtract ideas. Agreeable to this is the account, which Diogenes Laertius gives of the philoſophy of Plato: Εϛι δε των ειδων εν εκαϛον αϊδιον τε και νοημα, και παρ' τουτοις απαθες· διο και φησιν εν τη φυσει τας ιδεας εϛαναι καθαπερ παραδειγματα· τα δ' αλλα τουτοις οοικεναι, τουτων ὁμοιωματα καθεϛωτα. Πλατων. P. 73.

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bringing it to order, of converting it from it's indeterminate ſtate, and of making it determinate—that there might be diſtinctions of bodies, and that they might not receive undirected changes.

Let us now conſider Plato's deſcription of the pattern. He ſays, that it contained within itſelf all intelligible animals; as this world contains us and all other living creatures. For God, deſiring to make this world reſemble, as much as poſſible, the moſt beautiful of intelligibles, which was in all reſpects perfect, made it one viſible animal, having within it all correſponding animals, according to it's nature. If due allowance be made for the peculiar language of the Pythagorean and Platonic ſchools; nothing can be more plain, than that the pattern ſignifies no more than the abſtract idea, according to which the univerſe was formed, with parts in the one anſwering to parts in the other *.

Ariſtotle (Natur. Auſc. L. II. C. III.) diſtinguiſhes the cauſes of things into four kinds: Firſt, the ſubject matter, as braſs in the compoſition of a ſtatue, &c. Secondly, the ſpecific or generic form. Thirdly, the author. Fourthly, the final cauſe. The terms, in which he deſcribes the ſecond kind, or ſpecific and generic forms, are theſe, το ειδος και το πα-

* Νοητος επαγη κοσμος το τε φαινομενε τηδε αρχετυπον, ιδεαις αορατοις συνεσταθεις ωσπερ ητος σωμασιν ορατοις.
Philo Jud. De Confus. Ling. P. 345. Paris.

ραδειγμα

παδειγμα· (τυτο δ' εςιν ὁ λογος ὁ τυ, τι ην, ειναι) και τα τυτυ γενη.

With reſpect to the nature of the ſoul of the univerſe, it may be proper, firſt, to obſerve, that mind and ſoul do not ſignify two diſtinct independent exiſtences, as ſome have ſuppoſed. Ψυχη, ſoul, when conſidered ſeparately, ſignifies the principle of life: Νυς, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, according to Plutarch, (Plat. Quæſt. P. 1015). ſoul is the cauſe and beginning of motion, and mind of order and harmony with reſpect to motion *. Together they ſignify an intelligent ſoul (εννυς ψυχη) which is ſometimes called a rational ſoul (ψυχη λογικη). Hence, when the nature of the ſoul is not in queſtion, the word ψυχη is uſed to expreſs both. Thus in the Phædo, P. 79. the ſoul (ψυχη) is ſaid ſometimes to uſe the body for the examination of things (τω σωματι προσχρηται εις το σκοπειν τι); at which times, according to the principles of Plato, it forms confuſed and imperfect notions of things, and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by itſelf, it arrives at what is pure and always exiſting, and immortal and uniform, and is free from error. Here the higheſt operations of νυς, mind, are indiſputably attributed to ψυχη, ſoul.

* Ψυχη γαρ αιτια κινησεως και αρχη, νυς δε ταξεως και συμφωνιας περι κινησιν.

Ariſtotle,

Ariſtotle, deſcribing ψυχη, ſoul, ſays, that during anger, confidence, deſire, &c. it participates with the body; but that the act of underſtanding belongs peculiarly to itſelf *. Again, he ſays, Plato in the Timæus, in the ſame manner as Empedocles, makes the ſoul out of the elemental principles of things; for that like is known by like †. Soon after he ſays, that ſoul has in it a principle both of motion and of knowledge ‡.

It is evident, that παν τοδε or κοσμος, here treated of by Plato, is the ſyſtem of heaven and earth, and of the ſeveral natures contained in them §. And that νους και ψυχη κοσμε is, as Cicero expreſſes it, vis quædam ſentiens, quæ eſt toto confuſa mundo, performing the ſame functions in the great body of the univerſe at large, that human ſouls do in our bodies, giving life and motion to it's ſeveral parts, directing thoſe motions with conſummate wiſdom, and communicating different portions of it's eſſence to the different beings, that are contained within the bounds

* Φαινεται δε των πλειστων ουδεν ανευ σωματος πασχειν ουδε ποιειν, οιον, οργιζεσθαι, θαρρειν, επιθυμειν, ὁλως αισθανεσθαι. μαλιστα δ' εοικεν ιδιον το νοειν. Περι Ψυχης. L. I. C. 1.

† Τον αυτον τροπον εν τῳ Τιμαιῳ Πλατων την ψυχην εκ των στοιχειων ποιει· γινωσκεσθαι γαρ ὁμοιῳ ὁμοιον. C. II.

‡ Επει δε και κινητικον εδοκει ψυχη ειναι και γνωριστικον. Ibid.

§ Κοσμος μεν ουν εστι συστημα εξ ουρανου και γης και των εν τουτοις περιεχομενων φυσεων. Arist. Περι Κοσμου. C. 1. Δηλος γαρ ὁ λογιζομενος θεος ὁ δημιουργος· ὁ δε εσομενος και γιγνομενος αιει ὁ κοσμος. Stobæi Ecl. Phy. L. I. C. 1.

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of it's all-comprehending circumference; thus effecting and maintaining the variations of times and of ſeaſons, the changes of organized and unorganized matter, and the uninterrupted ſucceſſion of animated and rational beings. The proof of the exiſtence of this rational ſoul, animating and directing the univerſe, was derived, as has been already obſerved, from the obſervable fecundity of nature, and the order and harmony of it's parts and motions.

That *ωαν τοδε* or *κοσμος* was not eternal a parte ante is manifeſt from the whole tenor of the relation. We have the reaſoning of the Creator concerning this future God, before he was created (*λογισμος Θεϖ ϖερι τον εσσομενον Θεον*). We have a direct aſſertion of the creation of it (*δια δη τον λογισμον τονδε, νϖν μεν εν ψυχῃ, ψυχην δε εν σωμαϛι συνιϛας, το ϖαν ξυνετεκϛαινετο*). On account of this reaſoning having conſtituted a mind in a ſoul and a ſoul in a body, he compoſed the whole.—Thus this world was made by the providence of God an animated and intelligent being (*ζωον εμψυχον ενϖϖ τε*).

Nay, the philoſopher does not even ſtop here, but lays before us the order of the work and the particulars of the compoſition; the reſult of which is contained in the following words: *Δια ϖαυϛα δη ταυϛα ευδαιμονα Θεον αυϛον εγενηϛο.*—Time is ſaid to have been made with it; that, having been made together, they

they might alſo be diſſolved together, if there ſhould ever be a diſſolution of them (ἱνα ἁμα γενηθεντες, ἁμα και λυθωσιν, ἀν ποτε λυσις αυτων γενηται.—That it is not incapable of being diſſolved is clear from the declaration of the Creator to the Gods, whom he ſtiles Θεοι Θεων: Every thing, that has been compacted, is diſſoluble. Wherefore, ſince you have been made, you are not immortal (το μεν ουν δη δεθεν παν, λυτον—δι' ὰ και επειπερ γεγενησθε, αθανατοι μεν ουκ εστε).—It is manifeſt likewiſe from the terms, in which το παν, the univerſe itſelf, is deſcribed in the treatiſe of Timæus the Locrian: τουτον εποιει θεον γενναλον, επομενον φθαρησομενον ὑπ' αλλῳ αιτιῳ, εξω τῳ αυλον συνλεταγμενῳ θεῳ, ειποκα δηλετο αυλον διαλυειν. P. 94.

It will be proper to repeat here an obſervation, which was made at the beginning of the examination of the Parmenides. Plato in the Timæus, as well as in that Dialogue, is unwilling to make himſelf or Socrates reſponſible for the truth of the doctrines, which are maintained in it. He therefore does not, according to his uſual cuſtom, advance them as the ſentiments of Socrates; but attributes them to another, for whoſe credit he is not ſo much concerned. He moreover does not pretend, that the knowledge of them was attained by the principles of reaſon; but he founds their truth upon the authority of tradition.

This

This obſervation will ſerve to explain a circumſtance, which muſt otherwiſe appear very extraordinary. The real opinion of Plato concerning the eternity of the world has been much controverted at different periods of time. If the Timæus repreſented the genuine ſentiments of Plato, it would be impoſſible for any rational doubts to be entertained upon the ſubject. For this Dialogue not only contains the moſt expreſs declarations, that the world had a beginning, but alſo explains the nature of the different parts, of which it was compoſed; and ſtates the order, in which they were at firſt ſeverally created, and afterwards compacted. But if we conſider him in this Dialogue as only repreſenting the ſentiments of another, without intending to pledge himſelf abſolutely for the truth of them; nothing deciſive and incontrovertible can be derived from this Dialogue for ſettling the controverſy.

In this Dialogue the Creator, who exiſted eternally, is diſtinguiſhed from the intelligent ſoul of the world, which, we are told, was actually created, though prior in time and ſuperior in dignity to the body of groſs matter, which it animates and modifies. This intelligent ſoul is generally conſidered by the ancients as the principle and ſource of life and intelligence, and the ſupporter of order and harmony in the univerſe; and therefore in all ordinary caſes an inveſtigation of the nature

nature and origin of things uſually terminates in it.

Minutius Felix informs us, that the God of Pythagoras was deſcribed in terms of the ſame import: Pythagoræ Deus eſt animus, per univerſam rerum naturam commeans & intentus; ex quo etiam animalium omnium vita capiatur. Octav. C. XIX.

Recourſe was ſeldom had to any other being, except to account for the origin of the univerſe in oppoſition to thoſe, who maintained, that it exiſted from eternity. They, who aſſerted, that the univerſe was created, were under the neceſſity of providing a Creator. But they ſeldom made any other uſe of him, than juſt to account for the origin of the world. Hence Plato excuſes himſelf from enlarging upon the nature and attributes of this ſupreme Being, by ſaying, that it is difficult to diſcover the maker and father of this univerſe; and when he has been diſcovered, it is impoſſible to declare him to all: Τον μεν ων ποιητην και πατερα τωδε του παντος ευρειν τε εργον, και ευ ουτα, εις παντας αδυνατον λεγειν. Timæ. P. 28. In this caſe, however, the ſoul of the world, the principle of life and intelligence, the ſupporter of the ſucceſſion of beings, and the maintainer of order in the univerſe, held only the ſecond place. Whereas, on the other hypotheſis, this ſame principle is held to be the firſt cauſe.

What Origen ſays of the Stoics and Platonics is perfectly agreeable to this: The Greeks affirm, that the whole world is a God: the Stoics, that it is the firſt God: the Platonics, that it is the ſecond *. The Stoics maintained the eternity of the world. They had therefore occaſion to account for no more than the ſucceſſion of beings, and the wiſdom and order, with which the affairs of the univerſe were conducted. For this the ſoul of the world was ſufficient, and was eſteemed their firſt God. The Platonics derived moſt of their opinions from the Timæus, in which the doctrine of a Creator is taught. He therefore was neceſſarily the firſt God; and the ſoul of the world could occupy only the ſecond place of dignity in this ſyſtem. An attention to this diſtinction will ſerve to account for that apparent inconſiſtency in the principles of Plato, to which Cicero makes Velleius the Stoic object. De Nat. Deor. L. I. C. XII.

It would be eaſy to produce a great number of inſtances from the writings of Plato, Cicero, and others, in ſupport of what is here laid down. But, as on any ſuppoſition it is equally impoſſible to diſcover in this Dialogue the doctrine of the Holy Trinity;

* Σαφως δη τον ὁλον κοσμον λεγουσιν ειναι Θεον, Στωϊκοι μεν τον πρωτον· οἱ δ' απο Πλατωνος τον δευτερον. Contra Celſum. L. V. P. 235. Ed. Spencer. Cant. 1677.

it

it would lead me too far from the immediate ſubject of my enquiry to dwell any longer upon this topic. For the ſame reaſon, becauſe I would not meddle with any thing, that is not immediately and neceſſarily connected with my ſubject, I have declined entering into the controverſy concerning Plato's opinion of the nature and mode of the ſubſiſtence of ideas. Whether it be determined, that Plato taught, that they ſubſiſted notionally or ſubſtantially in the divine intellect; the deciſion, I conceive, will not of itſelf tend in the ſlighteſt degree to prove Plato's doctrine to have been, that the intellect is perſonally diſtinct from the ſupreme Being, to whom it belongs. Still leſs, if poſſible, can the queſtion be affected by any other hypotheſis concerning the nature and mode of the ſubſiſtence of ideas.

Having examined all the principal paſſages, which are produced from the writings of Plato, to prove, that he was acquainted with the doctrine of three hypoſtaſes in the divine nature; and having ſhewn, as I conceive, that none of them, in their true and genuine ſignification, do actually countenance the hypotheſis; I will endeavour to inveſtigate the ſubject farther, and trace out the origin and progreſs of the opinion in later times.

Of the ORIGIN *and* PROGRESS *of the* OPINION *of the* PLATONIC TRINITY.

SEVERAL ſects of Pagan Philoſophy in a manner derived their origin from the ſchool of Plato, yet no one of them, whether it profeſſed to adopt his opinions in the whole, or only in part, either affirmed or denied this article, which, if it had been really maintained by Plato, muſt have held ſo diſtinguiſhed a place among his tenets. Even Cicero has taken no notice of this ſtriking peculiarity; though he not only was a paſſionate admirer and imitator of Plato, but alſo made it the chief employment of his latter days to tranſpoſe into the Roman language the moſt important doctrines and reaſonings of the ſeveral ſects of Grecian Philoſophy. This profound ſilence is too remarkable and too general to be attributed to chance. Neither the high eſtimation, in which the writings of Plato were held, nor the penetration and induſtry of the many learned men, who either propagated or avowedly deviated from his opinions, will permit us for a moment to ſuppoſe, that this article could have been wholly overlooked, or regarded as a circumſtance of no moment.

If

If this opinion cannot be found in the writings of Plato, and is not attributed to him by the ſubſequent philoſophers of Greece and Rome; it is of importance to inveſtigate, by what means it gained admiſſion among men. For this purpoſe it will be neceſſary to examine at large the writings of Philo, an Helleniſt Jew, who ſtudied at Alexandria.

An ENQUIRY *into the* DOCTRINES *of* PHILO JUDÆUS.

Num cenſes igitur ſubtiliore ratione opus eſſe ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, ſpem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, ſalutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejuſmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non Deorum.

Cic. De Nat. Deor. L. III. C. 24.

BEFORE I enter upon this enquiry, I wiſh to remark, that it is confined entirely to the opinions of Philo himſelf. I do not mean to determine any thing about the doctrines of the Jews relative to the divine nature in the time of Philo: though all expoſitions of them, which are founded upon different interpretations of Philo, muſt, as far as they depend upon ſuch interpretations, be affected by my reaſonings, if they be allowed to be valid. Leaſt of all would I have it ſuppoſed, that I mean to deny, that many paſſages of the Old Teſtament refer to the ſecond perſon of the ever-bleſſed Trinity; when I deny, that Philo's interpretations of them have any ſuch reference.

A diſtinguiſhed * writer upon this ſubject has affirmed, that Philo was not a Platoniſt. If he had meant by this aſſertion, that Philo

* Allix's Judgment of the Jewiſh Church. P. 354.

did

did not adopt all the opinions of Plato, it muſt have been admitted. For it was ſcarcely poſſible for him to do this, without abandoning the religion of his fathers, which, with all his bias towards philoſophy, he does not appear to have entertained any thought of doing. But the author, to whom I refer, goes farther. He ſays, Philo had been ſo little acquainted with Plato's works, that he brings ſome of Plato's opinions upon the credit of Ariſtotle *. It is a queſtion of words, whether he ſhould be called a Platoniſt or an Eclectic; becauſe he did not abandon Judaiſm, and, embracing all the opinions, prove his doctrines by the authority of Plato. But it is of importance to the preſent enquiry to ſhew, that Philo was ſo well acquainted with the principles of Plato, that he made great uſe of them in his own theological works.

Philo has adopted Plato's diviſion of things into the two great claſſes, Intelligibles and Senſibles (νοητα και αισθητα), the former of which he characterizes in the language of Plato, as always the ſame in their properties and relations (αει κατα ταυτα και ωσαυτως εχοντα). But the latter he ſtates, on the contrary, to be ſubject to perpetual changes (παν γαρ το αισθητον εν γενεσει και μεταβολαις, ουδεποτε κατα ταυτα ον. Περι Κοσμ. P. 2). Like him in Philebus, he calls the ſtars living and intel-

* I preſume, he alludes to what Philo ſays, Περι Αφθ. Κοσμ. P. 941. Ed. Turneb. et Hoeſchel. Par. 1640.

ligent beings (ζωα τε ειναι λεγουσαι και ζωα νοερα. P. 16); where likewiſe he ſays, that man derives his ideas of muſic and virtue which conſiſts in well-harmonized affections, from the harmony that is conſpicuous in the works of creation. From this men, who were formed after them, inſcribed on their own ſouls, and delivered down the moſt neceſſary and moſt profitable rules of life (αφ' ης οι μετα ταυτα ανθρωποι, γραψαμενοι ταις εαυτων ψυχαις, αναγκαιοταυτην και ωφελιμωταυτην τεχνην τω βιω παρεδοσαν. P. 17). In conformity with this doctrine, he ſtyles wiſdom a well-harmonized and completely muſical ſymphony of virtues (ευαρμοστον και παμμουσον συμφωνιαν αρετων. Περι Συγχ. Διαλεκτ. P. 326). In the ſame language he deſcribes vicious folly to be an inharmonious, diſcordant, untuneful ſymphony (αναρμοστον και εκμελη και αμουσον συμφωνιαν. P. 322). Again, as Plato in his Timæus calls time an image of eternity, ſo Philo calls eternity the archetype and pattern of time (αρχετυπον τε χρονε και παραδειγμα αιων. Περι τε ὁτι ἀπρεπτ το Θειον. P. 298).

But, above all, it is moſt evident, that he had the Timæus of Plato in his eye, when he wrote his treatiſe of the Creation of the World, and that he grounded his explanations upon the ſame principles. Thus, having divided things into intelligible, which are eternal, unchangeable and permanent; and ſenſible, which are generated, are changeable and

and fleeting; he enquires, whether the world had a beginning. This queſtion he anſwers as readily as Plato did, and upon the ſame principle: Since it is viſible and the object of ſenſe, it muſt have been made (επει ην ὁρατος τε και αισθητος ὁδε ὁ κοσμος, αναγκαιως αν ειη και γενητος). This is preciſely the reaſon, which was before aſſigned by Plato in Timæus for the world's having had a beginning: It was made; for it is viſible and tangible, and has a body, that is, a body of groſs matter (γεγονεν· ὁρατος γαρ ἁπτος τε εϛι και σωμα εχων).

Again Philo tells us, that God foreſaw, that an imitation could not be beautiful without a beautiful pattern; and that nothing material was faultleſs, which had not been framed according to an archetype and intelligible idea. On this account, when he reſolved to create this viſible world, he firſt modelled the intelligible one, that by this incorporeal and moſt divine pattern, he might conſtruct the material world *. This material

* Προλαβων ὁ Θεος ὰτε Θεος, ὁτι μιμημα καλον ουκ αν ποτε γενοιτο καλως διχα παραδειγματος, ουδε τι των αισθητων ανυπαιτιον, ὁ μη προς αρχετυπον και νοητην ιδεαν απεικονισθη, βουληθεις τον ὁρατον τουτον κοσμον δημιουργησαι, προεξετυπωϛ τον νοητον, ινα χρωμενος ασωματῳ και θεοειδεϛατῳ παραδειγματι, τον σωματικον απεργασηται. P. 3. In this paſſage he clearly had in his eye the following one of Plato upon the ſame ſubject in the Dialogue above-mentioned. Ὁπως μεν ουν ὁ δημιουργος, προς το καλα ψαυτα εχον βλεπων αει, τοιουτῳ τινι προσχρωμενος παραδειγματι, την

rial world, which was to be the image of the intelligible, was to contain as many kinds of ſenſible beings, as there were intelligibles in the pattern *. This intelligible world, according to Philo, was compoſed of ideas. It is not allowable, he ſaid, to affirm or ſuppoſe, that it ſubſiſted in any place. But we ſhall know, where it did ſubſiſt, by purſuing the analogy of things in ourſelves †. When a city is to be built for ſome great prince or potentate, a man, well inſtructed in architecture, comes forward, and, having examined the ſituation, firſt deſcribes within himſelf almoſt all the parts of the city that is to be built, temples, places of exerciſe, courts of juſtice, market-places, harbours, docks, &c. Then having received the types of each of them in his mind, as in wax, he frames an intelligible city, and ſtamps the images of the ſeveral parts on his memory. To this model he looks, when he begins to

την ιδεαν και δυναμιν απεργαζηται, καλον εξ αναγκης ὅτως αποτελειϲθαι ϖαν· ὁ δ' αν εις το γεγονὸϛ, γενηϯῳ ϖαραδειγμαϯι ϖροϲχρωμενὸϛ, ϐ καλον. P. 28.

* Πρεϲϐυτερη νεωτερον απεικονιϲμα, τοϲαυτα ϖεριεχοντα αιϲθητα γενη, ὁϲαπερ εν εκεινῳ νοητα. This is evidently taken from the deſcription, which Plato gave of the pattern, according to which the Creator formed the preſent world: τα γαρ δη νοητα ζωα ϖαντα εκεινο εν ἑαυτῳ ϖεριλαϐον εχει, καθαπερ ὁδε ὁ κοϲμὸϛ ἡμας, ὁϲα τε αλλα ϑρεμματα συνεϛηκεν ὁρατα.

† Τον δε εκ των ιδεων συνεϛωτα κοϲμον εν τοπῳ τινι λεγειν η ὑπονοειν, ϐ ϑεμιτον· ἡ δ' υϕεϛηκεν, εισομεϑα, ϖαρακολουϑηϲαντες εικονι τινι των ϖαρ' ἡμιν.

execute

execute his well-arranged plan with ſtone and wood, making the material ſubſtances like each of the incorporeal ideas. Something of this kind muſt we conceive of God, who, having purpoſed to build a capital city, firſt imagined the types of it; of which he conſtituted the intelligible world, and then uſed it as a pattern, when he finiſhed the ſenſible world. As therefore the city, predelineated in the architect, had no external place, but was ſtamped upon the mind of the artiſt; in the ſame manner alſo the world compoſed of ideas cannot have any other place than the divine intellect, which arranged it.

Having diſcourſed a little upon the cauſe of God's creating the world, he returns to his analogy. If, ſays he, any one would uſe plain words, unadorned by figures, he would ſay, that the intelligible world is nothing elſe but the * intellect of God, while he was now making the world. For the intelligible city is nothing elſe but the reaſoning of the architect, while he is now projecting to build the material city.

The plain meaning of all this is, that the divine Being, when he purpoſed to create the world, firſt conceived ideas of the ſeveral

* If the reader wiſhes to ſee a complete ſpecimen of the exertions of a ſubtil genius in ſupport of a ſyſtem, let him look into Norris's Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. He will there ſee, how much that ingenious writer, aided by St. Auguſtin and Malebranche, could extract from this doctrine.

parts,

parts, of which it was to conſiſt. Theſe ideas he formed into one plan, and thus conſtituted the intelligible world. This he uſed as a pattern in his creation of the material world, which he made to correſpond with it in every particular, the ſeveral ſubſtances, which compoſed the one, anſwering to the ſeveral ideas, which compoſed the other. It is not allowable to aſſert or ſuppoſe, that this intelligible world, thus compoſed of ideas, had a real and external exiſtence, as ſome philoſophers may have maintained. It was no more than the ideal plan in the intellect of the Creator; in the ſame manner as the ideal plan of a city, which is to be built, ſubſiſts only in the intellect of the architect, and has no exiſtence external to it. So that, to uſe plain language, the intelligible world is nothing elſe but the reaſoning of God, when he was about to create the material world; juſt as the intelligible city was only the reaſoning of the architect, when he was about to build a material city.

He uſes the ſame language in the third Book of the Life of Moſes, when he is ſpeaking of the pattern of the tabernacle and the ſeveral parts of the furniture of it, which was ſhewed to Moſes in the mount, and according to which he formed the earthly tabernacle. The incorporeal ideas, which were impreſſed upon his mind, ſerved as a pattern, accord-

according to which he formed the material objects *.

Philo was not ſatisfied with giving this general account of the nature of the intelligible world. He proceeded to ſtate the principal parts of which it was compoſed, and the order in which they were framed. Firſt, the Creator formed in the intelligible world an incorporeal heaven and an inviſible earth, and the idea of air, and a void: Then the incorporeal eſſence of water, and breath or ſpirit, and light which was alſo incorporeal and the intelligible pattern of the ſun and of all the luminous ſtars, that were to ſubſiſt throughout the heaven.

In his treatiſe Περι τε τις ὁ των Θειων Πραγμαλων Κληρονομ&, he attributes the formation of things to the art of God (ἡ τε Θεε τεχνη—δεδημιεργηκε. P. 502). And again he ſtyles nature the ſacred logos or reaſon (ἡ φυσις—ὁ ἱερος λογος. P. 506).

If it had been the profeſſed deſign of Philo to guard againſt the poſſibility of annexing a diſtinct perſonality to Λογος Θειος or Λογος Θεε, which I have rendered the divine intellect and

* Των μελλονλων απολελεισθαι σωμαλων ασωμαλες ιδεας τη ψυχη θεωρων, πρ& ἃς εδει, καθαπερ απ' αρχετυπε γραφης και νοηλων παραδειγμαλων αισθητα μιμημαλα απεικονισθηναι—ὁ μεν ων τυπ& τε παραδειγμαλ& ενεσφραγιζετο τη διανοια τε προφητε, διαζωγραφημεν& και προδιαπλατλομεν& αφανως ανευ ὑλης αορλοις ειδεσι· το δ' αποτελεσμα πρ& τον τυπον εδημιεργειτο, εναποματλομενε τας σφραγιδας τε τεχνιτε ταις προσφοροις εκαςφ ὑλικαις ουσιαις.

the

the intellect of God; I do not see, how he could have used terms more precise or illustrations more appositе.

Yet the author, to whom I before referred, has maintained, that the passages in Philo for the existence of the Λογος, as a person coeternal with the Father, are so evident, that they cannot be denied. Indeed he conceives them to be so evident, that, though he has quoted abundantly upon the same subject from the Chaldee Paraphrasts, yet he rests the weight of his cause upon Philo, who, he says, writ much larger and clearer than they did; and will contribute to explain some of the quotations taken out of the Paraphrases in use at Babylon and Jerusalem. P. 146.

However, notwithstanding this confidence in the authority of Philo, and in the propriety of his own interpretations of his doctrines; he makes some concessions, which detract much from the efficacy of either the authority or the interpretation. "After all, "that I have alledged from Philo and the "Paraphrases," says he, "I do not pretend "to affirm, that they had as distinct notions "of the Trinity as we have; nor do I deny, "but that sometimes they put a different "construction on the texts which we have "cited in proof of this mystery: Nay, I "own that their ideas are often confused "when they speak of these things, and par-"ticularly they refer sometimes that to the "second

" ſecond perſon which ſhould be aſcribed to " the third, and that to the third which pro- " perly belongs to the ſecond."

But this is not all. He allows, that Philo, in one inſtance at leaſt, fell into error by endeavouring to accommodate Moſes his notions to the notions of a particular philoſophy. P. 154. He next admits, that Philo, who had gathered his notions, as other Jews did, from reading the books of the Old Teſtament, together with their traditional interpretations, was not ſo much a maſter of them, as to make them always conſiſt with one another. In the next ſentence he does not deny, that Philo was not conſtant to himſelf. P. 155, 156. Indeed he could not deny this; as he had himſelf before charged him with inconſiſtency, in making God, when he was engaged in his work of creation, addreſs himſelf (De Confuſione Ling. P. 349.) to the angels, and employ them as aſſiſtants in his work. P. 128, 129.

An animated and ingenious * writer of the preſent day, who has trodden boldly in the ſteps

* Whitaker in his Hiſtory of Arianiſm—Without entering into the general merits of the queſtion diſcuſſed by this learned author, I beg leave to make a remark upon his interpretation of a paſſage of Scripture, which appears to me not to be well founded. St. Matthew, xxii. 34. tells us, that, when our Saviour had anſwered the enſnaring queſtion of the Sadducees concerning the reſurrection, the Phariſees alſo aſſembled, and put a queſtion to him on their part. St. Mark, xii. 28. informs us, that the

ſteps of Allix, and enforced the ſame mode of interpretation with great energy, has been obliged, in ſupport of that mode, to impute to Philo not only exertions of his fancy at the expence of his judgment, P. 36, but alſo a ſpirit of ſubtilizing *being* into *power*, and of dividing the logos in two. P. 107.

I readily

the Phariſee, who put the queſtion, was a Scribe. But Mr. W. aſſerts, that theſe Scribes were outwardly Phariſees and inwardly Sadducees, that they came in to the aid of the baffled Sadducees, and that our Saviour alluded to this repugnance between their external profeſſion and internal ſentiments, when he addreſſed this queſtion to them, "What think ye of Chriſt? Whoſe ſon is he?"

I diſſent from this explanation for the following reaſons. Firſt, Neither of the Evangeliſts, who mention the tranſaction, give any direct intimation, that they were inwardly Sadducees. They call them ſimply either Phariſees or Scribes. Secondly, St. Mark ſays, that the Scribe, who put the queſtion to Jeſus, knew, that he had anſwered the Sadducees properly (ειδως, ὁτι καλως αυτοις απεκριθη). This he would not have known or have thought, if he had been a Sadducee. Thirdly, St. Mark ſays, that Jeſus, perceiving that the Scribe who had aſked him the queſtion, replied intelligently (νουνεχως), ſaid to him, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God. Fourthly, St. Mark ſays, that Chriſt, as he was teaching publicly in the Temple, aſked, How ſay the *Scribes*, that Chriſt is the ſon of David? Whereby it ſeems to be implied, not merely, that it was the opinion of thoſe particular men then preſent; but that it was the eſtabliſhed opinion of the Doctors of the Law. Fifthly, the queſtion is put by St. Luke, xx. 41. in terms ſtill more general: How ſay *they*, that Chriſt is David's ſon? By this it may be intimated, that it was the received opinion of the Jews in general at that time. Mr. Whitaker ſuppoſes, that a difference between the opinion of the Scribes

I readily allow, that Philo's interpretations of Scripture are generally very fanciful; and that his works exhibit a curious mixture of Pagan philoſophy and Rabbinical learning. But I am perſuaded, that many of thoſe inconſiſtencies, and all that ſpirit of ſubtilizing being into power, with which he has been

Scribes and that of the people at large is intimated by the Evangeliſt, Mark xii. 37. when he ſubjoins, "the common people heard him gladly." It is ſurely taking too much for granted to maintain, that our Saviour's reaſons would not have been able to work conviction in the people, unleſs they had been "conſentaneous to all their notions of the Meſſiah." P. 410. It is fully as natural to ſuppoſe, that the common people, not having ſpeculated ſo much upon the ſubject, and being leſs enſlaved by preconceived opinions and rooted prejudices, were more open to conviction, and more ready to acknowledge the juſtneſs of his reaſonings. St. Mark vi. 20. uſes the ſame expreſſion, when he ſpeaks of the manner, in which Herod heard John the Baptiſt; in which paſſage it is ſcarcely to be conceived, that he has any alluſion to Herod's preconceived opinions. Again, in the Acts of the Apoſtles, xvii. 11. it is ſaid, that the Bereans received the word with all readineſs of mind (μετα πασης προθυμιας). Yet this word, which they thus received, appears to have been ſo far from being conſentaneous to all their previous notions of the Meſſiah, that they ſearched the Scriptures daily, to ſee, whether thoſe things were ſo. Sixthly, Theſe men muſt have been very ſhallow pretenders indeed; if, when a queſtion of that kind was aſked them in public by a perſon, whom they had obviouſly been endeavouring to enſnare, they ſhould immediately return an anſwer according to their concealed opinions and not according to their outward profeſſion. Without therefore forming a preciſe opinion of the ſyſtem maintained by the learned author, I think he can derive no ſupport for it from the tranſaction in queſtion.

charged, are not juſtly to be imputed to him, but to his interpreters, who have not attended to the avowed deſign of his writings, and to the principles, which he laid down for the accompliſhment of that deſign.

The deſign itſelf he declares explicitly in his Treatiſe Περι Συγχυσεως Διαλεκτων; in which he undertakes to ſhew, that under the literal narrative is contained a moral or ſpiritual meaning, which is to be conſidered as the true ſenſe, the other being only a ſhadow *. After he had gone through the whole of his explanation; Theſe, ſays he, are my opinions. Others, following the plain and obvious meaning of the words, think, that the origin of the Greek and Barbarian languages is here deſcribed. I do not cenſure them. Perhaps they alſo give a true account. I would, however, exhort them not to reſt in it, but to paſs on to the figurative interpretations, and aſſure themſelves, that the literal circumſtances recorded in the Scriptures are, as it were, ſhadows of bodies, but

* Origen adopted from Philo the principle of allegorizing the Scriptures. His account of it is thus rendered by his tranſlator: Cum ergo de his talibus & horum ſimilibus Spiritui Sancto eſſet intentio illuminare ſanctas animas, quæ ſe myſterio dederant veritatis; ſecundò loco habetur ille proſpectus, ut propter eos, qui vel non poſſent vel nollent huic ſe labori atque induſtriæ tradere, quo hæc tanta & talia doceri vel agnoſcere mererentur, involveret & occultaret ſermonibus uſitatis ſub prætextu hiſtoriæ cujuſdam & narrationis rerum viſibilium arcana myſteria. Περι Αρχων. L. IV. C. 11.

that

that the qualities indicated by them are the things, which in reality ſubſiſt. P. 348.

It is natural to ſuppoſe, that a man, who deals in ſuch ſubtilties, ſhould occaſionally vary in the degrees of his refinements. He may alſo naturally be expected to be ſometimes led into a ſeeming inaccuracy of expreſſion, by his having in ſome reſpects adopted the ſentiments and in more reſpects the expreſſions of Plato. But it is not ſo natural to ſuppoſe, that he ſhould argue upon contradictory principles, which are generally the reſult of cooler judgment and more deliberate conſideration. Nor is it quite ſo cuſtomary for a writer to ſubtilize being into power, as it is to perſonify pŏwer, and by ſo doing to inveſt it with a figurative being.

But whatever judgment may be formed of theſe obſervations, every body, I think, muſt allow, that Philo himſelf is the beſt explainer of his own principles; and that thoſe, which he has exhibited in his cooler moments, muſt be the genuine interpretations of them, how extravagantly ſoever he may ſeem to have refined upon them in the fervor of his imagination.

I have already ſhewn, how careful he was to inculcate upon his readers in the beginning of his treatiſe Περι Κοσμοπ. that κοσμος νοητος, which he placed in the intellect of the Deity, and which he ſometimes denominated the divine intellect, meant nothing more than the

abſtract deſign or the reaſon of God, when he purpoſed to create the world; and was ſimilar to the plan of a city formed in the mind of an architect. Moſt of the authors who have written upon this ſubject, inſtead of taking this declaration as a guide, when they examine what Mr. Whitaker calls the exertions of his fancy at the expence of his judgment, have collected a multitude of detached paſſages ſeemingly attributing a direct perſonality and agency to the λογος, and have applied the concluſions, deduced from them, to what they call an explanation of this clear and explicit declaration. I ſhall therefore take the ſeveral appellations, by which the Logos has been denominated, and conſider a few inſtances under each, which may ſerve to explain all others of the ſame claſs.

Firſt, we will conſider it as being the image of God (εικων) and the ſhadow of God (σκια). Philo has explicitly declared, in the explanation of Beſeleel, how κοσμος νοητος, the intelligible world, the reaſon or intellect of God, the abſtract form of the univerſe, is entitled to theſe appellations. "The ſhadow of God is his λογος, or reaſon, which he uſed as an inſtrument or organ, when he made the world. This ſhadow and image is alſo another archetype. For as God is the pattern of the image, which we have now called the ſhadow; in the ſame manner the image is the pattern of other things." Having

ing thus ſhewn, that the pattern and ſhadow and image are relative terms, and that κοσμος νοητος, the intelligible world, which he alſo calls λογος Θεου, and which is the pattern of the ſenſible world, is alſo itſelf the ſhadow or image of God; he proceeds to ſhew, in what ſenſe it is the ſhadow. "The wiſeſt philoſophers have maintained, that it is from the world and it's parts and their powers, that we muſt derive our conception of it's author. For if a perſon ſhould ſee a houſe, a city, a temple, or any other building, conſtructed with their ſeveral parts harmonizing with each other, he would form a conception of an artiſt. For he would ſuppoſe, that thoſe things could not have been executed without ſkill and a builder. So alſo, when a perſon has entered into this world, as into a very great houſe or city, and has beheld the heaven revolving in a circle, and all things contained within it; and the planets and fixed ſtars moving harmoniouſly, &c.—and moreover, living beings, mortal and immortal, and different kinds of plants and fruits; he will truly reaſon, that thoſe things were not formed without perfect art, but that God was and is the diſpoſer of this univerſe. They, who reaſon thus, have a conception of God by means of his ſhadow, forming a notion of the artiſt by means of his works. (Αλληγορ. L. II. P. 79).

The plain meaning of this is, that the mind of man in it's natural ſtate, repreſented by Beſeleel, is not able by it's own ſtrength to attain any idea of the Deity, but by contemplating thoſe marks of his attributes, which he has impreſſed upon his works. Theſe exhibit an image, and reflect a ſhadow of the ſupreme ſelf-exiſtent being. But the perfect and thoroughly-purified mind, repreſented by Moſes, which is initiated into the great myſteries, does not acquire it's knowledge of the author from the things that were made, of the permanent being from the ſhadow; but, riſing above what was made, receives a manifeſt repreſentation of him, ſo as to derive from himſelf a conception of him and his ſhadow, which was, his logos, and this world (*εμφασιν εναργη τε αγεννητε λαμβανει, ὡς απ' αὐτε αὐτον καταλαμβανειν και την σκιαν αὐτε, ὁπερ ην, τον τε λογον, και τονδε τον κοσμον*).

This proceſs of the underſtanding in tracing out the Deity through the ſenſible and intelligible world is deſcribed in a ſimilar manner in his Treatiſe Περι Κοσμοπ. P. 15. "The mind, having traverſed ſea and land, and ſurveyed the ſeveral natures, riſes into the air, and examines it's ſeveral productions; whence it is carried higher, into the ether and the heavenly courſes of the ſtars. Thence, led by a love of wiſdom, it is elevated above all ſenſible, and advances to the intelligible eſſence;

eſſence; and, having contemplated in it the patterns and ideas of thoſe ſenſible things, which it ſaw here, ſurpaſſing beauty, it is ſeized with a ſober ebriety, and grows frantic like the Corybantes, being filled with a different and better deſire and longing, by which it is conducted to the very higheſt top of the intelligibles, and ſeems to proceed to the great king himſelf. But while it deſires to ſee him; the pure and unmixed ſplendors of heavenly light ruſh forth as a torrent, ſo as to darken the eye of the underſtanding with their brightneſs."

Moreover, the Deity is ſaid to be attended by two ſhadows, which are alſo called * powers (δυναμεις). De Ab. P. 367. By means of theſe there is a threefold repreſentation of one ſubject. Not that, properly ſpeaking, there can be any ſhadows of God; but the term is uſed in a figurative ſenſe to aſſiſt the illuſtration of the ſubject.—In the middle is the father of all, who is called, in the Holy Scriptures, the exiſtent Being; and on each hand are the oldeſt and neareſt powers of the exiſtent being, which are denominated the creative and the regal powers. The creative power is God; for by this he founded and

* Plato in his Dialogue De Rep. L. V. P. 477. gives this definition of powers: Φησομεν δυναμεις ειναι γενος τι ονλων, αις δη και ημεις δυναμεθα ἁ δυναμεθα—and knowledge he denominates the moſt energetic of all powers: Πασων γε δυναμεων ερρωμενεςατην.

arranged the world. The regal power is Lord; for that, which made, has a juſt right to controul and govern what is made. Thus, being in the middle and attended by each of his powers, he preſents an appearance ſometimes of one, ſometimes of three: of one, to the completely purified mind, that can attain to the ſimple and complete idea without any other aid; of three to the mind, that cannot form a conception of exiſtence from itſelf alone without ſomething elſe, but conceives of it from it's actions either as creating or as governing.

When the ſupreme Being is called the exiſtent; he is ſpoken of in an abſolute ſenſe and by his proper denomination (κυριως). But when he is called God, it is catachreſtically. For thoſe ſeveral powers, which he exerted in the creation, expreſs not the principle of his exiſtence, but his relations to other things (ὡσανι προς τι). As, when his regal and beneficent powers are ſpoken of, he muſt be a king of ſome thing and a benefactor of ſome thing; that, which is governed or benefited, being altogether diſtinct from it. Akin to theſe is alſo his creative power, which is called God. For by this power the father, who begat and framed, eſtabliſhed all things. Περι των Μετονομ. P. 1048.

It may be proper to obſerve, that in the former inſtances, which I quoted, the image or ſhadow of God is ſpoken of as one; as it referred

referred to that power of God, which was delineated and ſhadowed out in the creation of the world. But in the latter quotations there is alſo another ſhadow of him as governor and judge of that world, which he created. Thoſe, who have maintained from this and other ſimilar paſſages, that Philo had a knowledge of a plurality of perſons in the Godhead, have done it principally to ſhew, that he had a more accurate knowledge of the divine nature, than he could be ſuppoſed to have had, if he had conceived it to have been in all reſpects a ſimple monad, as much one in perſonality as in eſſence. Whereas Philo ſays, that the terms are catachreſtically uſed, which repreſent him under the appearance of three, as the exiſtent * Being attended on either hand by thoſe two of his powers, which were firſt exerted, and are moſt cloſely and intimately connected with his eſ-

* Origen in his firſt Homily on Iſaiah, viz. on Chapter VI. ſeems to have derived his ideas from hence, when he is explaining the viſion of the Lord ſitting upon a throne high and lifted up, ſurrounded by ſeraphim. The paſſage is thus rendered by his tranſlator: Si video eum regnantem cœleſtibus virtutibus, video eum ſedentem ſuper thronum excelſum & elevatum. Quid eſt, quod dicit, Cœleſtibus virtutibus? Throni, dominationes, principatus, poteſtates, virtutes cœleſtes ſunt.—Quæ ſunt iſta duo ſeraphim? Dominus meus Jeſus & Spiritus Sanctus. Teſtimonium enim dat Scriptura, quia ejus mundantur labia ab uno ex ſeraphim, qui miſſus eſt ad auferenda ejus peccata. Unus autem ex ſeraphim Dominus meus Jeſus Chriſtus eſt, qui ad auferenda peccata noſtra a patre miſſus eſt.

ſence,

ſence, viz. firſt, his power of creation; and ſecondly, his power of governing that, which he had created.

This mode of expreſſion and illuſtration was adopted, he ſaid, in order to aid the conceptions of imperfect minds, which are unable to comprehend the ſimplicity of one ſelf-exiſtent, independent being, and, by arguing *a priori*, to perceive, how from this pure eſſence, as from their proper fountain, proceed the powers of creation and government, and the ſeveral objects, upon which thoſe powers are to be employed. Finite intelligences, which cannot thus contemplate him at once in his eſſence, are obliged, as it were, to divide him, and view him in detached parts in his acts, but chiefly in thoſe acts of his which are prior in time to all others, moſt immediately ariſe out of his eſſence, and extend to all created beings, viz. his acts of creation and government. Thus arguing a poſteriori, they aſcend to the ſummit of intelligibles, and there contemplate the images of the power and goodneſs of the firſt cauſe impreſſed upon his works, and catch, as it were, a ſhadow of him, who cannot be contemplated in his eſſence.

Theſe powers are called (Περι Χερυβ. P. 112.) his goodneſs and authority or ſovereign power, and are denominated the two higheſt and firſt powers belonging to the one truly exiſting God. By his goodneſs he created the univerſe

univerſe, and by his ſovereign authority he governs what he created. Between both theſe is his λογος, which is expreſſed by the ſymbol of the flaming ſword. This connects them together; for it is by his λογος, that God is governor and good. This preceded all things, and was meditated before all things, and is conſpicuous in all things (αυτο παντα φθασαν παρημειψατο, και προ παντων νοουμενον, και επι πασι φαινομενον). Here λογος is the plan, the deſign, by which (to ſpeak after the manner of men) God acted in the creation and government of the world. The unity of deſign in both ſo connects his goodneſs and authority, that there are manifeſt indications of each in the acts of the other. P. 113.

When the general deſign of the univerſe, formed by the exiſtent Being, is ſpoken of, it is called λογος. His ſeveral deſigns of the ſeparate parts, though included in the general deſign, are called plurally λογοι, and are ſaid to be ſent, as well as the ſingular: τας εαυτου λογους επικουριας ενεκα των φιλαρετων αποστελλει. (Περι του Θεοπεμπτ. P. 575.) By theſe powers was formed the incorporeal and intelligible world, the archetype of this which appears, being compoſed of inviſible ideas, as this is of viſible bodies. (Περι Συγχ. Διαλεκτ. P. 345).

The ſupreme Being is perpetually ſaid to be ſurrounded by theſe powers, as guards of ſtate

ſtate and attending miniſters, δορυφορεμενῳ προς των δυναμεων. Περι τε ὁτι Ατρεπ]. P. 309.

Not to mention, that Iſocrates uſes the ſame expreſſion to ſignify a perſon's being guarded by the good-will of the citizens (τῃ των πολιτων ευνοιᾳ δορυφορεμενῳ); Philo uſes it to expreſs the human mind's being attended by the ſenſes, whoſe buſineſs it is to furniſh it with notices of colours, ſounds, taſtes, and ſmells. Περι Κοσμοπ. P. 32. Again, wealth, glory, and honours are ſaid to be the attendant miniſters (δορυφοροι) of the body, the ſenſes thoſe of the ſoul (Περι Συγχ. Διαλ. P. 322. and Περι τε Θεοπεμπ]. P. 570). Again, reaſons are ſaid to be the attendants and guards of the ſoul of the wiſe: δορυφοροι και ὑπερμαχοι ψυχης (Περι Συγχ. Διαλεκ]. P. 328). And ſacred and holy reaſonings and words are called the garriſon and ſentinels of the ſoul: ἱερους και ὁσιους λογους αυτῃ φρουρους και φυλακας ανῆ]ας. P. 324.

Theſe powers of the one exiſtent Being, and the external expreſſions of them, his words and actions, are ſaid (P. 324.) to be ſpoken of in the Scriptures under the emblems of angels. Thus, when young and old in Sodom are ſtated to have combined againſt the angels; the ſpiritual doctrine contained under that narrative is, that there was a general diſpoſition to wickedneſs; and that young and old, with one accord, as if they had bound themſelves together by an oath,

ſet

ſet themſelves in oppoſition to the divine words and actions, which it is cuſtomary to call angels: Πας, δ' ὡς φησιν, ὁ λαος περιεκυκλωσαν ἁμα την οικιαν, νεοι τε και πρεσβυται, καλα των θειων εργων και λογων συνομοσαμενοι, ὑς καλειν εθος αγγελυς. Again, Αθανατοις λογοις, ὑς καλειν εθος αγγελυς. Περι τυ Θεοπεμπ. P. 583.

One of the paſſages, produced to prove the perſonality of the λογος according to Philo, is that, wherein he ſays, that the angel, who met Hagar, when ſhe fled from the face of Sarah, and brought her back, was the divine λογος (Περι Χερυβ. P. 108). But who or what, according to the ſame interpretation, was Hagar, and Sarah from whom ſhe fled? By Hagar is meant human diſcipline and the circle of the arts and ſciences, who departed from her miſtreſs, Sarah, the emblem of virtue, and was brought back by the angel, who is the divine λογος * (ὡς εϛι θειος λογος), which he elſewhere calls † right reaſon (ορθος λογος). Hagar fled to avoid the auſtere and gloomy

* Την μεσην παιδειαν την τοις εγκυκλιοις χορευυσαν ὁρωμεν Αγαρ, δις μεν εξικσαν απο της αρχικσης αρετης Σαρρας— καλαγεται, ὑπανϊησανϊ῝ αγγελυ, ὁς εϛι θειος λογ῝.

† Προσηκαμεν῝ τον ορθον ἀυτυ λογον, πρωτογονον υἱον. Περι Γεωργ. P. 195. Ὁις αν ὁ ορθ῝ λογ῝ ὑποβαλλη πειθομενον, τ. ε. λογισμον, ὡσπερ τινα δικασην αδωροδοκητον. Περι τυ ὁτι ατρεπ῍; P. 301. Ὁ θει῝ λογ῝—ὁ ορθ῝ λογ῝. Περι τυ Θεοπεμπ῍. 583. Ὁ της φυσεως ορθ῝ λογ῝, ὁς κυριωτερᾳ κλησει προσονομαζεται, θεσμ῝, νομ῝ θει῝, καθ' ὁν. Περι Κοσμοπ. P. 33.

life

life of the virtuous *. Afterwards Hagar, and her ſon Iſhmael, who ſignifies the ſophiſt, were driven out by Abraham, an emblem of the wiſe man, at the inſtigation of Sarah, perfect virtue or wiſdom. (P. 109.)

In like manner Philo ſays (P. 114.) that the angel, who ſtood armed to oppoſe Balaam, was the λογος of God. But in order to underſtand the true meaning of the aſſertion, it is requiſite to conſider, who or what Balaam was, who is ſaid to have been thus oppoſed. Balaam, ſays Philo, ſignifies a fooliſh people (ματαιον λαον) who ride in purſuit of gain upon an aſs, which ſignifies huſbandry, merchandize, or any other lucrative employment. When he finds, that theſe ſtop in their courſe, and do not carry him to the object, at which he aims; he wiſhes for a ſword, that is, a power of reaſons and words, to chaſtize them for the failure. But thoſe things, though deſtitute of the organs of ſpeech, utter a language more diſtinct than that of any tongue, and point out to him an angel, that is, the word of God, ſtanding armed with divine vengeance to oppoſe his progreſs.

It is manifeſt, that, in theſe inſtances, θειος λογος and Θεου λογος, are no more perſons, becauſe they are repreſented by the emblems of angels, than merchandize or agriculture is an

* Αγαρ, ἡ μεση και εγκυκλιος παιδεια, κατ τον αυσηρον και σκυθρωπον των φιλαρετων αποδραναι βιον σπουδαση.

animal, becauſe they are ſuppoſed to be repreſented by the aſs.

In the ſame ſpirit of emblematizing he ſays, that by * Eve is meant the ſenſes. It would be too tedious to diſcuſs the ſeveral moral and religious doctrines, ſuppoſed to be conveyed under the characters of Cain, Jacob, Laban, his daughters, his cattle, &c. P. 119. The ark and the animals contained in it, 186. Joſeph, his wife, and father-in-law, 577. Rebecca, 379. Leah, and in ſhort all the perſons and places mentioned in the Pentateuch. The ſpecimens, already given, are ſufficient to ſhew, that they are emblematic and figurative. Now, it is well known, that the perſonality of an emblem by no means proves the perſonality of the thing ſignified by that emblem, which is ſome quality, virtue, or duty; as the general reſult of the whole ſtory is ſome moral or religious doctrine, which is inculcated under the form of a narrative.

In the ſame figurative language the Lord's hoſt ſignifies the ſeveral virtues †; and the leader of the Lord's hoſt, that divine order and harmony diſplayed in the arrangement of the univerſe, from which men derive the principles of virtue and wiſdom. It is alſo called

* Προσηγορικως μεν γυναικα, ονομαζικως δε Ευαν, αινιττομενω αισθησιν. Περι Χερυβ. P. 118.

† Στρατω δε θειω αι αρεται, φιλοθεων υπαρμαχοι ψυχαν. P. 198.

(P. 341.) the firſt born λογος, the eldeſt angel, being as it were the archangel with many names. The ſenſible world is called the younger ſon of God, and the intelligible world is called the elder ſon, P. 298. In the paſſage, "The horſe and the rider hath he thrown into the ſea," the rider, he ſays, is the mind, and the horſe the paſſions *. And when the lawgiver forbids the uſe of horſes in war, he ſays, he does not ſpeak of real cavalry, which is neceſſary for both offence and defence, but of the irrational and unreſtrained and ungovernable motions of the ſoul †. Virtue in general is expreſſed by paradiſe, (P. 48.) and the ſeveral virtues by the trees planted in it.

The divine λογος is ſaid (P. 507.) to be the cement, the bond of union, by which the ſeveral parts of the univerſe are kept together ‡. But the ſame properties are likewiſe aſcribed to the order and plan, according to which the univerſe was conſtructed §.

Moſheim ſuppoſes, that Philo (De Abrahamo, P. 367.) alludes to ſome among the

* Τετραπων και σκιρτητικον και ὑπεραυχον—παθωντε και κακιων αλκιμωτατον σιφ—ωρ δε και ὁ επιβατης αυτων νους. P. 199.

† Αλλα περι της καλα ψυχην αλογυ και αμετρυ και απειθυς φορας. P. 200.

‡ Λογῳ σφιγγεται δειῳ· κολλα γαρ εσι και δεσμ ὁτ.

§ Παγκαλῳ τῳ της ακολυθιας ἑιρμῳ κεχρηται. P. 14. Ταξις δ' ακολυθια και ἑιρμ εσι προηγυμενων τινων και ἑπομενων.

Jews,

Jews, who aſſerted the doctrines of three natures in God. Whereas in the paſſage alluded to Philo appears moſt evidently to me to be ſpeaking of thoſe, who are not, as he figuratively expreſſes it, initiated into the great myſteries, and who are not able to contemplate the exiſtent Being in his ſimple ſtate, without ſomething elſe to aid their conceptions. They are therefore obliged to have recourſe to his acts, and to conſider him as creating or governing, when they endeavour to form a notion of him. Indeed the notion, which is formed in this circuitous manner, partakes of a pious opinion; but that, which reſults from a direct view, does not partake of, but is, a pious opinion, or rather, ſurpaſſes opinion, and is the truth itſelf. This is the language, in which he generally ſpeaks of the popular and the ſublime theology, as diſtinct from each other in degree rather than in kind.

THE

FATHERS *of the* CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

Εγεννησε τοινυν αυτον ο ὑτως, ὡς αν τις νοησειεν ανθρωπων, αλλ' ὡς οιδεν αυτῳ μονῳ. ο γαρ το, πως εγεννησεν, ειπειν επαγγελλομεθα, αλλα το, ὁτι ὑτως, διαβεβαιωμεθα· και ὁτι ἡμεις αγνοουμεν μονον την εκ πατρῳ του υἱου γεννησιν, αλλα και πασα γεννητη φυσις.

Cyr. Cat. xi. p. 96. Ed. Par. 1631, fo.

PHOTIUS informs us, that from Philo was derived the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, which prevailed in the primitive Church. This aroſe from very natural cauſes.

Firſt, they, who have been favoured with a divine revelation, and have by grace availed themſelves of it, enjoy a great and manifeſt advantage over thoſe, who are left in a great meaſure to the exertions of their own minds, and are obliged to trace out the inviſible things of God by intricate reaſonings and deductions from the things, which do appear in the conſtitution and government of the world. What even learned men among the latter, do hardly gueſs and with labour find out, is plain and obvious to the meaneſt and

and moſt uncultivated underſtandings among the former.

Yet this advantage, great as it really is, has not always been ſufficient to ſatisfy the pretenſions of thoſe, who have been bleſſed with a divine revelation. Not contented with the bright ſunſhine, which blazes around them, they will ſcarcely allow the benighted heathen the dim taper of human reaſon, to guide their ſteps in their laborious travels over the dark mountains. Whatever the Apoſtle Paul may have ſaid in his various expoſtulations with the Gentiles, and particularly in his Epiſtle to the Romans; there are ſome, far wiſer in their own conceit than ſeven men that can render a reaſon, who boldly maintain, that whatever glimmerings of light the Pagans of old have been able to ſtrike out by mere dint of labour and ſtudy, have been all either directly or circuitouſly derived from the ſacred writings *.

Traces of this opinion are to be found in ſome degree in the works of ancient authors, both Jewiſh and Chriſtian; though it did not ſhoot up to the extravagant height, to which ſome have carried it in later days. I ſhould depart from the tenor of my ſubject, if I did more than barely mention the well-known example of Joſephus among the former.

* Εξ ὡ (Φιλων) οιμαι και πας ὁ αλληγορικ της γραφης εν τη εκκλησια λογ εσχεν αρχην εισρυηναι. Bib. Cod. CV.

Among the latter the inſtances are numerous. As I proceed with my work, I ſhall, in confirmation of what I have here advanced, produce ſome ſtrong and pointed paſſages from Juſtin Martyr and Clemens Alexandrinus, both of them writers of the ſecond century.

To Chriſtians, who had embraced theſe ſentiments, the writings of Philo muſt have been an invaluable treaſure. The manner, in which he has applied the principles of Plato, to illuſtrate the Moſaical account of the Creation and other parts of the Old Teſtament, was admirably calculated to flatter their prejudices, and furniſhed them with ſpecious arguments in ſupport of the opinion, which they ſo ſtrenuouſly maintained.

Secondly, many were converted to the Chriſtian religion, who had previouſly made conſiderable progreſs in the Platonic or * Eclectic Philoſophy, and retained many of their former prejudices. Others were ſtruck with the great reſpect that was paid to philoſophy, and

* The following is a deſcription, which Clemens Alexandrinus gives of the Eclectic philoſophy. By philoſophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean and Ariſtotelean. But whatever things have been properly ſaid by each of thoſe ſects, inculcating juſtice and devout knowledge, this whole ſelection I call philoſophy. Φιλοσοφιαν δε, ου την Στωικην λεγω, ουδε την Πλατωνικην, η την Επικυρειον τε και Αριστοτελικην· αλλ' οσα ειρηται παρ' εκαστη των αιρεσεων τουτων καλως, δικαιοσυνην μετ' ευσεβους επιστημης εκδιδασκουσα, τουτο συμπαν το εκλεκτικον φιλοσοφιαν φημι. Strom. L. 1. P. 288. Ed. Sylburg. Par. 1641.

and with the ſuperior ſkill, which it's profeſſors diſplayed in the arts of controverſy. On this account they frequented the ſchools of Alexandria, in which maſters of profound learning and great celebrity explained and inculcated with bewitching eloquence the ſpeculations of the ſages of ancient Greece.

Theſe men, having the ſacred Volumes in one hand and the writings of Plato in the other, if they believed them both to be true, muſt have thought the principles and doctrines of each conſiſtent with thoſe of the other. For it is impoſſible, that one truth ſhould be oppoſite to or at variance with another. To theſe men, therefore, the writings of Philo muſt have been as acceptable, as to thoſe, whom I mentioned before; and indeed for the ſame reaſon, namely, for his having ſo induſtriouſly and ſpeciouſly marked out a ſeeming conformity between two works, if I may ſo call them, both of which they ſo highly reverenced.

The writings of Philo came the more ſtrongly recommended to theſe men; becauſe the method of interpretation, which he has adopted, may be as commodiouſly applied by Chriſtians to reconcile the principles of Plato

1641. fo. But though the followers of the Eclectic philoſophy profeſſed to ſelect the truth from the doctrines of the ſeveral ſects; yet the authority of Plato, in their eſtimation, far ſurpaſſed that of any other, and the bulk of their tenets concerning God and the human ſoul, was compoſed of his doctrines.

nd the doctrines of the Goſpel, as it was by Philo to explain the contents of the Old Teſtament by the ſame principles.

Firſt, there are to be found in the writings of many of the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church evident traces of the opinion, that the heathens derived all the principles of their knowledge from the ſacred Scriptures, and even that the wildeſt ſtories of their mythology originated from the ſame ſource. Thus, in the addreſs to the * Greeks, attributed to Juſtin Martyr, the author, P. 15, Ed. Paris 1636, fo. boldly aſſerts, that Orpheus, and Homer, and Solon the legiſlator of the Athenians, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and ſome others, received great aſſiſtance from the writings of Moſes, *εκ της Μωϋσεως ἱςωριας ωφελεθενλες.* He affirms, that hence they derived the knowledge of the unity of God and ſome of the myſteries of the divine nature. He maintained, that Plato, in the beginning of the Timæus, in deſcribing the principle of exiſtence, obſcurely alluded to the appellation, which the ſupreme Being aſſumed to himſelf in the book of Geneſis: but that he varied the form of expreſſion, in order to evade the cenſure of the court of Areopagus: (P. 20.) that when he ſpeaks of an ancient account, he means the

* Though there is reaſon to doubt, whether this addreſs was really the work of Juſtin; it ſerves to ſhew, in conjunction with the other quotations, that this opinion prevailed among the early Chriſtians.

law

law of Moſes *: that, when he mentions men beloved of God, he thinks of Moſes and the other prophets, from whoſe writings he learned the doctrine of a future judgment †: that, when he made εἰδος, ſpecific form, the third principle after God and matter, he was led to the uſe of the expreſſion by a paſſage in the writings of Moſes, which, for want of an enlightened inſtructor, he did not correctly underſtand: "Look, that thou make "them after the pattern, which was ſhewed "thee in the mount." Exod. xxv. 40. And again, "According to all, that I ſhew thee, "after the pattern of the tabernacle, and the "pattern of all the inſtruments, even ſo ſhall "ye make it ‡." Plato, ſays he, having met with theſe paſſages, ſuppoſed, that ſome ſeparate ſpecific form exiſted, before what is the object of the ſenſes: which form he alſo often calls the pattern of the things that

* Ενθαυθα ὁ Πλατων σαφως και φανερως τον παλαιον λογον Μωϋσεως ονομαζει νομον, τυ μεν ονοματος Μωϋσεως, φοβῳ τυ κωνειυ, μεμνησθαι δεδιως. P. 24.

† Ανδρας δε τινας ἑτερους τῳ Θεῳ φιλους ειναι νομιζει, ει μη Μωϋσεα και τους λοιπους ωωρφητας; ὡν ταις ωροφητειαις ενθυχων, και τον ωερι κρισεως ωαρ' αυτων μεμαθηκως λογον, εν τῳ ωρωτῳ της ωολιτειας λογῳ ὑτω ωροαναφωνει. P. 24.

‡ Πλατων δε μετα τον Θεον και την ὑλην το εἰδος τριτην ἀρχην ειναι λεγων, και αλλοθεν ωοθεν, αλλα ωαρα Μωϋσεως την ωροφασιν ειληφως φαινεται, το μεν τυ ειδους ονομα απο των Μωϋσεως μεμαθηκως ρητων, ὁ διδαχθεις δε τηνικαυτα ωαρα των ειδοτων, ὁτι ηδεν εκ μυσικης θεωριας των απο Μωϋσεως ειρημενων, σαφως γινωσκειν εσι δυναιτο, γεγραφε γαρ Μωϋσης, ὡς τυ Θευ ωερι της σκηνης ωρος αυτον ειρηκοτος, ὁτως, κ. τ. λ. P. 28.

were made *. He then proceeds to point out the miſtakes, into which Plato fell in reading the Moſaical account of the creation, and the manner, in which he was led by thoſe miſtakes to imagine an intelligible world, and other opinions, that appear in the Timæus. It is unneceſſary to give a minute detail of theſe things, and of the alluſion, which, in the ſecond Apology for Chriſtians, (P. 92, 93.) Juſtin ſtates the philoſopher to make to the ſhape of the croſs, the knowledge of which he is ſuppoſed to have obtained from the ſtory of the brazen ſerpent in the hiſtory of Moſes.

In his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, P. 294, he aſſerts, that the devil formed many of the mythological ſtories of the Greeks in imitation of the ſeveral circumſtances foretold of Jeſus Chriſt; in the ſame manner, as the magicians of Egypt imitated the miracles, that were performed by Moſes. One inſtance of this is Bacchus, the ſon of Jupiter, who, having been torn to pieces, after his death roſe again and aſcended into heaven; whoſe myſteries alſo are celebrated with wine. Another inſtance is Æſculapius, who is repreſented as curing diſeaſes and raiſing the dead. Again (P. 295.) we hear of Perſeus, who was

* Τουτοις ην ενδυχων ὁ Πλατων, και η μετα της προσηκουσης θεωριας δεξαμενος τα γεγραμμενα ῥητα, ωηθη ειδος τι χωριστον προϋπαρχειν τη αισθητῳ· ὁ και παραδειγμα των γενομενων ονομαζει πολλακις. P. 29.

born

born of a virgin. Again (P. 296.) when the Perſians ſay, that Mithras was born of a rock; they are ſuppoſed to have taken the idea from the book of the prophet Daniel, where the kingdom of God is prefigured by a ſtone, cut out of a rock without hands.

Clemens Alexandrinus, in his admonition to the Gentiles (P. 46.) expoſtulates with Plato, and aſks him, whence aroſe his conjecture about truth and genuine piety. I know your teachers, ſays he, though you may wiſh to conceal them. You are indebted to the Hebrews for ſuch of your laws, as are true, and for your opinion of God *. To the ſame origin he refers the knowledge, which Xenophon had attained of the ſupreme Being †.

In the firſt book of his Stromata (P. 274.) he gives an inſtance of a law, which, he ſays, Plato borrowed from the Hebrews; wherein he orders every one to abſtain from the water of his neighbour, till he has tried every method, without ſucceſs, of procuring water in his own poſſeſſions ‡. In page 304 he ſays,

* Ποθεν, ω Πλαΐων, αληθειαν αινιτλη; ωοθεν ἡ των λογων αφθονω χορηγια την θεοσεβειαν μανλευελαι;—οιδα σε τυς διδασκαλυς, καν αποκρυπλειν εθελης—νομιμυς, ὁσοι αληθεις, και δοξαν την τυ Θευ, ωαρ' αυλων ωφελησαι των Ἑβραιων.

† Ποθεν αρα ὁ τη γρυλλυ σοφιζεται; η δηλαδη ωαρα της ωροφηλιδω της Ἑβραιων θεσπιζυσης ὡδε ωως;

‡ Εν γαν τοις νομοις ὁ εξ Ἑβραιων φιλοσοφω Πλαΐων κελευει τυς γεωργυς μη επαρδευσαι μηδε λαμβανειν ὑδωρ ωαρ' ἑτερων εαν μη, ωρολερον ορυξανλες ωαρ' αυλων αχρι της ωαρθενιυ καλυμενης, ανυδρον εὑρωσι την γην.

that

that Numa was a Pythagorean; but that it was in conſequence of what he learned from Moſes, that he prohibited the Romans from making an image of God. In page 309 is quoted, from the Goſpel of St. John, the ſaying of our Saviour, that all before him were thieves and robbers. This ſome men applied to the philoſophers, to whom the * arch-apoſtate ſurreptitiouſly communicated detached portions of divine wiſdom. Yet, ſays Clemens, this philoſophy, ſtolen as it were by Prometheus, retained a little fire emitting ſome uſeful light, a faint reſemblance of divine wiſdom. The Grecian philoſophers, who lived before the coming of our Lord, may indeed be called thieves and robbers for having, without acknowledging it, taken portions of truth from the Hebrew prophets, and appropriating them, as if they were their own doctrines †. He produces the authority of Ariſtobulus, to prove, that Plato was guided by the law of the Jews ‡. He quotes

* Φιλοσοφια δε ουκ απεσαλη ὑπο Κυριου· αλλ' ηλθε, φησι, κλαπεισα, η παρα κλεπτου δοθεισα· ειτ' ουν δυναμις η αγγελου μαθων τι της αληθειας και μη καλαμεινας εν αυλη, ταυτα ενεπνευσε και κλεψας εδιδαξεν. P. 310.

† Εσιν ουν καν φιλοσοφια τη κλαπεισῃ, καθαπερ ὑπο Προμηθεως, πυρ ολιγον εις φως επιτηδειον χρησιμως ζωπυρουμενον, ισχυου τι σοφιας και κινησις παρα Θεου· ταυτα δ'αν ειεν κλεπται και λῃσαι δι παρ' Ελλησι φιλοσοφοι, και προ της του Κυριου παρουσιας παρα των Εβραϊκων προφητων μερη της αληθειας ου κατ' επιγνωσιν λαβοντες, αλλ' ὡς ιδια σφετερισαμενοι δογματα. P. 312.

‡ Καθηκολουθηκε δε και ὁ Πλατων τῃ καθ' ἡμας νομοθεσιᾳ, και φανερως εσι περιεργασαμενος· ἑκασα των εν αυτῃ λεγομενων. P. 342.

the

the following paſſage from Numenius, a Pythagorean philoſopher: What is Plato, but Moſes ſpeaking the Attic language *? That Plato was aſſiſted by the writings of Moſes, when he compoſed his treatiſe on Laws, is again aſſerted (P. 349). In the ſecond book (P. 367) he ſays, that the fable of Minos aſſociating with Jupiter was invented by ſome, who had heard, that God had converſed with Moſes, as a man converſes with his friend.

I will not ſtop to remark the many conformities and reſemblances, which he has pointed out in the moral injunctions and obſervations of the Gentile philoſophers and the inſpired writers, particularly in the fourth book of his Stromata. Nor will I dwell upon what he ſays at the end of that book, that the Hyperborean and Arimaſpian cities, the Elyſian fields, and the Republic of Plato, are images (εικονας) of the church, the heavenly Jeruſalem. In the fifth book, P. 580, after mentioning ſome doctrines of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, he affirms, that they were derived from Moſes †. In the 592d and the following pages, he enumerates many doctrines in confirmation of the ſame poſition concerning Plato. In page 595, he alledges the authority of Ariſtobulus, that the Peripatetic philoſophy was taken from the law of

* Τι γαρ εστι Πλαΐων, η Μωσης ατθιζων; P. 342.

† Παρα Μωσεως τοιαυτα φιλοσοφησανθες οι των Ελληνων ακροι.

Moſes

Moſes. I ſhall conclude this topic with the following paſſage: Και το συνολον, Πυθαγορας και Σωκραϊης και Πλαϊων λεγονϊες ακουειν φωνης Θεου, την καϊασκευην των ολων θεωρουντες ακριβως ὑπο Θεου γεγονυιαν και συνεχομενην αδιαλειπτως· ακηκασι γαρ τε Μωσεως λεγοντος, Ειπε και εγενετο. P. 596.

Secondly, theſe ſentiments naturally led thoſe, who entertained them, to regard with a favourable diſpoſition the writings of Philo, in which the plan is laborioufly purſued of reconciling Divine Revelation and Pagan philoſophy, and of expounding Scripture hiſtory upon heathen principles.

Origen, in the beginning of his treatiſe againſt Celſus, being deſirous of giving his readers ſome idea of the qualities of his antagoniſt, and of the time in which he lived, ſays, We are told, that there were two men, Epicureans, of the name of Celſus; the firſt in the time of Nero, but this in the time of Adrian and later *. Now, whatever practices Celſus really obſerved and objected to in the Chriſtians, may fairly be preſumed to have been of ſome duration and extent in his time; particularly if the charges were avowed and defended by the Apologiſt. One of the things, which Origen ſtates him to impute to the Chriſtians, is, that they, in conjunc-

* Δυο δε παρειληφαμεν Κελσης γεγονεναι Επικουρειους· τον μεν προτερον καϊα Νερωνα· τουτον δε καϊα Ἀδριανον και κατωτερω. L. I. P. 8. Ed. Cant. 1677.

tion

tion with the Jews, adopted allegorical explanations of the tranſactions recorded in the Books of Moſes *. Origen ſuppoſes, that Celſus referred to the works of Philo and of ſome ſtill more ancient, ſuch as Ariſtobulus; and concludes, that he had never read thoſe works himſelf, but had only heard, that there were writings, which contained allegorical explanations of the law; otherwiſe he would not have ſpoken in ſo contemptuous a manner of ſuch valuable compoſitions †.

Theſe inſtances ſeem to me to prove, that the writings of Philo and the allegorical mode of interpretation adopted by him were in high eſtimation among Chriſtians very early in the ſecond century at the lateſt. The works of the Fathers of the Church in that age, particularly among the Greeks, abound in imitations, alluſions, and direct references to him.

* Φησιν, ὁτι και Ιυδαιων και Χριϛιανων ὁι επιειχεϛεροι ταυτ' αλληγορησι. L. IV. P. 196.

† Δοκει δε μοι και ακηκοεναι, ὁτι εϛι συγγραμματα περιεχοντα τας τη νομω αλληγοριας· ἁπερ ει ανεγνωκει, ουκ αν ελεγεν, αἱ γουν δοκησαι περι αυτων αλληγοριαι γεγραφθαι, πολυ των μυθων αισχιους εισι και ἀλοπωτεραι, τα μηδαμη μηδαμως ἁρμοσθηναι δυναμενα, θαμαϛη τινι και πανταπασιν αναισθητῳ μωρια συναπτουσαι. εοικε δε περι των Φιλωνος συγγραμματων ταυτα λεγειν, η και των ετι αρχαιοτερων, ὁποια εϛι τα Αριϛοβουλου. ϛοχαζομαι δε τον Κελσον μη ανεγνωκεναι τα βιβλια, επει πολλαχη ἀν ϛως επιτετευχθαι μοι φαινεται, ὡϛε αἱρεθηναι αν και τους εν Ἑλλησι φιλοσοφιας απο των λεγομενων· εν οἱς ουκ μονον ἡ φρασις εξησκηται, αλλα και νοηματα και δογματα και ἡ χρησις των ὡς οιεται απο των γραφων Μυθων ὁ Κελσος. P. 198.

Clemens

Clemens Alexandrinus, (Strom. L. I. P. 284.) diſcourſing about heavenly wiſdom and philoſophy, undertakes to confirm his reaſonings by the teſtimony of Scripture. For this purpoſe he introduces the allegorical interpretation of Abraham, Sarah, and Agar, which interpretation he ſupports by the authority of Philo, and then purſues the ſame train of thought through Rebecca, Jacob, and Thamar. In like manner in his Παιδαγωγὸς (L. I. C. v. P. 90.) he allegorizes the characters and ſtory of Iſaac, Rebecca, and Abimelech. In the ſame ſtyle he interprets the command of Moſes to abſtain from the fleſh of ſwine, the eagle, &c. which he makes to ſignify a prohibition from voluptuouſneſs and rapacity (Strom. L. V. P. 571). Thus alſo he explains (P. 572) Joſeph in his coat of many colours to ſignify a man endued with various knowledge. In P. 583, the three days, which Abraham ſpent in going to the place, where he was to ſacrifice his ſon, are made to ſignify the degrees, by which a man advances to the knowledge of ſpiritual things. And in P. 574, he beſtows high encomiums upon the utility and dignity of theſe allegories and the interpretations of them.

Theophilus in his ſecond book to Autolycus (P. 94, &c.) partly with hints taken from Philo, partly with additions of his own, to make the whole apply to Chriſtianity, deduces a variety of alluſions to the great myſ-

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teries of religion, the nature of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, the condition of man, and the diſpenſations of Providence, from the number of days employed in the creation of the world, the portion of them which preceded the creation of the luminaries of heaven, and the different productions of the ſeveral days.

I think, I have now incontrovertibly eſtabliſhed theſe two facts.

Firſt, That the early Chriſtians entertained the opinion, that the philoſophical principles and mythological ſtories of Pagan antiquity, were derived either immediately or circuitouſly from the books of the Old Teſtament.

Secondly, That the allegorical writings of Philo were in high eſtimation among the ſame people, and that the principles of interpretation, which he had adopted, were received as juſt and wiſe.

I ſhall now proceed to enquire into the effects, which theſe two opinions conjointly produced in the reaſonings of the Chriſtians of the ſecond century.

The firſt effect, which I ſhall point out, is this. We ſaw, that Philo, by an allegorical mode of interpretation explained the things, perſons, and tranſactions, recorded in the Old Teſtament, to ſignify moral and intellectual qualities and operations. The Fathers of the Chriſtian Church proceeded farther, and again converted thoſe qualities and opera-

operations, with the ſuppoſed emblematic things, perſons, and tranſactions, into other perſons and tranſactions under the Goſpel covenant.

Becauſe in the Timæus of Plato the Creator is ſaid to have uſed an ideal world as a pattern, when he formed the preſent ſenſible one; Philo alſo, when he commented upon the Moſaical account of the creation, and applied to it the principles of Plato, repreſented the ſupreme Being, as forming within himſelf a plan of the work, which he was about to accompliſh. This plan, he ſays, was nothing elſe but the reaſon or reaſoning of God, in the ſame manner as the plan of a city, formed by an architect, is the reaſoning of that architect. Becauſe the arrangement of this plan of courſe preceded the creation of the things, which were to be formed according to it; he calls it the firſt-born, (πρωτοτοκος) by which word he expreſſes likewiſe the difference of it's nature from that of external things, ſince it was the natural production of the divine intellect by a reflex act, if we may ſo expreſs it. In other parts of his works he makes ſeveral things, perſons, and actions emblematically repreſentative of the divine wiſdom and it's dealings with men. Becauſe St. John has called Chriſt ὁ λογος, and he is elſewhere ſtyled πρωτόλοχος; it has been concluded, that all, which Philo has ſaid of what

what he calls ὁ λογος, is expreſſive of Chriſt in a literal ſenſe.

Philo aſſerted, that the two Cherubim over the mercy-ſeat were intended to ſignify the creative and governing powers of God. The creative power is ſaid by Juſtin Martyr to be Chriſt, and is called by him a certain rational power, which God begat of himſelf in the beginning, before all created beings *. In his ſecond Apology for the Chriſtians, he calls the author of our ſalvation the reaſon, of which the whole human race partakes; and aſſerts, that they, who lived according to reaſon, are Chriſtians, even though they were eſteemed Atheiſts; as among the Greeks Socrates and Heraclitus, and ſuch as were like them †.

In like manner Athenagoras, ſtating the eternity of the ſon of God, and his conſubſtantiality with the father, ſays, I will tell you in ſhort what his being a ſon means: That he was the firſt production of the father, not as a thing that was made; for God, being an eternal mind, from the beginning had reaſon in himſelf, being eternally reaſonable ‡.

* Αρχην προ παντων των κτισματων ὁ Θεος γεγεννηκε δυναμιν τινα εξ εαυτου λογικην. P. 284.

† Λογον ουν, ὁ παν γενος ανθρωπων μετεσχε· και οι μετα λογου βιωσαντες Χριστιανοι εισι, καν αθεοι νομισθησαν· οιον εν Ἑλλησι μεν Σωκρατης και Ἡρακλειτος και οι ὁμοιοι αυτοις. P. 83.

‡ Ὁ παις τι βουλεται, ερω δια βραχεων· πρωτον γεννημα ειναι τω πατρι, ουχ ὡς γενομενον· εξ αρχης γαρ ὁ Θεος, νους αϊδιος ων, ειχεν αυτος εν εαυτω τον λογον, αϊδιως λογικος ων. P. 10. Ed. Par. 1636. fo.

Theophilus, in the ſecond book of his addreſs to Autolycus, explains in the ſame manner the λογος as being always reſident in the heart of God. For, before any thing was made, God had him as his counſellor, being his own mind and intellect. And when God willed to make whatever he counſelled; he begat this prophoric logos, the firſt-born of all creation *.

Tertullian, in his treatiſe againſt Hermogenes, ſeems to purſue the ſame idea. Speaking of the nature of wiſdom, he ſays, † When he perceived it neceſſary for the works of the world, he immediately eſtabliſhes it and generates it in himſelf—Wiſdom was born and eſtabliſhed, as ſoon as God began to diſpoſe himſelf to ſet in order the works of the world —Though he had been about to make it of

* Αληθεια διηγειται τον λογον, τον ονα διαπαντος ενδιαθετον εν καρδια Θεου. προ γαρ τι γινεσθαι, τουτον ειχε συμβουλον, ἑαυτου νουν, και φρονησιν ονα· ὁποτε δε ηθελησεν ὁ Θεος ποιησαι ὁσα ἐβουλευσατο, τουτον τον λογον εγεννησε προφορικον, πρωτοτοκον πασης κτισεως. P. 100. Ed. Par. 1636. fo.

† Denique ut neceſſariam ſenſit ad opera mundi, ſtatim eam condit & generat in ſemetipſo—Sophia ſcilicet ejus exinde nata & condita, ex quo in ſenſu Dei ad opera mundi diſponenda cœpit agitari. P. 416. Ed. Pamel. Par. 1608. fo. Tertullian, contrary to ſome other of the Fathers, reprobated refinements upon the word Αρχη. Principium ſive initium inceptionis eſt verbum non alicujus ſubſtantiæ nomen—Etiam ex materia facturus fuiſſet, ante in ſophia cogitando & diſponendo jam fecerat.—Primo ſophiam conditam initium viarum in opera ejus: dehinc & ſermonem prolatum, per quem omnia facta ſunt, & ſine quo factum eſt nihil.

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matter, he had before made it in wiſdom, by meditating and arranging—He afterwards ſets forth this order in a more diſtinct manner. Wiſdom was firſt eſtabliſhed. After that was ſent forth the word, by which all things were made and without which nothing was made. In this paſſage the author evidently meant by ſophia, wiſdom, the internal conception, and by ſermo, word, the external expreſſion or command. Athenagoras has expreſſed ſomething of the ſame kind, though not exactly in the ſame manner: the ſon of God is the logos of the father in idea and energy *.

Upon this order Tertullian enlarges in his treatiſe againſt Praxeas. Before all things God was alone, being to himſelf both world, and place, and all things. Now he is ſaid to have been alone, becauſe there was nothing externally beſide him. Yet he was not even then alone; for he had with him, what he had in himſelf, namely, his own reaſon. Even God is reaſonable, and reaſon was in him firſt, and ſo all things were by him.—Although God had not yet ſent forth his word; he had it within himſelf with and in his reaſon, by ſecretly conſidering and arranging with himſelf, what afterwards he was about to utter

* Εστιν ὁ υἱος του Θεου λογῳ του πατρῳ εν ιδεᾳ και ενεργειᾳ. P. 10.

by the word *. This he propoſes to illuſtrate by what takes place in man, who was made after the image of God, and has alſo reaſon in himſelf. Whenever he thinks, he ſpeaks within himſelf, has a collocutor, and holds a conference with his reaſon †. Thus, ſays he to his adverſary, there is in you a kind of ſecondary ſpeech, by which you ſpeak in thinking, and by which you think in ſpeaking. Your very diſcourſing faculty becomes another perſon. How much more fully does this take place in God?

Tertullian ſeems to have been aware, that the wiſdom and word of God, according to his explanation, might be taken for a quality or an act. He therefore ſuppoſes his opponent to aſk, if he maintained the word to be a ſubſtance; to which queſtion he anſwers decidedly in the affirmative. In reply to this, his adverſary is made to object, that a word is ſomething void, empty, and incorporeal,

* Ante omnia enim Deus erat ſolus, ipſe ſibi & mundus & locus & omnia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinſecus præter illum. Cæterum ne tunc quidem ſolus; habebat enim ſecum, quam habebat in ſemetipſo, rationem ſuam ſcilicet. Rationalis etiam Deus, & ratio in ipſo prius: & ita ab ipſo omnia—Etſi Deus nondum ſermonem ſuum miſerat, proinde eum cum ipſa & in ipſa ratione intra ſemetipſum habebat, tacite cogitando & diſponendo ſecum, quæ per ſermonem mox erat dicturus. P. 845.

† Ita ſecundus quodammodo in te eſt ſermo, per quem loqueris cogitando, & per quem cogitas loquendo. Ipſe ſermo alius eſt. Quanto ergo plenius hoc agitur in Deo? P. 846.

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the mere voice and ſound of the mouth, and, as grammarians call it, impelled air, intelligible by hearing. Our author therefore in ſupport of his aſſertion advances the following reaſon: I ſay that nothing empty and void can come forth from God—and that what proceeded from ſo great a ſubſtance, and made ſuch great ſubſtances, is not itſelf void of ſubſtance *. He afterwards proceeds to illuſtrate the mutual relation of the three perſons of the Holy Trinity by the root, the tree, and its fruit; a fountain, a river, and a ſtream; the ſun, a ray of light, and the apex of the ray.

* Ergo, inquis, das aliquam ſubſtantiam eſſe ſermonem, ſpiritu & ſophiæ traditione conſtructam? Plane—Quid eſt, dices, ſermo, niſi vox & ſonus vocis, & (ſicut grammatici tradunt) aer offenſus, intelligibilis auditu; ceterum, vacuum neſcio quid & inane & incorporale? At ego nihil dico de Deo inane & vacuum prodire potuiſſe, ut non de inani & vacuo prolatum; nec carere ſubſtantia, quod de tanta ſubſtantia proceſſit, & tantas ſubſtantias fecit. P. 846. The language, which Gazalius uſes in ſpeaking of the Coran is ſimilar to this: Ipſum (Deum) præterea loqui, imperare, prohibere, promittere, minari, ſermone æterno, antiquo, qui ſubſiſtat in eſſentia ipſius, nec ſimilis ſit ſermoni creaturarum, quique non conſiſtat voce, quæ oriatur e commotione aeris, & colliſione corporum, neque literis quæ conficiantur concurſu labiorum, aut motione linguæ, & eſſe Alcoranum, Legem, Evangelium, & Pſalterium, libros ab ipſo demiſſos ſuper Apoſtolos ſuos, & legi Alcoranum linguis, inſcribi libris, reponi cordibus, ita tamen ut interim ſit antiquus, ſubſiſtens in eſſentia Dei, nec obnoxius fiat ſeparationi & diviſioni. Pocock. Spec. Hiſt. Arab. P. 288.

We have ſeen, that, according to Philo, in order to aſſiſt the underſtandings of men, who were unable to contemplate God, under the ſimple character of the one ſelf-exiſtent Being, he was repreſented as attended by two principal powers and attributes, and conſidered under the threefold character, as the principle of exiſtence, the principle of wiſdom and goodneſs, and the principle of power and authority. Theſe were ſuppoſed by Chriſtian writers to indicate the three perſons of the Holy Trinity, revealed in the Goſpel Diſpenſation. According to this doctrine, the ſecond perſon is ſpoken of either as the * mind of the firſt, or as the † reaſoning faculty of that mind, or as the ‡ internal operation or production of that faculty, or as the § external expreſſion of that production.

* Νης και λογ@ τη πατρ@ ὁ υἱος τυ Θευ. Athenag. P. 10. Ὅλος νης, ὁλος φως παλρων. Clem. Alex. P. 702.

† Rationalis enim Deus, & ratio in ipſo prius—quæ ratio ſenſus ipſius eſt. Tertull. P. 845.

‡ Sophia ſcilicet ipſius exinde nata & condita, ex quo in ſenſu Dei ad opera mundi diſponenda cœpit agitari. Tertull. P. 416. Cum ratione enim ſua cogitans atque diſponens ſermonem, eam efficiebat, quam ſermone tractabat. P. 845. Clemens Alexandrinus (P. 553.) having quoted John XVII. *I am the truth*, thus expatiates upon it: Ὁ δε λογος τυ Θευ, Εγω, φησιν, ειμι ἡ αληθεια. νῳ αρα θεωρητ@ ὁ λογος· τυς δε αληθινυς, ἐφη, φιλοσοφυς τινας λεγεις; τυς της αληθειας, την δ' εγω, φιλοθεαμονας. εν δε τῳ Φαιδρῳ (P. 247.) περι αληθειας, ὡς ιδεας λεγων ὁ Πλατων δηλωσει. ἡ δε ιδεα εννοημα τυ Θευ· ὁπερ οἱ βαρβαροι λογον ειρηκασι τυ Θευ.

§ Cum dicit Deus, Fiat lux; hæc eſt nativitas perfecta ſermonis. Tert. P. 846.

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* Athenagoras combines three of thoſe ſenſes together.

Hence Praxeas, perceiving, that by this mode of interpretation perſonality was attri-

* Νυς, λογος, σοφια, υἱος του πατρος. P. 27.—This mode of explaining the nature of the ſecond and third perſons of the Holy Trinity, led ſome of the principal ſects among the Mahometans to deny the exiſtence of the divine attributes; leſt by admitting them they ſhould ſeem to infringe the fundamental article of their faith, the ſimple unity of the Deity. The account of Abul Farajius is: Quod ad Motazalas attinet, illud, de quo inter eos in univerſum convenit, hoc eſt, quod attributa æterna ab eſſentia Creatoris, qui ſupra omnia excelſus, amoveant, fugientes diſtinctionem perſonarum, quam conſtituunt Chriſtiani. Poc. Spec. Hiſt. Arab. P. 18. Another author reaſons in this manner upon the ſame principle: Infidelitatis arguuntur Chriſtiani, quod tria ſtatuunt æterna; quid ergo de iis pronuntiandum, qui ſeptem aut plura ſtatuunt? ib. p. 216. Waſel, the founder of this claſs of ſects, thus expreſſes himſelf upon the ſubject in general terms: Quicunque aſſerit ſignificatum aut attributum æternum, duos ſtatuit Deos. ib. By this language they meant nothing more, than to aſſert the ſimple and indiviſible eſſence of the Deity, which, according to the metaphyſical notions of thoſe ages, would not be conſiſtent with an acknowledgment of his attributes. For inſtance, when they denied the attribute of knowledge to the Deity, they affirmed, Deum per eſſentiam ſuam ſcire, non per ſcientiam. That in this embarraſſed mode of expreſſing themſelves, they had an eye to the metaphyſics, which then prevailed among Chriſtians, ſeems evident from the following paſſage of Shareſtanius: Dicunt illi, qui ſe æquitatis aſſertores vocant, Deum excelſum unum eſſe eſſentia ſua, nullam eſſe ei diviſionem, nullum attributum, unum etiam operibus ſuis, nec ſocium ipſi eſſe, nec æternum alium præter eſſentiam ipſius, nec conſortem in operibus ipſius, nec fieri poſſe, ut reperiantur duo æterna, atque hoc eſt unitatem aſſerere. ib.

buted to mere qualities, operations, and relations, maintained, that the Trinity in the divine nature, was not a trinity of perſons, but was intended to expreſs the different offices and relations of the ſame identical Being. In conſequence of this poſition he aſſerted, that God the father himſelf deſcended into the womb of the Virgin, that he was born of her, that he ſuffered, in ſhort, that he was Jeſus Chriſt *.

In all theſe caſes it is highly neceſſary to obſerve the mode of reaſoning, which is adopted; and to diſtinguiſh between the general doctrine laid down, and the explanations made uſe of to illuſtrate the nature of it. Thus the moſt approved writers of the ſecond century reſted upon the authority of the Scriptures the general doctrine of the eternal generation of the ſon of God, his unity with the father, and his being the perſon, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made that was made. But when they proceeded to particular explanations of this general doctrine; they had little or no aſſiſtance from the Scriptures, if we except a few figurative paſſages, which they explained in a literal ſenſe †. Their principal de-

* Ipſum dicit patrem deſcendiſſe in virginem, ipſum ex ea natum, ipſum paſſum, denique ipſum eſſe Jeſum Chriſtum. Tertull. Adv. Praxeam. P. 844.

† An obſcure expreſſion is a weak baſis for an elaborate ſyſtem. Critic. Obſ. on VIth Book of the Æneid.

pendence

pendence was upon their own ingenuity and imagination, furniſhed with wrong conceptions of things and modes of reaſoning by their miſtaking the principles and deſigns of Plato and Philo. This led them to explain the unity of the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity with the firſt, by denominating the ſecond the mind of the firſt, thus making a diſtinction between God the father and his own mind, and aſſigning a ſeparate perſonality to each; as if God the father were any other than mind; or it were conceivable, that any being ſhould underſtand by an intellect, that which was perſonally different from it, and which of courſe poſſeſſed a ſeparate conſciouſneſs.—This led them to explain the eternity of the ſecond perſon, by denominating him the reaſon of the firſt, who exiſted from eternity, and was always poſſeſſed of reaſon. —Hence it was, that the ſecond perſon is deſcribed to be the wiſdom of the firſt, or that operation of the divine reaſon and that plan of proceeding, which was laid in the divine intellect before all creation.—Hence, likewiſe, the author of our ſalvation is aſſerted to have been literally that word, which was projected from the father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, when he ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light; which is termed by Tertullian, the perfect nativity of the word.

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The orthodox writers of the ſecond century ſeem to have differed from the * heretics not ſo much in their prime abſtract principles and modes of reaſoning, as in their ſuperior reverence for the canonical Scriptures and the doctrines obviouſly contained in them, and their ready reference to them alone in confirmation of their tenets. The former ſteadily adhered to the doctrines of the Scriptures, but had recourſe to peculiar principles and modes of reaſoning, in order to explain and illuſtrate the nature of real beings, whoſe exiſtence and general character are revealed in the word of God, and to make them appear conſiſtent with the philoſophical tenets or popular opinions of thoſe, to whom they wiſhed to recommend them. Many of the heretics ſet out with ſimilar principles and modes of reaſoning. But inſtead of confining them to the explanation of acknowledged doctrines eſtabliſhed upon the authority of the Scriptures, they gave up the reins to a wild imagination, and unchecked by authority, they proceeded as far as their fantaſtical principles and reaſonings would carry them in queſt of new and unauthorized doctrines and imaginary perſonages.

* Clemens Alexandrinus ſays, that the heads of the principal hereſies of his time were born in the reign of the emperor Adrian, and lived to the time of the elder Antoninus: Περι της Αδριανη της Βασιλεως χρονης οι τας αιρεσεις επινοησαντες γεγονασι, και μεχρι γε της Αντωνινε της πρεσβυτερε διετειναν ηλικιας. Strom. L. VIII. P. 767.

I ſhall

I ſhall endeavour to illuſtrate what is here aſſerted, by a paſſage in that treatiſe of Tertullian, to which I have ſo often referred. Tertullian, having advanced what has been already ſtated concerning the reaſon and wiſdom and word of God, ſeems to have been aware of the reſemblance, which his principles and reaſonings bore to thoſe, that were maintained by Valentinus. He therefore undertook to obviate the objection by pointing out the difference that was between them. Obſerve now, in what he repreſents that difference to conſiſt. It is not in the principles, which he lays down; it is not in the reaſonings and illuſtrations, which he uſes. But it is in the doctrines, to which thoſe principles, reaſonings and illuſtrations are applied: Hoc ſi qui putaverit me προβολην aliquam introducere, id eſt, prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, alium atque alium Æonem de Æone producens; primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utitur & veritas vocabulo iſto & re ac ſenſu ejus, quia & hæreſis utitur; immo hæreſis potius ex veritate accepit, quod ad mendacium ſuum ſtrueret. Prolatus eſt ſermo Dei annon? Hîc mecum gradum fige. Si prolatus eſt, cognoſce probolam veritatis; & viderit hæreſis, ſi quid de veritate imitata eſt. Jam nunc quæritur, quis quomodo utatur aliqua re & vocabulo ejus. Valentinus probolas ſuas diſcernit & ſeparat ab auctore, & ita longe ab eo ponit, ut Æon patrem neſciat.

ciat.—Apud nos autem ſolus filius patrem novit, & ſinum patris ipſe expoſuit, & omnia apud patrem audivit & vidit; &c. P. 846.

What thoſe doctrines of Valentinus were, may be ſeen at large in Irenæus. The fact ſeems to be, that Valentinus and other heretics, in the ſame manner as the orthodox, adopted erroneous principles, which led them into falſe doctrines. They learned at one time to ſpeak of mind as a perſon diſtinct from the principle of exiſtence; at another time to attribute ſubſtance and perſonality to reaſon, at another time to wiſdom, at another time to the word expreſſive of power and authority. But they did not ſufficiently attend to a very material circumſtance, to which the orthodox paid more regard, that all thoſe poſitions were originally advanced to explain eſtabliſhed and well authenticated doctrines, and the nature of real perſonages. They began with them as firſt principles and unqueſtioned truths, and framed ſuch doctrines, as ſeemed to ariſe out of them. Thus they were induced to adopt the doctrine of a perfect Æon before all things, eternal, incomprehenſible, inviſible, and unbegotten. Conſidering mind, reaſon, wiſdom, truth, life, &c. as diſtinct in their meaning, they attributed a diſtict perſonality to each, and deviſed a ſeries of Æons, projected one from another in a long courſe of ſucceſſion.

We

We have ſeen, that Plato maintained the ſpecific forms to be the real entities. By theſe Philo ſtated him to mean the mere notions of the mind. But the ſeveral ſects of Gnoſtics conſidered them as real things, that had a proper and actual ſubſiſtance, and held, that every ſpecies of ſenſible fleeting things had an ideal permanent repreſentative. It was eaſy and natural for them, thus diſpoſed and in a great meaſure free from the reſtraints of the doctrines of the canonical Scriptures, to fall in with the eaſtern philoſophy, and to embrace a doctrine, which admitted of an extenſive liſt of Æons, ſuch as man, church, thought, will, &c. each the chief of a particular order of beings ſimilar to himſelf.

This primary derivation of the doctrines of the Gnoſtics from the philoſophical opinions of Plato, is expreſsly affirmed by Irenæus, L. II. C. XIX. in which chapter it is ſtated, that they alſo borrowed many of their notions from the theories of other philoſophical ſects and from the poetic mythologies of ancient Greece. Non ſolum quæ apud comicos poſita ſunt arguuntur, quaſi propria proferentes; ſed etiam quæ apud omnes, qui Deum ignorant, & qui dicuntur philoſophi, ſunt dicta, hæc congregant, & quaſi centonem ex multis & peſſimis panniculis conſarcientes ſubtili eloquio ſibi ipſis præparaverunt.—He ſays indeed, that they affected to confirm their wild theories by Scripture; but it was by the moſt

moſt forced and arbitrary interpretations of it, by collecting detached expreſſions and names, and treating them as one continued narration, juſt as if a perſon ſhould undertake to frame a ſtory by tacking together verſes widely diſperſed through the works of Homer. But, ſays he, when the Word, the Only-begotten, and Life, and Light, and Saviour, and Chriſt, and Son of God are proved to be one and the ſame Being, and it is ſhewn, that this ſame perſon was made fleſh for us: the fabric of their Ogdoad is diſſolved; and, when this is diſſolved, their whole hypotheſis falls to the ground *.

Clemens Alexandrinus alſo in the third book of his Stromata diſcourſes upon the uſe which Epiphanes, Carpocrates, Marcion, and other heretics made of the principles and doctrines of Plato and other philoſophers. He ſays, that Epiphanes was inſtructed by his father Carpocrates in the doctrines of Plato †; ſome

* Ἐν᾽ γαρ τῳ αυτῳ δεικνυμενῳ λογῳ και μονογενης και ζωης και φωτ᾽ και σωτηρ᾽ και Χριστ᾽ και υἱῳ Θεῳ, και τουτῳ αυτῳ σαρκωθεντ᾽ ὑπερ ἡμων, λελυται ἡ της Ογδοαδ᾽ σκηνοπηγια. ταυτης δε λελυμενης, διαπεπτωκεν αυτων πασα ἡ ὑποθεσις. Iren. adv. Haer. L. I. P. 40. Ed. Par. 1639. fo.

† Επαιδευθη μεν ην παρα τω πατρι την τε εγκυκλιον παιδειαν και τα Πλατων᾽. P. 428.—Δοκει δε μοι και τα Πλατων᾽ παρακηκοεναι εν τῃ πολιτειᾳ. P. 430. Οἱ φιλοσοφοι δε, ὡν εμνησθημεν (Πυθαγορας τε και Πλατων) παρ᾽ ὡν την γενεσιν κακην ειναι ασεβως εκμαθοντες δι απο Μαρκιων᾽, P. 431. Ουκ ασαφως δεδειχθαι ἡμιν, νομιζω, τας αφορμας των ξενων δογματων τον Μαρκιωνα παρα Πλατων᾽ αχαριστως τε και αμαθως

ſome of which he had miſtaken: that Marcion derived ſome improper notions from the ſame ſource, and that he made an unſkilful uſe of others. He attributes ſome of the errors of Caſſianus to too great an attention to Plato; and he quotes from the writings of ſome of thoſe heretics the very expreſſion in the Parmenides, ἐν ηυ τα παντα, P. 466.— Tertullian calls Valentinus apoſtate, heretic, and platoniſt. (De Carne Chriſti, C.XX.) Relucere ideis ſemina Gnoſtidæ & Valentinianæ hæreſeos. De Anima. P. 322.

It would be eaſy to multiply paſſages from Tertullian and others in ſupport of what is here advanced. I will cloſe this topic with one teſtimony from the writings of an author in the beginning of the next century; a teſtimony upon this ſubject as unexceptionable as any one that can be obtained. The author, whom I mean, is Plotinus: a man inferior to few in application, acuteneſs of genius, and profound knowledge of the various methods, in which the men of thoſe times interpreted the philoſophical opinions of Plato, and applied them to ſubjects of theology.

The ninth book of his ſecond Ennead was written profeſſedly to diſcuſs the doctrines of the Gnoſtics. After having examined ſome of their principal doctrines at large, he ſays, Theſe things have been partly taken from

αμαθως ειληφεναι. P. 434. ἡγειται δε ὁ γενναιος ὑτος Πλατωνικωτερον. P. 466.

Plato;

Plato; but whatever new things they have introduced, in order to form their own ſyſtem of philoſophy, thoſe are found to be deſtitute of truth *. He then produces one inſtance of this from the Timæus. Plato ſaid, that as mind ſees ideas in that, which is a living being; the Creator deviſed, that the univerſe alſo ſhould contain as many. But the Gnoſtics, not underſtanding this, conceived one mind at reſt, having in it all entities: another mind beholding what was in it: and a third mind deviſing †. He next ſhews, in what manner their ideas of the corruption of matter and the impurity, of all terreſtrial things were derived from Plato's direction to abſtract the thoughts, and to withdraw the mind as much as poſſible from the influence of the body. He again intimates, P. 215. that they were led to hate the nature of the body in conſequence of having heard ‡ Plato complain much of it, on account of it's being ſo great an impediment to the ſoul.

* Ὅλως γαρ αυτοις τα μεν παρα τη Πλατωνος ειληπται· τα δε, ὁσα καινοτομησιν, ἱνα ἰδιαν φιλοσοφιαν θωνται, ταυτα ἐξω της αληθειας ἑυρηται. P. 203. Ed. Bas. 1580.

† Ειπονιος γαρ αυτω, ἡπερ ην νους ενησας ἰδεας εν τῳ, ὁ ἐστι ζωον, καθορᾳ, τοσαυτας και ὁ τοδε ποιων το παν διενοηθη σχειν· οἱ δε, ὡ συνετες, τον μεν ελαβον εν ἡσυχιᾳ ἐχοντα εν αυτῳ παντα τα ὀντα· τον δε νουν ἑτερον παρ' αυτον θεωρουντα, τον δε διανοουμενον. P. 204.

‡ Και τοι ει και μισειν αυτοις ἐποιει την του σωματος φυσιν, διοτι ακηκοασι Πλατωνος πολλα μεμψαμενου τῳ σωματι, ὡς εμποδιον παρεχων τῃ ψυχῃ.

The

The concluſion, which I would draw from the whole of the topic, is this: Firſt, that the original general principles, adopted by both the orthodox and the heretics of the ſecond century, were the ſame, and that the latter differed from the former, chiefly in conſequence of the more unreſtrained and licentious uſe, which they made of thoſe principles. Secondly, That the chief of thoſe principles were derived immediately from the mythological ſtories and the tenets of the philoſophers of Greece, particularly of Plato.

I have been the more particular in this enquiry; becauſe Moſheim, and after him Brucker, has aſſerted, that the Gnoſtic hereſies were derived ſolely from the oriental philoſophy. The real ſtate of the caſe ſeems to me to be this: Firſt, The genuine doctrines of Plato in many points bear a ſtrong reſemblance to the oriental philoſophy, whence indeed they were derived by Pythagoras and Plato. The ſame may be ſaid of the mythologies of ancient Greece, which in a great meaſure originated from the ſame ſource. Secondly, This reſemblance was encreaſed by the manner, in which the philoſophy of Plato was taught at Alexandria, when that city become a diſtinguiſhed ſeat of learning. Thirdly, It was cuſtomary for thoſe, who aſpired to eminence in their profeſſion, to affect a more profound knowledge of the ſublime doctrines of philoſophy relating to God

and the human ſoul. For this purpoſe they were not ſatisfied with what Plato taught upon thoſe ſubjects; but, after they had gone through the courſe of education in his ſchool, they applied to the oriental philoſophy, from which Plato himſelf drew. Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. L. I. P. 274.) enumerates the ſeveral maſters, under whom he himſelf ſtudied. Among theſe one was from the eaſt. Plotinus, who was himſelf a kind of ſecond father of the later Platoniſts, undertook, though he failed to accompliſh, a journey into the eaſt, for the purpoſe of perfecting himſelf in the philoſophy of thoſe countries.

We may hence be able to account for the high pretenſions to wiſdom, which the Gnoſtics advanced, and for the contempt, with which they treated Plato and his followers, with whom they had ſet out in the purſuit of truth. They looked upon him as one, who had made but very little progreſs in the ways of true knowledge, and was qualified to teach men only the firſt rudiments of ſcience. But they arrogated to themſelves the name of ſages, who were initiated into the great myſteries of God and nature. This contemptuous treatment of Plato and his doctrines, could not fail to produce a proportionable degree of animoſity in the later Platoniſts, whoſe vanity was ſeverely wounded by the arrogant pretenſions of the Gnoſtics.

Theſe

Theſe patch-work ſyſtems of hereſy (if I may be allowed to borrow the idea of Irenæus) will the leſs ſurprize us, if we recollect an opinion, which generally prevailed in that age, that moſt of the ſects of Grecian and Barbarian philoſophy contained ſeverally ſome ſcattered portions of truth, which it was the buſineſs of a wiſe man to collect and combine in one conſiſtent ſcheme *.

While theſe general principles prevailed, as well among the orthodox Chriſtians as among heretics, Ammonius Saccas, who was educated a Chriſtian, eſtabliſhed a ſchool at Alexandria. Philoſophy at this time had gained an undoubted aſcendency in the church; and the nature of the ſituation, in which Ammonius was placed, ſeemed to call upon him to ſupport at once the character of divine revelation and human philoſophy. As he left no writings behind him; we can judge of his abilities only from their effects and the teſtimony of others. Theſe unite in placing him in the moſt conſpicuous point of view. In his endeavours to render more complete the

* This opinion is thus ſtated by Clemens Alexandrinus. Ξυμπανλες ων Ελληνες τε και Βαρβαροι, ὁσοι τ' αληθους ωρεχθησαν, οἱ μεν ων ολιγα, οἱ δε μερ☉ τι, ειπερ αρα, τ☉ της αληθειας λογ☉ εχονλες αναδειχθειεν—ὡτως ων ἡ τε βαρβαρος ἡ τε Ελληνικη φιλοσοφια, την αἰδιον αληθειαν απαραγμον τινα ☉ της Διονυσ☉ μυθολογιας, της δε τ☉ Λογ☉ τ☉ ον☉ς αει Θεολογιας ωεποιηλαι. ὁ δε τα διηρημενα συνθεις αυθις, και ἑνοποιησας τελειον τον λογον, ακινδυνως, ευ ισθ' ὁτι καλοψεται την αληθειαν. Strom. L. I. P. 298.

agreement between the ſeveral ſtories of Pagan mythology, the tenets of the Grecian and Oriental philoſophers, and the doctrines of the Goſpel, he entirely changed the whole ſtate of the queſtion, effected a complete revolution in philoſophy, and made no inconſiderable impreſſion upon the Chriſtian profeſſion. By the refinements of his ſpeculations and the copiouſneſs and force of his eloquence, he ſeems to have exerciſed an almoſt uncontroulable influence over the minds of men in the perſonal diſcharge of his office as a public teacher. And from him ſprung a ſect, the members of which, for their learning and acuteneſs, have been the admiration of great numbers in all ſucceeding ages.

Ammonius is ſaid to have differed in principles from Clemens in the following reſpect. Clemens affirmed, that truth was diſperſed in different portions through moſt of the ſtories of Pagan mythology and the ſeveral ſects of philoſophy; and that the great error of the heathens conſiſted principally in this, that each nation, party, and ſect, having but a portion of truth, and ſome of them a very ſmall portion of it, perſuaded themſelves, that they poſſeſſed the whole *. Whereas Ammonius is ſaid to have affirmed, that each ſect and party would be found to be poſſeſſed

* Αἱ της φιλοσοφιας της τε βαρβαρε της τε Ελληνικης αἱρεσεις, ἑκαστη, ὁπερ ελαχεν, ὡς πασαν αυχει την αληθειαν. Strom. L. I. P. 238.

of all the moſt important doctrines of true religion, if their principles, tenets, and mythologies were properly interpreted. This ſtep alone was wanting, in order to make the junction between Chriſtianity and Paganiſm complete. If the point could be fully accompliſhed; it would follow of courſe, that the ſchool of Ammonius would be frequented by men of all parties, who repaired to Alexandria for inſtruction in philoſophy and religion. The event was anſwerable to the greatneſs of the undertaking, and the ſplendid abilities of the undertaker.

Before the time of Ammonius, Chriſtian writers had for different purpoſes endeavoured to make out a conformity between their own profeſſion and the traditions and principles of thoſe, to whom they addreſſed themſelves. Sometimes they did this, in order to mitigate the abhorrence, in which they were held by their Pagan perſecutors, and to convince them of the innocence and reaſonableneſs of the doctrines, which they taught and practiſed. At other times their views were more extenſive and diſintereſted, and were directed to the converſion of thoſe, to whom their diſcourſes were delivered. They repreſented to them, that the mythological traditions and philoſophical ſpeculations, which were ſo highly eſteemed by the Gentiles, were but faint and very imperfect copies of divine wiſdom, that was to be found only among Chriſ-

tians complete in all it's parts, and with undiminiſhed luſtre. They exhorted them therefore to repair to the ſacred volumes, where thoſe celeſtial treaſures are depoſited, and to enroll themſelves in that order of men, who glory in profeſſing and practiſing the moſt ſublime truths and the pureſt morality, and in inculcating the ſame profeſſion and practice upon others. Sometimes their object was to make philoſophy appear reſpectable in the eyes of their fellow Chriſtians, from a conviction, that it tended to ſtrengthen their intellectual powers, to enlarge their capacities, and refine their conceptions, and give them more juſt and comprehenſive views of the ways of God in man. Perhaps alſo thoſe good men were not quite free from ſome tincture of vanity in this reſpect. As they were undoubtedly ambitious of being reputed philoſophers as well as Chriſtians; they probably felt ſome pleaſure in exalting their profeſſion.

Yet all this while, Chriſtianity, it's doctrines, and language, ſeem to have engaged very little of the attention of Pagan philoſophers. They ſaw no purpoſes of intereſt, ambition, or vanity, that were to be anſwered by concurring in thoſe forced interpretations, in order to promote a ſeeming conformity. They were indeed often preſſed by the Chriſtian apologiſts with the groſs impurities, that were recorded in the hiſtories of their gods; and

and the Stoics, whoſe ſyſtem of religious faith comprehended them all, had given them a ſpecimen of the excellent uſe, that might be made of phyſical interpretations. Yet all thoſe circumſtances appear to have made but a ſlight impreſſion upon their minds before the time of Ammonius; and they betray no ſymptoms of having even ſuſpected, that their popular mythologies, poetical fables, and philoſophical tenets contained either thoſe expreſs declarations of theological doctrines, or thoſe obſcure alluſions to them, in which their ſucceſſors ſo confidently affirmed, that they every where moſt obviouſly abounded.

But when the reputation of Ammonius gave a conſequence and dignity to the doctrines, which he profeſſed; the ſcene was ſuddenly changed. The Pagan philoſophers ſeemed at once to be rouſed, as it were, from a profound ſleep. A thick veil appeared to have been drawn from their eyes. Men of the moſt refined wit, the moſt acute genius, and the moſt extenſive learning, thought it an employment worthy of their nobleſt faculties and attainments to ſearch for the great myſtery of revelation, the Trinity of Perſons in the Divine Nature, among the doctrines and traditions of men. They tortured their invention a thouſand ways, in order to accompliſh their purpoſe; and they did not diſdain to uſe ſcriptural language and ſcriptural figures and illuſtrations in the proſecution of it. Now

the withered arm was impiouſly lifted up againſt him, who gave it ſtrength. Now the Pagan ventured to enter into competition with the Chriſtian concerning the purity of their reſpective moral precepts. Now he preſumed to aſſail the authenticity of the revelation, by aſſerting, that Chriſt and his diſciples proclaimed nothing new concerning either the nature of God or the duty of man, but only ſet forth in a new form what was known to the world long before.

The moſt illuſtrious of the Pagan ſcholars of Ammonius was Plotinus. He ſtands eminently diſtinguiſhed by the manner, in which he applied the hypotheſis and principles of his maſter to the decoration of the mythology and philoſophy of Greece. The acuteneſs of his genius, his abſtracted mode of reaſoning and expreſſion, and his unremitting application of metaphyſical ſubtilties, gave a wonderful degree of reputation to his ſyſtem.

It ſeem'd
For dignity compos'd and high exploit:
But all was falſe and hollow.

If we refer to the detached original ſtories and reaſonings, which he undertook to illuſtrate and conjoin; if we attempt to explore the foundations of what, by the power, as it were, of his magic art, appeared in the eyes of ſome men to be a ſolid and ſtately building; we ſhall be ſurprized to diſcover, that

that it is nothing more than the baſeleſs fabric of a viſion.

The writings of Plotinus are to be conſidered as philoſophical lectures, in which he undertakes, not to inveſtigate, but to prove and illuſtrate certain doctrines by a variety of arguments and ſtatements. The principal of thoſe doctrines, to which his chief attention is directed through all his works, is a trinity in the divine nature. (Enn. II. L. IX. C. I. and elſewhere.) This doctrine, ſo conſpicuous and important in the Chriſtian diſpenſation, he endeavours to prove by abſtract reaſoning, to ſupport by the authority of Plato, and to illuſtrate by mythological ſtories. He calls his three principles, the firſt, the good (τ' αγαθον) or the exiſting (το ον), the ſecond, mind (νους), the third, ſoul (ψυχη). He ſays, that mind is the archetype and pattern of this world, which is the image of it and which exiſts by means of it *: that the nature of mind and the exiſting is the true and firſt world †. Mind, having imparted ſomething of itſelf to matter, made all things, itſelf remaining motionleſs and quiet. That, which flowed from it, was reaſon ‡. It was

* Αρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος τοῦτο οὐρανὸς καὶ ὁ ἐκεῖνον οὐρανός. Enn. III. L. II. C. I.

† Ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φύσις κόσμου ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθινὸς καὶ πρῶτος.

‡ Νοῦς τοίνυν δοὺς τι ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ὕλην, ἀτρέμης καὶ ἡσύχου τὰ πάντα εἰργάζετο· ὅτου δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥεύσεις. C. II.

reaſon

reaſon, that gave harmony and an unity of compoſition to all things *. But this univerſe is not, like the intelligible one, mind and reaſon. It only partakes of mind and reaſon. Wherefore it ſtood in need of harmony by the concurrence of mind and neceſſity. The latter tends to defect and diſproportion; but mind controuls neceſſity †. He again repeats this ſentiment, that the reaſon or ſoul, which preſides over this univerſe, is not, like that of the intelligible world, pure mind and ſoul, but ſuſpended from the latter, and, as it were, an effulgence from both ‡. This reaſon therefore, though it proceeds from one mind and one life, each of them perfect, is neither one life nor one mind, nor every where perfect; and does not impart itſelf whole and entire to thoſe things, to which it imparts itſelf §.

In his treatiſe on the nature of Love, he makes uſe of theſe principles to explain the

* Τω δε λογω επ' αυλοις την ἁρμονιαν και μιαν την συνταξιν εις τα ὁλα ποιουμενω. Ib.

† Εσι γαρ το παν τοδε ωχ, ὡσπερ ἐκει, νως και λογος, αλλα μεμειχον νω και λογω· διο και εδεηθη ἁρμονιας, συνελθοντος νω και αναγκης. της μεν προς το χειρον ἑλκυσης και εις αλογιαν φερουσης—αρχοντος δε νω ὁμως αναγκης. Ib.

‡ Εσι τοινυν ὁτος (λογος) ωκ ακραντος νως, ωδ' αυλονως, ωδε γε ψυχης καθαρας το γενος· πρτημενος δε εκεινης, και ὁιον εκλαμψις εξ αμφοιν νω και ψυχης. C. XVI.

§ Ἡκων τοινυν ὁτος ὁ λογος εκ νω ἑνος και ζωης μιας, πληρως ονος ἑκατερω, ωκ εσιν ωτε ζωη μια, ωτε νως τις εις, ωτε ἑκασταχη πληρης, ωδε διδως ἑαυτον, οις διδωσιν, ὁλον τε και παντα. Ib.

birth

birth of that urchin, as related by Plato in his Sympoſium. There was, he ſays, a two-fold Venus: one the daughter of Jupiter and Dione; the other the heavenly Venus or the divine ſoul, deſcended from Cælus the firſt principle, but the immediate production of Cronus, mind, the ſecond principle, without a mother, that is, without any communication with matter, and without any relation to marriage; as there is no marriage in heaven, every thing there being pure and unmixed. It is more immediately connected with mind, than the light with the ſun. This heavenly Venus, following Cronus, or, if you pleaſe, his father Cælus, aſſociating with him and beloved by him, brought forth heavenly love. (Enn. III. L. v. C. II.)

But the ſoul of this univerſe alſo has a love attending her, who is concerned in marriages. (C. III.) This love was begotten at the birth of Venus, in the gardens of Jupiter, upon Penia, poverty, by Porus, abundance, In this fable, he ſays, that Jupiter does not mean the third principle, as it uſually does, but the ſecond, viz. mind. For Venus ſignifies the divine ſoul. Porus ſignifies the reaſon of all things: not abſtract univerſal reaſon, or, as he expreſſes it, reaſon remaining in itſelf, but an effulgence from it, and mixed with Penia, indefinite matter void of qualities *. Nectar, with which Porus is ſaid to

* Εκ λογε ε μειναν]ος εν αυ]ω, αλλα μιχθεν]ος αοριςια. Enn. III. L. v. C. VII.

have

have been intoxicated, ſignifies divine wiſdom, flowing into the ſoul at the birth of Venus. The gardens of Jupiter are the glory and ſplendor of the divine mind. (C. VIII. IX. X.)

In the fifth Ennead, the firſt book, and the ſeventh chapter, he applies the ſtory of Cronus or Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, to a ſimilar purpoſe. Cronus, the wiſeſt God, ſignifies the divine intellect, which devours it's own offspring *, that is, abſorbs within itſelf the divine reaſons, not ſuffering them to ſink into matter, and to be foſtered by Rhea. From him, however, ſprung Jupiter, the divine ſoul, the light and impreſſion of the mind, revolving round it, and attached to it. A power too great to be unproductive.

In aid of this ſolemn trifling, he had recourſe to the philoſophical principles of Plato. In the proſecution of his plan, he conſiders the Parmenides, the Timæus, and To Αγαθον or univerſal good, and contemplates them, as if they all treated the ſame ſubject in exactly the ſame point of view. Though the Parmenides was intended to explain the phænomena of the univerſe, according to the prin-

* The Stoics interpreted Cronus to ſignify time, his offspring days, months, and years, &c. Κρονος dicitur, qui eſt idem χρονος, id eſt, ſpatium temporis. Saturnus autem eſt appellatus, quod ſaturetur annis. Ex ſe enim natos comeſſe fingitur ſolitus, quia conſumit ætas temporum ſpatia, anniſque præteritis inſaturabiliter expletur. Cic. De Nat. Deor. L. II. C. 25.

ciples

ciples of Parmenides, on the ſuppoſition of it's having exiſted from eternity. Timæus, on the other hand, proceeds upon the ſuppoſition, that the world was created; and undertakes to delineate the order, in which that great work was performed; the relative dignity of the ſeparate parts; and the ingredients, of which they were ſeverally compoſed. In neither of theſe treatiſes does Plato make himſelf abſolutely reſponſible for the doctrines, which are advanced in them. And in his dialogue concerning a Republic, he is not treating of the firſt and efficient cauſe, but of the final cauſe. It is obvious, how forced an interpretation it muſt be, that aims at blending ſuch inconſiſtences in one ſyſtem. But this is not all. The manner, in which this ſcheme is conducted, adds greatly to the confuſion, that neceſſarily ariſes from the nature of the ſcheme itſelf.

He affirms, that the terms ἓν, ἓν πολλα, and ἓν και πολλα in the Parmenides ſignify the three principles in the divine nature; (Enn. V. L. I. C. VIII.) and that το αγαθον, which I have ſhewn to ſignify the final cauſe, is equivalent to ἓν the firſt principle, (Enn. VI. L. VII. C. XL. and elſewhere) the root, as it were, of the tree, (Enn. VI. L. VIII. C. XV. Enn. V. L. IV. C. I.) the firſt intelligible, a ſimple unit (Enn. V. L. II. C. I.) ungenerated and ſelf-ſufficient, not ſtanding in need of

of intellect to complete it's perfection *, Whereas the ſecond principle, mind, which, he ſays, is the ſame as ἓν πολλα requires the intelligible for the exerciſe of it's powers and the fruition of it's enjoyment, and of courſe for the perfection of it's nature †. Mind has eſſence and intelligence, which are many. (Enn. VI. L. VII. C. XXXVII.) ‡ It is alſo all things, and therefore many. (Enn. III. L. III. C. III.—Enn. V. L. IX. C. VI.) It is generated of the firſt principle by a reflex view of itſelf §.

As mind is generated from the firſt principle by a reflex view; ſo it alſo, being at

* Αυταρκες ου αυτῳ εις αγαθον, ωδεν αν δεοιτο της νοησεως περι αυτο. Enn. VI. L. VII. C. 38. The terms, in which he deſcribes it, are not unlike the account, which Cicero gives of the Gods of Epicurus: Nihil agit: nullis occupationibus eſt implicatus: nulla opera molitur: ſua ſapientia & virtute gaudet: habet exploratum fore ſe ſemper cum in maximis tum in æternis voluptatibus. De Nat. Deor. I. 19.

† Ὁ μεν γαρ νους το αγαθον, το δ' αγαθον ου δειται εκεινου. Enn. III. L. VIII. C. X. Ὁρα ὁ νους εκεινον και δειται αυτου μονου· εκεινῳ δε τουτου ωδεν. Enn. V. L. I. C. VI.—L. IV. C. II.

‡ Δυο ουτα τουτο το ἐν ὁμου νους. και ον, και νουν και τρεμενον. ὁ μεν νους καλα το νοειν· το δε ον καλα το νουμενον. Enn. V. L. I. C. IV.

§ Πως ουν νουν γεννα, η ὁτι τῃ επιστροφῃ πρῳ αὐτο ἑωρᾳ. ἡ δε ὁρασις αυτη νους. Enn. V. L. I. C. VII. Ου γαρ τελειον τῳ μηδεν ζητειν μηδε εχειν, μηδε δεισθαι, οἱον ὑπερπληρες. και το ὑπερ πληρες αυτου ωεπονηκεν αλλο. το δε γενομενον εις αυτο επεσραφη και επληρωθη. και εγενετο πρῳ αυτο βλεπον. και νους ὁτῳ. και ἁ μεν προεκεινο ϛασις αυτη το ον εποιησεν· ἁ δε πρῳ αυτο θεα τον νουν. επει ην εϛι πρῳ αυτο ἱνα ιδῃ, ὁμα νους γιγνεται και ον. Enn. V. L. II. C. I.

reſt,

reſt, out of it's eſſence produces ſoul. The ſoul, not indeed at reſt but in motion, begat likewiſe an image. Looking at the principle, whence it ſprung, it was filled; and having proceeded to different and contrary motion, ſhe generated an image of herſelf, ſenſation, and the nature which is in plants *. Soul is the reaſon of the mind, and an energy of it; as that is of the firſt principle. But the reaſon of the ſoul is obſcure †. As the emitted reaſon is an image of the reaſon in the ſoul; ſo is the ſoul the image and reaſon of the mind; and it is all energy and life, which it ſends forth for the ſubſiſtence of other things. One may be compared to the heat, which reſides in fire; the other to that, which it communicates ‡. The ſoul, being one as ſubſiſting in the divine nature, is alſo many

* Ουλως ουν ον οιον εκειν@, τα ὁμοια ωοιει, δυναμιν ωροχεας ωολλην. ειδ@ δε και τυλο αυλυ, ὡσπερ αυλο αυλυ ωροτερον ωροεχεε. και αὐτη εκ της υσιας ενεργεια ψυχης, τυλο μενονλος εκειυυ γενομενη. και γαρ ὁ νυς μενονλ@ τυ ωρο αυλυ εγενετο. ἡ δε υ μενυσα ωοιει, αλλα κινηθεισα εγεννα ειδωλον. εκει μεν υν βλεπυσα ὁθεν εγενετο, ωληρυλαι. ωροελθυσα δε εις κινησιυ αλλην και ενανλιαν, γενυα ειδωλον ἀυλης, αισθησιν και φυσιν την εν τοις φυλοις. ib.

† Ἡ ψυχη λογ@ νυ. και ενεργεια τις, ὡσπερ αυλ@ εκειυυ. αλλα ψυχης μεν αμυδρ@ ὁ λογ@. Enn. V. L. I. C. VI.

‡ Ἡ ψυχη—εικων τις εςι νυ. οιον λογ@ ὁ εν ωρόφορᾳ λογυ τυ εν ψυχῃ, ὁτω τοι και αυλη λογ@ νυ. και ἡ ωασα ενεργεια. και ἡν ωροϊεται ζωην εις αλλυ ὑποςασιν. οιον ωυρ@, το μεν ἡ συνυσα θερμολης, ἡ δε ἡν ωαρεχει. Enn. V. L. I. C. III.

as conſiſting of the reaſons of the things that are made *.

She made all animals, breathing into them life: whatever the earth or the ſea nouriſhes, and whatever are in the air or in heaven, the ſtars and the ſun. She arranged this great heaven, and makes it revolve in regular order, being a nature different from the things, which ſhe arranges, and moves, and cauſes to live. When ſhe communicates life to them, they come into being: when ſhe quits them, they periſh. Without her, matter is a dead carcaſs; but ſhe flows into it, and enlightens it. As the rays of the ſun, illuminating a dark cloud, make it ſhine, and give it an aſpect of golden ſplendor; ſo alſo ſoul, entering into the body of heaven, gave it life and immortality. Enn. V. L. I. C. II.

It ſhould ſeem, that it would be a bold undertaking and an arduous taſk to reconcile this theory with the doctrines laid down in the Timæus. In this theory mind and ſoul are ſtated to be the ſecond and third principles, and to be co-eternal and co-eſſential with the firſt principle, and to flow neceſſarily from it by a gradual proceſs: that is, mind from the firſt principle, and ſoul from mind. Soul, in like manner, from the ſame neceſſity of it's nature diffuſing the emana-

* Το δε ποιειν την ψυχην, τουτο αρα πληθος εν. τι ην το πληθος; οι λογοι των γινομενων. Enn. VI. L. II. C. V.

tions

tions of it's eſſence through matter, and giving it form and life, conſtituted the viſible world, with all that it contains. In the Timæus the three principles, as has been juſtly obſerved, are the Creator, Idea which is denominated the pattern, and Matter. Out of the two laſt the firſt is ſaid by a voluntary and deliberate act (βυληθεις και λογισαμενω) at the beginning of time to have made the univerſe, conſiſting of mind in ſoul and ſoul in body. But Plotinus was not diſcouraged by the difficulty, that would have deterred a leſs enterprizing genius; and he has ſhewn by the manner, in which he ſurmounted it, that nothing is arduous to a ſophiſt, who is indulged with an arbitrary aſſumption of abſtract principles and ænigmatical interpretations. He ſays, that Plato does not always appear to aſſert the ſame doctrines; ſo that it is not eaſy to aſcertain his opinion *: that he

* Ου τ' αυλον λεγων παγλαχη φαινεται, ινα αν τις εκ ραδιας το τυ ανδρω βυλημα ειδεν. Enn. IV. L. VIII. C. I. Cicero in his dialogue De Nat. Deor. L. I. C. XII. makes Velleius the Stoic bring the ſame charge of inconſtancy of principles againſt Plato: De Platonis inconſtantia longum eſt dicere, &c. The inſtances, which he produces, are taken from the Timæus and the Books of Laws. If he had thought, that the Timæus and the Parmenides treated preciſely of the ſame ſubject, and that in both thoſe dialogues Plato intended to convey his own ſentiments; the ſtrongeſt poſſible argument, that could have been advanced, might have been obtained from a compariſon of the different doctrines maintained in thoſe two dialogues. For Velleius clearly perceived, that the poſitive creation

he does but obſcurely intimate, (ηνιγμενως — αινιττομενως. Enn. VI. L. II. C. XXII.) that mind ſees ideas in the firſt principle, together with the principal conſequences deduced from it: that when the production of mind or ſoul is mentioned; it is not intended to ſignify a production in time, but only to point out the order of cauſes*: that according to Plato mind ſees ideas in the living, which he calls alſo the inteiligible: that by the contemplation of thoſe ideas is generated reaſon or ſoul, which divides them into the ſeveral exiſting reaſons or ſouls: that the univerſal ſoul was not any where, and did not come any whither; but body, being near it, partook of it: it was not in body, nor does Plato ſay ſo; but body was in it. Other ſouls proceed from it, and return to it; but itſelf is always above, in that, whoſe nature is exiſtence. Enn. III. L. IX. C. I, II.

of the world was taught in the Timæus. But Cicero underſtood the principles of reaſoning too well to put ſuch an objection into the mouth of any of his diſputants, whom he repreſents as the leading men of their ſeveral ſects: tres trium diſciplinarum principes. It was incumbent upon Plato to preſerve a conſiſtency of principles and doctrines in the ſame diſcourſe. But it was by no means neceſſary, that he ſhould maintain the ſame doctrines in explaining the phyſiology of Parmenides and the coſmogony of Timæus.

* Εκ ποθεν δε ἡμιν εϛω γενεσις: ἡ εν χρονῳ, τον λογον περι των αει ονλων ποιημενοις. τῳ δε λογῳ την γενεσιν προσαπλονλας αυλοις, αιτιας και ταξεως αυλοις αποδωσει. Enn. V. L. I. C. VI.

If

If we conſider the almoſt innumerable ſtories of Pagan mythology, together with the various methods of relating and explaining them; we ſhall readily ſee, that it would not be difficult for ſo ſubtil a genius to cull ſomething from them, which to thoſe, who revered his authority, might ſeem to carry with it an air of probability, and to fall in with his favourite ſyſtem.

The allegorical method of interpreting the Pagan mythology was attacked with great ſpirit and acuteneſs by Arnobius. The new theological mode of interpretation does not appear to have attracted his notice. He confines himſelf chiefly to the phyſical explanations, which were more ancient and general; though moſt of his obſervations are equally applicable to the other. One of the moſt obvious objections is, that both the accounts and interpretations of different authors are at great variance with each other. Among other inſtances he mentions the Muſes, who, according to Mnaſeas, were the daughters of Tellus and Cœlus. Other accounts made them the daughters of Jupiter and Memory, or Mind. Some ſaid, that they were virgins; others affirmed, that they were mothers. Ephorus ſaid, that they were three in number; Mnaſeas, that they were four; Myrtilus, that they were ſeven; Crates, that they were eight; Heſiod, that they were nine. L. III. P. 121. Ed. L. Bat. 1651, 4oto.

Again, concerning the Penates, Nigidius aſſerted, that they were Neptune and Apollo, who encircled Troy with walls. The ſame man in other places mentions four kinds of Penates. Cæſius thinks, that they are Fortune, Ceres, Genius Jovialis, and Pales, a male, an attendant of Jupiter. Varro maintains, that neither their number nor their names are known. The Tuſcans affirm, that they are ſix males and ſix females. "Nor, ſays he, have there been wanting men, who maintained, that they are Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. So that, you ſee, there is nothing conſiſtent in all this, nothing determinate, nothing upon which the mind can reſt with even a probability of truth." P. 123, 124 *.

You

* From this account it ſhould ſeem, that very little ſtreſs can be laid upon the following paſſage in Cudworth's True Intellectual Syſtem, p. 451. "Nevertheleſs it may juſtly be ſuſpected, as G. J. Voſſius hath already obſerved, that there was yet ſome higher and more ſacred myſtery, in this Capitoline Trinity, aimed at; namely, a Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes. For theſe three Roman or Capitoline Gods, were ſaid to have been firſt brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian Iſland; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian Flood, if we may believe Euſebius. And as theſe were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets, Dii per quos Penitus ſpiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi poſſidemus, that is, The Gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being; but Varro in Arnobius, Dii qui ſunt Intrinſecus, atque in Intimis Penetralibus Cœli, the Gods,

"who

"*You* may interpret the connexion of Jupiter with Ceres, to ſignify rain gliding into the boſom of the earth. *Another* may give it a more plauſible meaning: a third may aſſign a different one; and each particular thing may receive an infinite number of interpretations, according to the different geniuſes and diſpoſitions of the interpreters. For as the ſuppoſition of an allegory is adopted in obſcure caſes, and there is no certain and determinate end, to which the meaning is neceſſarily directed; every man is at equal liberty to ſtrain it to his own opinion. How then can you extract certainties from ambiguities; and affix one ſignification to a ſtory, which admits of innumerable expoſitions?" L. V. P. 181. Again, "Why do you ſelect particular ſtories or parts of ſtories? If they be all allegory; give the interpretation of each particular. If they be partly allegorical, and partly literal; by what rule or art do you diſtinguiſh one from the other?" P. 182, 183.

"who are in the moſt Inward Receſſes of Heaven; ſo "were they called by the Samothracians Κάβειροι or Ca-"biri, that is, as Varro rightly interprets the word, "Θεοὶ δυνατοὶ, or Divi Potes, the Powerful and Mighty "Gods. Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew "גבורים gives juſt occaſion to ſuſpect, that this ancient "tradition of three divine hypoſtaſes (unqueſtionably "entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongſt "the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Perſians) ſprung originally from the Hebrews."

"Your interpretations are directly oppoſite to ancient uſage. Allegories were formerly adopted, in order to clothe mean and impure things in a comely dreſs, and to inveſt them with a dignity, which did not naturally belong to them. But, according to your expoſitions, the moſt auguſt and chaſte things are recorded in moſt obſcene language. Why were not things ſtated in literal terms? Was there no danger in making gods adulterers? If the ſhade of allegorical obſcurity had not involved the ſubject; the truth would have been obvious to the learner, and the dignity of the Gods would have been preſerved inviolate." P. 186.

The moſt eminent of the Greek fathers of the third century was Origen. He was educated at Alexandria, and one of his name was a ſcholar of Ammonius. Whether it was he, or a Pagan philoſopher, is not quite ſo certain. He was a man of great induſtry, genius, and learning. But his judgment was not always able to moderate the fervor of his imagination. He was a warm admirer of Philo, and adopted without reſerve the allegorical mode of interpreting Scripture, which an injudicious uſe of his principles in the ſecond century had introduced into the church of Chriſt.

Like the Valentinians, he maintained, that Αρχη, Beginning, indicated a perſon; and diſcourſing upon the firſt chapter of St. John's Goſpel,

Goſpel, he ſays, that it may ſignify the ſupreme Being. Thus "The Word was in the beginning will ſignify, that it was in God the father *. Chriſt is alſo the beginning, being the wiſdom of God and "the beginning of his ways." Proverbs VIII. 22. Thus, commenting upon the firſt verſe in the book of Geneſis, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," he ſays, What is the beginning of all things but our Lord and Saviour Chriſt Jeſus, the firſt-begotten of every creature? In this beginning therefore, that is, in his word or reaſon, God made the heaven and the earth. Hom. in Gen. C. 1. P. 1. Like Plotinus he ſays, the father is in all reſpects one and ſimple; but our Saviour is many †, on account of the variety of his names and relations, as being the way, the truth, and the life, as being wiſdom and righteouſneſs, and ſanctification and redemption—αυτοαληθεια, the prototype of the truth, which is in reaſonable ſouls, P. 99. —αυτοδικαιοσυνη ἡ ουσιωδης, ſubſtantial righteouſneſs. P. 100.—proceeding from the father, as will does from mind. He terms him the living and, as it were, animated incorporeal ſubſtance of various theorems, con-

* Οὐκ ἀλοπως δε και τον των ὁλων θεὸν ερει τις αρχην, σαφως προπιπλων, ὁτι αρχη υἱὸς ὁ σωτηρ—εν αρχῃ ην ὁ λογος, λογον νοων τον υἱον παρα το ειναι εν τῳ πατρι λεγομενον ειναι εν αρχῃ. P. 17. Ed. Huet. Roth. 1668.

† Ὁ Θεος μεν ων παντη ἑν εστι και ἁπλουν. ὁ δε σωτηρ ἡμων —πολλα γινεται. P. 19.

taining the reaſons of all things.* He diſtinguiſhes the divine intellect or wiſdom from the logos, though he aſſigns them both to Chriſt. For the Scriptures ſo explicitly declare the logos, to which they attribute the creation, to have been Chriſt, the ſecond perſon, that he could not, as Plotinus did, aſſign it an hypoſtaſis diſtinct from intellect, and denominate it the third perſon in the divine nature. Having quoted Pſalm XLV. 1. he ſays, the heart ſignifies the intellectual power of God, the logos that power, which declares the things contained in it †; and he ſays, that the logos always was in wiſdom. P. 43.

In explaining the derivation of the third perſon of the Holy Trinity, he approaches very near the doctrine of Plotinus. "The Holy Ghoſt," ſays he, "ſeems to ſtand in need of the Son, who adminiſters to his ſubſiſtence, not only that he might *be*, but alſo that he might be wiſe, and reaſonable, and juſt, and whatever elſe we ought to underſtand him to be, by a participation of the forementioned conceptions of Chriſt ‡. And I think,

* Ασωματον ὑποστασιν ποικιλων θεωρημαλων, περιεχουσαν τους των ὁλων λογους, ζωσαν και ὁιονει εμψυχον. Com. in Johan. P. 36.

† Την καρδιαν του Θεου την νοητικην αυτου και προθετικην περι των ὁλων δυναμιν εκληπτεον, τον δε λογον των εν εκεινῃ επαγγελτικον. P. 42.

‡ Μονα του μονογενους φυσει υἱου αρχηθεν τυγχανοντος, ὡ χρηζειν εοικε το ἁγιον πνευμα, διακονουντος αυτῳ τῃ ὑποστασει, ω μονον

I think, that the Holy Spirit communicates the matter, if I may ſo call it, of the gifts from God to thoſe, who are ſanctified by him and the participation of him, the ſaid matter of the gifts being wrought by God, adminiſtered by Chriſt, and ſuſtained by the Holy Spirit."

This likewiſe bears ſome reſemblance to what Philo ſays of the divine powers: principles, which Origen, unawed by the example of Praxeas and the Patripaſſians, whoſe hereſy probably ſprung from them, has in other places expreſsly applied to the ſecond and third perſons of the bleſſed Trinity. In his firſt Homily on Iſaiah (P. 624.) he ſays, that the two ſeraphim, who ſtood round the throne, were our Lord Jeſus and the Holy Spirit. He quotes the authority of Philo for this interpretation in both the third chapter of the firſt book, (P. 757.) and in the ſecond chapter of the fourth book, (P. 843.) of his treatiſe Περι Αρχων.

It is not eaſy to aſcertain exactly the preciſe opinions of ſo fanciful an interpreter, and ſo looſe a reaſoner as Origen. But this, I think, we may venture to affirm, that they were not ſo exceptionable, as the principles and reaſonings, which he advanced in the defence and explanation of them. His princi-

ὴ μονον εις το ειναι, αλλα και σοφον ειναι, και λογικον, και δικαιον, και ωαν ὁτιποτουν χρη αυτο νοειν τυγχανειν, κατα μετοχην των ωροειρημενων ἡμιν Χριστω επινοιων. κ. τ. λ. P. 57.

ples and reaſonings contain in them the ſeeds of many hereſies; but he often proteſts againſt thoſe heretical applications of them, and advances, in oppoſition, ſound doctrines.

The moſt important hereſy, which ſprung up in the third century, was that of Sabellius; whether we conſider it in itſelf or in it's conſequences. He adopted the uſual method of explaining the nature of the Son, by ſtating him to be the wiſdom or the reaſon of the Father. But he maintained, that the reaſon of God was identically the ſame with God, conſtituting one perſon with the father; in the ſame manner as a man together with his reaſon compoſes one man *. Thus the ſame perſon, being really one but having two names, is at one time the father, and at another time his own ſon †.

This opinion of Sabellius was embraced by ſome biſhops of Pentapolis in Upper Libya; inſomuch that ſcarcely any other doctrine relative to the ſon of God was taught in the

* Λογον ὑιον τῳ εκ καρδιας ανθρωπε νομιζησι τον τε Θεε, και σοφιαν ὁποιαν την εν ψυχῃ, και δια τυ̃το ωροσωπον ἓν τον Θεον ἁμα τῳ λογῳ φασιν. ὡσπερ και τον ανθρωπον ἁμα τῳ ἑαυτ῀ λογῳ ἀνθρωπον ενα. Athanaſius contra Sab. Greg. P. 651. Ed. Par. 1627.

† Ουδε ὡς τε ἐν῀ δις ονομαζομενε, ὡσε τον ὑιον αλλοτε μεν πα῀ερα, αλλοτε δε ὑιον ἑαυτε γινεσθαι· τυ̃το γαρ Σαβελλιε῀ φρονησας ἁιρετικ῀ εκριθη. Athan. contra Arian. Orat. IV. P. 456. Το ἐν διωνυμον, Σαβελλιε το επιτηδευμα, τον ὑιον ὑιον και πα῀ερα λεγονσ῀. V. P. 525.

churches

churches of thoſe parts *. Dionyſius, biſhop of Alexandria, to whom the care of thoſe churches belonged, ſent and counſelled thoſe, who had been guilty, to relinquiſh that impious doctrine, and return to the true faith. When he found, that his expoſtulations had not produced the intended effect, he wrote them a letter, in which he undertook to prove the falſhood of the doctrine, which they were ſo ſtrenuous in propagating. In this letter, while he was perhaps too earneſtly inſiſting upon the difference between the father and the ſon, he made uſe of reaſonings and expreſſions, which ſeemed to ſome men to entrench too much upon the dignity of the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity. However, when he was accuſed, he extricated himſelf from the difficulty either by retracting his error, or by explaining away the ſeemingly offenſive paſſages in his letter, and by ſolemn profeſſions of a true faith. Athanaſius defends him by comparing his conduct to that of a ſkilful phyſician, who, when he is called in to a patient, conſiders only the nature of the diſorder, under which he labours, and adminiſters ſuch remedies for the removal of it, as, if applied without any re-

* Εν Πενταπολει της ανω Λιβυης τηνικαυτα τινες των επισκοπων εφρονησαν τα Σαβελλιου· και τουτον ισχυσαν ταις επινοιαις, ως ολιγου δειν μηκετι εν ταις εκκλησιαις κηρυτλεσθαι τον υιον του Θεου. Athan. De Sent. Dion. contra Arian. P. 552.

ference

ference to a caſe of that particular deſcription, might have a tendency to produce a malady of a directly oppoſite nature.

Whatever ground there was for theſe inſinuations to his prejudice, it is certain, that in the enſuing century the followers of Arius endeavoured to ſhelter themſelves under the authority of the name of Dionyſius. Athanaſius, who carefully watched every movement of the Arians, did not ſuffer them long to enjoy this advantage without moleſtation. He compoſed an elaborate treatiſe, in order to vindicate his venerable predeceſſor from the imputation of favouring thoſe opinions, for the ſuppreſſion of which he himſelf was exerting all the powers of a vigorous mind and an ardent ſpirit.

Arius was a Preſbyter at Alexandria; and the hereſy, that goes by his name, and which occaſioned ſo much confuſion in the church in the fourth century, either originated from, or gave riſe to, a violent conteſt between him and Alexander, the biſhop of Alexandria. Arius explained and defended his principles in a treatiſe, which he denominated Thalia. But as neither that work nor any writings of his opponent Alexander are extant; all the knowledge, that we can have of their reſpective principles, muſt be derived from the writings of others. Athanaſius, who ſucceeded Alexander in the ſee of Alexandria, and was conſidered from the firſt as the ſtrongeſt

ſtrongeſt bulwark of the cauſe, may be ſafely deemed to have given a juſt repreſentation of the principles of his own party. And as he entered into the controverſy more deeply than any other; it is from him, that we have the beſt chance of collecting the principles of Arius.

I wiſh it to be obſerved, that I am now enquiring not about the reſpective doctrines of the contending parties, (for thoſe are notorious) but about the principles, which led to thoſe doctrines, and the modes of explaining them. Arius accuſed Alexander of profeſſing the doctrine of Sabellius, who confounded the perſons of the father and the ſon. Alexander accuſed Arius of degrading the ſon to the rank of a creature.

In order to underſtand clearly this controverſy, it will be proper to call to mind the ſophiſticated doctrines of Philo, which were compoſed of heterogeneous principles, derived from the books of the Old Teſtament and the writings of Plato. Theſe doctrines were ſtill farther diſtorted by the early writers of the Chriſtian Church, and raſhly applied to explain the ſublime myſteries of our holy religion.

The word Λογος is uſed by Philo in three diſtinct ſenſes, in each of which it has been applied by Chriſtian writers to the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity. He denominates by it, firſt, The divine intellect: ſecondly, The

The conception of that intellect, the idea or ſyſtem of ideas, which is the production of it's reflex act, and the internal object of it's contemplation: thirdly, The external expreſſion of that conception. Thus, when he is ſpeaking of the intelligible world, of that plan or pattern, which the Deity formed, before he created the external world; he ſays, it is not allowable to ſay, that it is in any place. For as the plan, that an architect forms of a city, which he is about to build, is not in any place, but in the ſoul of the artiſt; in the ſame manner the world of ideas can have no other place, but the divine intellect, which arranged thoſe things *. Farther on he ſays, If a man would uſe plain words, he would ſay, that the intelligible world is nothing elſe, but the reaſoning of God, while he was in the act of making the world †. The uſe of the word in the third ſenſe is too common for it to be neceſſary, that I ſhould quote any paſſages to prove it.

I have already produced inſtances, in which the early fathers applied the term in theſe ſeveral ſignifications to Chriſt.

If the principles of Alexander were the ſame, as thoſe, which were advanced by Atha-

* Τον αυλον τροπον ωδ' ὁ εκ των ιδεων κοσμ☉ αλλον αν εχοι τοπον, η τον θειον λογον τον ταυτα διακοσμησαντα. Περι Κοσμοπ. P. 4.

† Ει δε τις εθελησειε γυμνοτεροις χρησασθαι τοις ονομασιν, ωδεν αν ἑτερον ειποι τον νοητον ειναι κοσμον, η Θεου λογον ηδε κοσμοποιουντ☉. P. 5.

naſius;

naſius; he applied the word Λογος to the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity in the firſt ſenſe only. When he is diſputing with the Arians about the eternity of the ſecond perſon, he, with an air of triumph, bids them add this to their queſtion, Whether there ever was a time, when the eſſentially exiſtent God was deſtitute of reaſon or intellect *. But in his expoſition of faith, in order to make his meaning clearly and accurately underſtood upon ſo important a ſubject, he aſſerts this doctrine with all imaginable caution, to the abſolute excluſion of the explanations of Arius, Sabellius, and other heretics †. He ſaid, that the error of the Sabellians aroſe from their falſe notions of this reaſon or wiſdom and word of God, which conſtitutes the ſecond perſon of the Holy Trinity. They conceived of God as of man, and ſuppoſed, that the Word of God was ſimilar to that, which iſſues from the heart of man; and that the Wiſdom of God was ſuch, as that, which is in the ſoul of man. On this account they ſay, that God together with his word conſtitutes but one perſon; in the ſame manner, as a man together with his word or reaſon

* Ὁ ων Θεος ην ποτε αλογος. Con. Arian. Orat. II. P. 330.

† Εις ἑνα μονογενη λογον, σοφιαν, υἱον, εκ τυ πατρος αναρχως και ἀϊδιως γεγεννημενον. λογον δε υ προφορικον, υκ ενδιαθετον, υκ απορροιαν τυ τελειυ, υ τμησιν τυς απαθυς φυσεως, ητε προβολην, αλλ' υἱον αυτοζωντα, ζωντα τε και ενεργυντα. κ. τ. λ. Expoſ. Fidei. P. 240.

com-

compoſes but one man. Cont. Sab. Greg. P. 651. Upon this he remarks, that the word of a man neither lives nor ſubſiſts, and is only the motion of a living and ſubſiſting heart; and paſſes away, as ſoon as it is uttered. But the word of the Lord, as the Pſalmiſt declares, endureth for ever in heaven. This he elſewhere calls ſubſtantial word and ſubſtantial wiſdom *.

Arius maintained, on the contrary, that this principle, which ſtated the real wiſdom and reaſon of God to be the Son in the Holy Trinity, is mere Sabellianiſm. When he denied the eternity of the Son; he did not affirm, that there ever was a time, when God was without wiſdom or reaſon. He has in himſelf his own wiſdom and his own reaſon, which is not Chriſt, but in which he made Chriſt †.

There are ſome paſſages in the writings of Athanaſius, which ſeem to intimate, that the principles of Arius were connected with ſome Jewiſh and Grecian tenets. He ſays, that impiety is introduced by their principles, or rather Judaiſm, different from that contained in the Scriptures, which has Helleniſm cloſely

* Ουσιωδης λογος και υσιωδης σοφια. Cont. Arian. Orat. V. P. 520.

† Σοφος μεν εϛι και ουκ αλογος, ιδιαν δε εχει εν ἑαυτῳ σοφιαν. και ιδιον λογον, ὁ τον Χριϛον δε, αλλ' εν ᾧ και τον Χριϛον εποιησε. Orat. V. Con. Arian. P. 522. See to the ſame purpoſe the third oration. P. 408.

following

following it *. In another paſſage he exhibits a more particular account of the principles of Arius. By comparing that with a paſſage of the ſame import near the beginning of Philo Περι Κοσμοῦ. it will be obvious, from what ſource Arius, as well as Tertullian, derived his notions. God, ſays he, was alone, and reaſon and wiſdom were not yet. But when he was diſpoſed to create us, he then made one being, and named him reaſon, and ſon, and wiſdom, that by means of him he might create us. There are then, ſays he, two wiſdoms: one God's own, and ſubſiſting with him. In this wiſdom the other, the ſon, was formed †. In this paſſage we have the ſtrongeſt features of the twofold logos of Philo; viz. The intelligible world, which he calls alſo the reaſoning of God when he was in the act of creating the world, the pattern according to which this ſenſible world was made: and ſecondly, The wiſdom and intellect of God, in which that pattern, the intelligible world, was formed. Athanaſius in a great number of places controverts the prin-

* Αθεοῖης γαρ εκ τῆίων εισαγεῖαι, και μαλλον ωαρα τας γραφας Ιυδαϊσμ☉, εχων εγγυς επακολυθενία τον Ἑλληνισμον. P. 296.

† Ην γαρ, φησι, μον☉ ὁ Θε☉, και υπω ην ὁ λογ☉ και ἡ σοφια· ειτα θελησας ἡμας δημιυργησαι, τοῖε δε ωεποιηκεν ἑνα τινα, και ωνομασεν αυῖον λογον, και υἱον, και σοφιαν, ἱνα ἡμας δι' αυῖυ δημιυργησῃ· δυο γυν σοφιας φησιν ειναι, μιαν μεν, την ιδιαν και συνυπαρχησαν τῳ Θεῳ, τον δε υἱον εν αυτῃ τῃ σοφιᾳ γεγενησθαι. Orat. II. P. 310-11.

ciple of Arius, that the ſon was produced on our account, and for the expreſs purpoſe of forwarding our creation; and that he is called the wiſdom of God in a figurative ſenſe, on account of the great diſplay, which his nature exhibits, of the divine wiſdom, in which he was formed.

Theſe modes of explanation and defence were now ſo thoroughly eſtabliſhed, and from this time aſſumed ſo regular a form, that it is unneceſſary to purſue the ſubject farther.

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CONCLUSION.

THE inferences, which I would draw from the preceding inveſtigation, are two: Firſt, That a Trinity of Perſons in the divine nature was the genuine and peculiar doctrine of the primitive Chriſtian Church. Secondly, That it is extremely dangerous to affect to be wiſe in holy things above what is written in the word of God.

I. How much ſoever the early writers of the Church differ in their method of explaining the *nature* of the three divine perſons, and their *relation* to each other; they are in a manner unanimous in their profeſſion of the general doctrine. The great and important queſtion ſeems to be, From whence did they derive this opinion? Moſt of the defenders and oppoſers of this doctrine in modern times agree in maintaining, that the doctrine of the Trinity is delivered and inculcated in the writings of Plato. Hence the orthodox conclude, that, though this great myſtery is more fully ſet forth in the Holy Scriptures, and derives it's chief authority from divine reve-

 lation;

lation; yet, either the doctrine itſelf is congenial to the mind of man, and regularly deducible from principles of reaſon; or that it was handed down in the heathen world by uninterrupted tradition from remote antiquity. The oppoſers of our faith, on the contrary, infer from the ſame premiſes, that the doctrine itſelf is no part of genuine Chriſtianity: that it is the natural production of philoſophy, falſely ſo called: and that it was introduced into the Church of Chriſt by men, who with their ſubtilties diſtorted the graceful form, and corrupted the ſimplicity of our holy religion.

In the courſe of the preceding enquiry, I have found myſelf obliged to differ in ſome points from both thoſe parties. After a minute and impartial examination of the writings of Plato, I cannot find any thing, which ſufficiently proves him to have had even an obſcure knowledge of the myſterious doctrine of the Trinity. None of his immediate followers taught it: none of his perſonal enemies or philoſophical rivals urged it as an objection againſt him: none of the ſects, which branched off from the academy, profeſſed it. When the arts and learning of Greece were imported into Italy: when poets, philoſophers, and ſtateſmen conſidered it as the moſt noble employment inter ſylvas Academi quærere verum: when Plato was eſteemed to have ſpoken, as it were, the language of the Gods;

Gods; and all the ingenuity and eloquence of Rome were exerted, to unfold his principles, and recommend his concluſions—during this long and enlightened period, no traces are to be found, in the works of heathen writers, of this profound, this peculiar doctrine.

The diſcovery was not made, till philoſophers became Chriſtians, and Chriſtians became philoſophers. The converted philoſopher endeavoured to ſhew to his unconverted brethren the ſuperior brilliancy of the light, which he enjoyed as a Chriſtian. To this purpoſe he contended, that Chriſtianity was not without it's evidences even among themſelves: that intimations of the ſublime doctrines of revelation were to be found in the writings of the philoſophers of Greece: that thoſe ſages, to whom they looked up with ſo much reverence, had nothing whereof to glory: that they were mere retailers of ſcraps and fragments from holy writ, mutilated by their ignorance, and obſcured by their ſpeculations.

The conceit was captivating: it was ſeized with avidity. The Apologiſt urged the Pagan to approach the pure fountain of God's word, and not to drink of the muddy ſtream of human ſpeculation. The Chriſtian teacher, while he traced out fanciful reſemblances, conveyed to his hearers a great idea of the

extent of his knowledge and the ſubtilty of his wit.

If the expedient tended at all to promote the progreſs of Chriſtianity; it did ſo for a very ſhort time. Error is multiform, and it's cauſe may be advanced in ten thouſand different ways. But nothing, that is not entirely founded on fact, and perfectly conformable to the nature of things, can coaleſce with the ſimple texture of truth, or accord with the ſymmetry of it's parts. The unnatural conjunction will inevitably, ſooner or later, weaken the good cauſe, which it was intended to ſupport. It is, to uſe the words of the prophet Iſaiah, a ſtaff of a broken reed, whereon, if a man lean, it will go into his hand, and pierce it. So are falſe conceits to all, that truſt in them. The battery was ſoon turned againſt Chriſtianity by the ſophiſts of thoſe times.

The author of our holy profeſſion diſclaimed all compromiſe and communication with the ſeveral religions of the heathen world, which he repreſented to lie in darkneſs and the ſhadow of death. He was a light to lighten the Gentiles, and roſe with healing on his wings. He told his followers, that no one knew the father, but the ſon, and he to whom the ſon ſhould reveal him. He unfolded ſuch myſteries concerning the divine nature and proceedings, as even the angels of God had before deſired in vain to look into.

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The diſputers of this world ſoon ſaw the advantage, which the indiſcreet preachers of our holy religion gave them againſt the high claims of their maſter and his immediate followers; and they availed themſelves of it to the utmoſt extent. They readily admitted the ſuppoſed fact, that the doctrines contained in the writings of Plato, and thoſe propounded in the Goſpel, were eſſentially the ſame. But the concluſion, which they drew from this common principle, was widely different from that, which was held forth by the Chriſtians. They denied, that the Holy Scriptures were the original fountain of all wiſdom. They maintained, on the contrary, that the founders of the different ſects of Grecian philoſophy and popular mythology, more eſpecially Plato, derived their information from the ſame ſource, as the author of Chriſtianity; which was no other, than the genuine dictates of reaſon and nature. Where then, they triumphantly aſked, is the ſuperiority for which you contend, over all the nations of the earth? Why do you call upon us to relinquiſh the wiſe and venerable ſyſtems and inſtitutions of our anceſtors, when you have nothing eſſentially different to offer us in their ſtead?

The ſophiſts of thoſe times ſatisfied themſelves with the poſitions, that the characteriſtic doctrines of Chriſtianity were really, though obſcurely, taught in the writings of

Plato; and that they were concealed under allegories in the fables of popular mythology. The ſtate of religion and philoſophy did not admit of the poſſibility of their going farther than this point at that time. It was reſerved for the diſputers of later ages to aſſert, that thoſe profound doctrines are in truth no part of genuine Chriſtianity: that they were the ſubtil inventions of men: and that they were originally introduced into Chriſtianity from the writings of Plato. As this aſſertion has been frequently repeated, though without the ſhadow of a proof, it deſerved a minute enquiry.

In aſſertions of this kind, ſome particular time or perſon muſt be pointed out, in order to give a kind of plauſibility to the thing aſſerted. Juſtin Martyr has been almoſt unavoidably fixed upon in the inſtance before us. To have carried up the general corruption much nearer to the time of the apoſtles would have been ſcarcely conſiſtent with probability. To have brought it down lower would have been impoſſible; as the doctrine of the Trinity is manifeſtly aſſerted in the works of that Apologiſt. He was, moreover, familiarly converſant with the principles of Plato and other Grecian philoſophers, before he embraced Chriſtianity; and he was particularly fond of proving to his unconverted brethren, the ſuperior advantages, which he derived from the ſtudy of the Holy Scriptures, in conſequence of the originality, the purity,

and

and the extent of the diſcoveries relating to divine things, that were contained in them.

If Juſtin derived his opinion of a Trinity of Perſons in the divine nature from the writings of Plato, and from thence tranſplanted them into Chriſtianity; either he adopted the received notions of the Platoniſts of his own or preceding times; or by his ſagacity he had diſcovered in the writings of Plato ſome doctrines, which had eſcaped the ſcrutiny and penetration of all others. That Juſtin by his ſagacity diſcovered what had eluded the diligent ſearch of the long liſt of ſages of Greece and Rome, who flouriſhed between the days of Plato and the ſecond century of the Chriſtian æra, is, I conceive, what our opponents will not be very forward to advance, or even admit. If they affirm, that the followers of Plato had actually diſcovered that doctrine in his writings, and had openly and explicitly avowed it in or before the days of Juſtin; it reſts upon them to prove it. As far as my reſearches have extended, I have not been able to find any one inſtance, in which the doctrine had been maintained by Pagan philoſophers *, in the ſame plain and decided

* The high eſtimation, in which Lord Montboddo and Dr. Heberden are deſervedly held by the learned world, obliges me to take notice of the following note in that noble Lord's Treatiſe on the Origin and Progreſs of Language, Book II. C. 11. P. 339.—"A learned and worthy gentleman of my acquaintance in London, Dr. Heber-

decided manner, as by the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church. By theſe it was propounded, as the criterion of their orthodoxy, as the ground-work of their faith. But the cultivators of human wiſdom appear to have been total ſtrangers to it; till it was diſcloſed to them by a teacher of philoſophy, who had been educated in the boſom of Chriſtianity. Then, and not till then, they uſed it, as a

Heberden, ſhowed me a paſſage in Seneca's Conſolatio ad Helviam, from which it appears, that it (the doctrine of the Trinity) was known to the Stoics. His words are, ſpeaking of the misfortune that had befallen this woman: Id actum eſt, mihi crede, ab illo, quiſquis formator univerſi fuit, ſive ille Deus eſt potens omnium, ſive incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, ſive divinus ſpiritus, per omnia maxima & minima æquali intentione diffuſus, ſive fatum & immutabilis cauſarum inter ſe cohærentium ſeries. Senecæ Conſol. ad Helviam, cap. 8. edit. Lipſii, p. 77." To my mind this paſſage does not appear to have the leaſt tendency towards proving the point, in ſupport of which it is cited. I ſhould as ſoon undertake to prove, that Pope inculcated the doctrine of the Trinity, from the laſt line of the firſt ſtanza in his Univerſal Prayer:

Father of all! in ev'ry age,
In ev'ry clime ador'd,
By ſaint, by ſavage, and by ſage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!

The poet aſſerts, that the firſt cauſe is worſhipped by men in all ſtates, however they may differ about the name, by which they addreſs him. In like manner the philoſopher refers the calamity to the appointment of the ſupreme Being, however he may have been characterized by philoſophers, and by whatever appellation he is to be diſtinguiſhed.

key

key to unlock the abſtract ſubtilties of Plato, and to throw a decent veil over the extravagant and licentious fables of Pagan mythology.

Again, the manner in which Plotinus conducts his argumentation, is an object deſerving our attention. The Chriſtian opened the ſacred volume; and, as he read, he found, or believed that he found, the profound doctrine of the Trinity of Perſons in the Godhead revealed in it. The truth of the doctrine he reſted upon the authority of Holy Writ. For an explanation of the nature of thoſe beings whom it concerns, and of the relation which they bear to each other, where his heavenly guide was ſilent, he had recourſe to the ſubtilties of human wit. This was the natural courſe for thoſe to take, who derived their information from another, and reſted the truth of their tenets upon the authority of their teacher.

But this was not the courſe, which Plotinus followed. His object was not to prove the truth of the doctrine by the authority of Plato, but to bend the language of Plato to a conſiſtency with the doctrine. He does not even profeſs to have learned it from that great maſter of philoſophy; but undertakes to deduce it by general reaſoning from abſtract notions of entity, mind, and ſoul. Having thus drawn his concluſions, he next applies them in illuſtration of the doctrines of Plato.

This,

This, I conceive, is the exact courſe, which a man would purſue, who had derived the doctrine from another ſource, and wiſhed to prove, that it was alſo to be found in the writings of Plato. I aſk, Would any one, but a man thus circumſtanced, have diſcovered this profound doctrine in the ſtory of the birth of Venus, or in the mythological fable of Cronus, Rhea, and Jupiter?

I will not dwell upon the inconſiſtencies, that frequently occur in the explanations, which are given by the advocates for the Platonic Trinity. They are obliged by their ſyſtem to make the mythological Ζευς ſometimes the firſt, ſometimes the ſecond, and ſometimes the third hypoſtaſis. And in their interpretations of Plato, they ſometimes make δημιυργος the firſt, νες the ſecond, and ψυχη the third hypoſtaſis: at other times they make δημιυργος, at other times ιδεα η παραδειγμα, at other times ψυχη the ſecond hypoſtaſis.

II. The ſecond inference, which I would make from the preceding inveſtigation is, that it is extremely dangerous to affect to be wiſe in holy things, above what is written in the word of God. It is to this diſpoſition, I conceive, that we are to attribute, in a great meaſure, the preſent miſerable condition of the Jewiſh nation. They would not be ſatisfied with that degree of information, which Jehovah condeſcended to give them,

of

of the order of his diſpenſations, and of the nature of that being, who was to come from God as their Saviour and their King. They raſhly ſpeculated upon things, that were not revealed; and they framed to themſelves a ſyſtem of belief, widely different from the truth. Hence, when in the fulneſs of time God ſent his ſon into the world, the world knew him not: when he came unto his own, his own received him not.

The ſame ſpirit of curioſity and deſire of prying into heavenly things have, though in a different manner, produced very pernicious conſequences in the Church of Chriſt.

The writings of Philo Judæus furniſhed the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church with the fatal means of deceiving themſelves and others. The figurative language, in which that author delivered himſelf concerning the Logos, whenever he meant by it either the divine intellect, it's internal operation, the ideal object of it's contemplation, or the external expreſſion of it, led them to imagine, that he attributed to it a real and eſſential perſonality. From the epithets, affixed to this ſuppoſed perſon, they naturally conceived, that he could be no other than our Lord and Saviour, Jeſus Chriſt. To make this plauſible they maintained, that what was expreſſed by the word Logos, was not in God, as it was in man, a mere power, or operation, or notion, or word; but was a real and living

ſubſtance, poſſeſſed of a perſonality diſtinct from the great principle of exiſtence, to which it belonged. This received countenance from the doctrines of Plato, that ideas were moſt properly the real entities.

Hence was deviſed the metaphyſical argument for the eternity of the ſecond perſon of the Trinity, which was built upon this plain and incontrovertible maxim, that God the father could never have been deſtitute of reaſon. Hence the ſecond perſon is called by Athanaſius ſubſtantial Logos and ſubſtantial Wiſdom. Hence aroſe the conceit, that he flowed neceſſarily from the divine intellect exerted on itſelf. Hence Origen ſtyles him, The living and, as it were, animated ſubſtance of various theorems, containing the reaſons of all things.

It unfortunately happened, that many ſignal hereſies were produced by men's accepting a falſe hypotheſis and an erroneous explanation, and turning them againſt the doctrine, for the illuſtration of which they were deviſed.—The Gnoſtics, preſuming that every production of the divine intellect was neceſſarily a ſubſtance, imagined an almoſt infinite number of ſuch productions, and attempted to explain by them the origin of thoſe ſeveral orders of Æons, which conſtituted ſo ſtriking a part of the eaſtern philoſophy.

Praxeas

Praxeas and Sabellius admitted, that Chriſt was the intellect and wiſdom of God the father, and thence concluded, that he was one with him, as well in perſonality as in eſſence; thus attempting to ſubvert a doctrine by means of an hypotheſis, which was founded, if it had any foundation at all, upon the ſuppoſed truth of that doctrine, and which was advanced, not to prove, but to explain it.

Arius ſeems to have felt the force of the reaſoning of Praxeas and Sabellius; but he was too well verſed in the Scriptures not to ſee, that a diſtinct perſonality is in them attributed to Chriſt. He therefore perceived the neceſſity of projecting a new mode of defence; but, like many others, who had gone before him, he embraced hypothetical explanations, to the injury of the truth, which was to be explained. He acknowledged with Praxeas and Sabellius, that the real intellect or wiſdom of God was no other than God himſelf. He admitted with Tertullian, that the immediate production of the divine intellect was neceſſarily a living ſubſtance. Hence he maintained, that Chriſt was, what Philo called the intelligible world; or, as Origen ſtyled him, the living and animated ſubſtance of various theorems, containing the reaſons of all things; denominated Logos, and Son, and Wiſdom, though not the real wiſdom of God, yet formed in it; not exiſting from all eternity, but created on our account,

count, that God by means of him might create us *.

Thus it appears, that, though Chriſtians did not, as has been maintained by ſome, derive the great and characteriſtic doctrines of their holy profeſſion from the impure ſource of Pagan philoſophy; they did, at a very early period indeed, adopt principles and modes of interpretation, which but ill accorded with the ſimplicity of the Goſpel. They preſumed to intrude with unhallowed ſtep into the ſanctuary of the moſt High, and to attempt with ſacrilegious hands to tear off the veil from thoſe auguſt myſteries, which God himſelf had concealed from human ſight. The event was ſuch, as might naturally have been expected. Profeſſing themſelves to be wiſe, they became fools; and God gave many of them up unto a reprobate mind. All the ex-

* So ſtrongly was this hypotheſis rooted in the minds of men, that it was not even yet abandoned; and Arius has been combated on his own ground. It has been admitted, that Chriſt was the intelligible world, containing the ideas of all things. Yet ſtill his proper eternity has been maintained upon metaphyſical principles. The divine intellect is from it's own nature ever active. Before all external creation it was employed from eternity in an internal contemplation of the ideal pattern of the things, which were in due time to be created. The reader may ſee this argument very ingeniouſly drawn out and enforced by Norris, in his Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World; who, in the true ſpirit of his ſyſtem, maintains, that all things were made not *by* Chriſt, but *according to* Chriſt, that is, according to thoſe ideas or patterns, which compoſe his eſſence.

travagances

travagances and impurities of the ſeveral orders of Gnoſtics, all the impiety of Praxeas and Sabellius, the hereſy of Arius, and the bloody contentions, which rent in ſunder the Eaſtern Church, and paved the way for the reception of the impoſtures of Mahomet, are to be referred to this ſource. Hence alſo have ariſen many of thoſe diſputes and bitter reproaches, which in latter days have diſgraced the Chriſtian name, and injured the cauſe of genuine piety. Hence was derived the moſt opprobrious of all imputations, that the ſublime doctrine of the Trinity, the diſtinguiſhing feature of Chriſtianity in every age, was drawn from the dregs of Pagan philoſophy. This ſhould ſerve as a warning to men, if any thing can, to confine themſelves in their reſearches within the bounds, that have been preſcribed to them by divine wiſdom, and to ſatisfy themſelves with ſuch communications, as God has thought proper to make, of his nature and diſpenſations.

If they would act wiſely; they ſhould exert their faculties, firſt, in proving the authenticity of revelation; ſecondly, in aſcertaining the genuine ſenſe of it. For they may be well aſſured, that, if God has made to men any revelation of his nature and diſpenſations; he has revealed as much, as is proper for them to know, in their preſent circumſtances. Nay, if they attempt to proceed a ſtep farther, than their heavenly guide has condeſcended to con-

duct them; they will not only be diſappointed in their expectation of making any real progreſs, but will even be led out of the way, and removed much farther from the object of their vain purſuit, than if they had ſtopped at the point, where divine Providence had ſet them their bounds, that they ſhould not paſs.

Of this every one is ſenſible, with reſpect to preceding diſpenſations. We are all ready to acknowledge, that the intimation, with which God favoured Adam, reſpecting the ſeed of the woman, was adapted with wonderful wiſdom and mercy to his particular ſituation: that it conveyed the preciſe degree of information, which the otherwiſe deſperate ſtate of the affairs of our firſt parent required: but that it was not ſufficient to enable him to trace out that amazing ſcheme of Providence, which the divine Being afterwards vouchſafed in the fulneſs of time gradually to diſcloſe to the ſons of men.—The ſame obſervation will apply to every period of the Patriarchal and Jewiſh diſpenſations; till God ſent his Son into the world in the likeneſs of ſinful fleſh, when perhaps as much of the myſtery of godlineſs was revealed, as is requiſite to be known by man in this our ſtate of pilgrimage.

As ſo extraordinary an atonement was made for the tranſgreſſion of our firſt parents and the depravity of their poſterity; the diſplay of that ſtupendous proceeding ſeems well calculated to produce in men a ſtrong ſenſe of the

the heinous nature of ſin, and a dread and abhorrence of its pollutions. It is the language of religion, that we are to conſider this world as a ſtate of diſcipline, preparatory to a future life of ſuperior excellence and enjoyment; and we have every reaſon to believe, from the repreſentations of the Holy Scriptures, that Chriſt will reign at the head of his ſaints in his kingdom of glory. In this view it is eaſy to perceive, how expedient it was, that we, who are hereafter to be his ſubjects, ſhould, in this our ſtate of diſcipline, have ſome intimation of the dignity of our Lord and Maſter. But it does not thence follow, that it is either expedient or conſiſtent with the limited nature of our faculties, that the myſteries of the divine nature ſhould be completely unfolded to us; or that we, who cannot fully comprehend the internal conſtitution of the moſt common object, which is expoſed to our ſenſes, ſhould be encouraged to pry into the deep receſſes of that Being, whoſe goings forth have been of old from everlaſting. Error, and many times impiety, muſt be the conſequence of ſo raſh and overweening a conceit of our own abilities. It becomes us rather, and will be found in the end to be moſt conſiſtent with our true intereſt, to be ſatisfied with that portion of light, which God himſelf has imparted to us in his holy word; and not to flatter ourſelves, that we ſhall be able to encreaſe it by a pretended

philoſophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Chriſt—Hæc fere dicere habui de Naturâ Deorum, non ut eam tollerem, ſed ut intelligeretis, quam eſſet obſcura, & quam difficiles explicatus haberet.

Cic. de Nat. Deor. III. 39.

In a former * treatiſe I undertook to demonſtrate, that true philoſophy has no tendency to undermine divine revelation, and that a well-grounded philoſopher may be a true chriſtian: that the legitimate object of philoſophy, as well as of revelation, is truth: that the purſuit of this object, by a careful attention to and inveſtigation of the appearances and operations of nature, has a direct tendency to enliven and invigorate the intellectual powers: and that the poſſeſſion of it enlarges the capacity of the mind, and prepares it for the reception and right apprehenſion of the doctrines of Chriſtianity.—In this I have endeavoured to point out ſome ſtrikingly pernicious effects, which have ariſen from the raſh attempt of men to explain the moſt profound myſteries of the nature and eſſence of God by the vain and groundleſs conceits of ſpeculative ſophiſts; inſtead of confining themſelves to an inveſtigation of the moral character of the Deity by the united

* The diſſertation, to which the honorary prize was adjudged by Teyler's Theological Society at Haarlem, in April 1785.

aid

aid of reaſon and revelation, and of the duties, which reſult from the ſeveral relations, that he bears to them, of Creator, Preſerver, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Judge.

I find, that in thus aſſerting and illuſtrating the uſe and abuſe of reaſon, when applied to religion, I have conformed, without being aware of it at the time, to the opinion of a man, whoſe comprehenſive and penetrating mind has contributed not a little towards advancing true philoſophy to that exalted ſtate of dignity, which it at preſent ſo juſtly poſſeſſes. I will produce this teſtimony as the concluſion of the whole.

" By the contemplation of nature to induce " and enforce the acknowledgment of God, " and to demonſtrate his power, providence, " and goodneſs, is an excellent argument, " and hath been excellently handled by divers. " But on the other ſide, out of the contem- " plation of nature, or ground of human " knowledges, to induce any verity or per- " ſuaſion concerning the points of faith, is " in my judgment not ſafe: Da fidei, quæ " fidei ſunt. For the heathen themſelves " conclude as much in that excellent and di- " vine fable of the golden chain: *That Gods* " *and men were not able to draw Jupiter down* " *to the earth; but, contrariwiſe, Jupiter was* " *able to draw them up to heaven.*

" So as we ought not to attempt to draw " down, or ſubmit the myſteries of God to " our

" our reaſon; but, contrariwiſe, to raiſe and
" advance our reaſon to the divine truth.
" So as in this part of knowledge, touching
" divine philoſophy, I am ſo far from noting
" any deficience, as I rather note an exceſs:
" whereunto I have digreſſed, becauſe of the
" extreme prejudice, which both religion and
" philoſophy have received, and may receive,
" by being commixed together; as that which
" undoubtedly will make an heretical religion,
" and an imaginary and fabulous philoſophy."

Bacon of the Advancement of Learning.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Introduction, Page 1.	Line 4. from bottom	*insert a* comma *after* "principles."
2.	4.	*insert a* comma *after* "exiſtence."
4.	18.	*insert a* comma *after* "animals."
	2. from bottom	*insert a* comma *after* "true."
Inveſtigation, &c. 2.	19.	*place a* ſemicolon *after* "wiſe."
Note	6.	*read* το μεγιστον.
	8.	*read* ὑποτιθεσθαι.
	10.	*for* κ᾽ δυω *read* και τα δυο.
	13.	*after* γιγνεσθαι *place* ;
3.	1.	*place a* comma *after* "virtue."
Note	5.	*read* περιφορας.
	10.	*expunge* "Par."
	11.	*add* Ed. Par. 1640.
5.	2.	*for* "of" *read* "and."
	19.	*place a* comma *after* "reaſon."
6. Note	5.	*after* "regi ?" *inſert* ——.
8. Note	2.	*read* ῥυθμος.
	3.	*read* ερῤωμενεϛατα, *and after* φερονται *inſert* την.
	4.	*after* τραφεις *inſert* ——.
	6.	*for* γενοιλο *read* γιγνοιλο.
	7.	*read* ἁρμονια.
10.	3.	*place a* comma *after* "paſſages."
11.	8.	*for* "them" *read* "him."
	12.	*place a* comma *after* "principles."
14.	5.	*place a* comma *after* "point."
	7.	*place a* period *after* "dialogue."
	20.	*for* "generally" *read* "general."
Note	2.	*for* τη *read* τω.
	5. and 6.	*read* μεταλαμβανοι.
21. Note	4. from bottom	*for* ωολλα *read* πολλα
22.	7.	*for* "conſtitute" *read* "conſtitutes."
28. Note	5. from bottom	*read* ἡγεισθαι.
41.	15.	*inſert a* comma *after* "thoſe."
63.	24.	*read* ὑροντα.
66.	5.	*inſert a* ſemicolon *after* "Plato."
70.	3.	*place a* comma *after* "muſic."
71. Note	2. from bottom	*for* ψαυτα *read* ταυτα.
72. Note	2. from bottom	*read* ὑφεϛηκεν.
96.	2. from bottom	*expunge* comma *after*
97.		"latter." *The reference at* "writings" —Εξ ὲ (Φιλωνος) κ. τ. λ. *ſhould be at* "Photius," page 96.
101. Note	5.	*for* πωρφηταϛ *read* πρωφηταϛ.
111. Note	4. from bottom	*for* γνωνμα *read* γεννημα.
116.	3.	*expunge* comma *after* "God."
119.	14.	*expunge* "that."
127.	5. from bottom	*for* "become" *read* "became."
140. Note	13.	*place a* comma *after* ὁμω *expunge* "period" *after* νως—*thus* το ἐν ὁμω, νως και ον.
Note	19.	*for* ὑπερ πληρες *read* ὑπερπληρες.

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